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ABSTRACT 
In the 1950s, Louis Hartz drew attention to the curiously 
paradoxical nature of antebellum Southern political thought by 
coining the descriptive phrasep the "Reactionary Enlightenment". 
The essence of the paradox lay in the apparent impossibility of 
combining a coherent defence of human slavery with the prevailing 
ethos of liberal political theoryp represented most succinctly by 
the political values of John Locke, which Americans had been 
importing throughout the course of the eighteenth century, and to 
which they had become ideologically attached during the Revolution- 
ary period. The Southp arguably the most liberal region of the 
nation in the 1780s and 1790s, became increasingly intolerant and 
authoritarian in response to repeated abolitionist attacks from 
the 18308 onwardsp though the pervasiveness of their former liberal 
convictions proved to be a straitjacket on their mental processes, 
preventing Southern thinkers, like Calhoun, from transcending the 
liberal thought patterns they had inherited and from-fabricating a 
convincing and meaningful defence of slavery. 
The following study is an attempt to evaluate the usefulness of 
the "Reactionary Enlightenment" concept as a categorical paradigm 
of Calhoun's Disquisition on Government. In Part One, we shall be 
concerned with preliminary methodological questions (-c-hapter, one), 
and'external details concerning. the. composition., of the text., includ- 
ing Calhoun's intended audience (Chapter Two). Part Two is entirely 
devoted to the task of clarifying the possible senses in which the 
Disquisition may be said to belong to the "Reactionary Enlighten- 
ment". The procedure followed is to identify the basic features of 
the Enlightenment style, and to distinguish those components of 
the Disquisition which conform most nearly to them. Thus, we shall 
be examining Calhoun's philosophical method, his religious attit- 
udesy his concept of human nature and his idea of progress. In the 
penultimate chapter we shall examine the most original of Calhoun's 
contributions to political theoryt the idea of the concurrent 
majority. The central argument of the study is that while Calhoun 
attempts to defend values which may be termed reactionary, he does 
so by utilising the apparatus of liberal discourse, and this 
ace-ounts for much of the appearance of inconsistency in his 
political theory. 
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For if truth be at all within 
the reach of human capacity, Itis 
certain it must lie very deep and 
abstruse; and to hope we shall 
arrive at it without pains, while 
the greatest geniuses have failed 
with the utmost pains, must certainly 
be esteemed sufficiently vain and 
presumptuous. I pretend to no such 
advantage in the philosophy I am 
going to unfold, and would, esteem 
it a strong presumption against it, 
were it so very easy and obvious. 
David Hume 
A Treatise of Human Nature 
PART ONE 
POLITICAL THEORY AND THE POLITICAL TEXTS OF CALHOUN 
Chapter One: The Study of Political Texts 
In an influential article published in 1954, Andrew 
Hacker addressed himself to the question of how political 
theory ought to be studied, and in particular how scholars 
ought to approach what he termed the "Great Books". Hacker 
maintained that from the perspective of the political sci- 
entistt whose primary concern is with contemporary political 
forms and structuresp the texts of political theory ought to 
be treated as "timeless". that is containing principles of 
universal applicationt irrespective of the temporal or cult- 
ural context that gave rise to them. Hacker derived this 
approach from his basic assumption that the function of 
political theory is two-fold: to provide an explanation of 
actual behaviour (causal theory) and to lay down principles 
of how people ought to behave (ethical theory). The preemin- 
ent function of the political theorist, in Hacker's formulat- 
ion, is to make causal and ethical generalisations about 
political behaviour which hold true for all periods of 
historyý including the present. 
1 
Hacker's article served to rekindle the flagging debate 
between the two orthodox, though conflicting schools of 
thought in the study of political theory. Hacker's strenuous 
arg=ent in favour of regarding the texts as autonomous is 
countered by the argument that the meaning of a particular 
text can only be properly understood by taking account of 
the peculiar cultural factors which obtained at the time of 
1 
writing. The-unstated assumption oflthe contextualist , 
approach is, that ideas, do not arise in, a, 'yacuumt but are__ 
particularýresponses to concrete and specific-conditions; 
without those-, conditions the text would, not have-been 
writtenp, nor-would it-have., needed to, have-been written. -- 
The contextualists, then, assume that, -. there, exists an, intim- 
ate and. -. causal-, connection, between a, particularý, political - 
text, and--the, -perceived-ýsocial-environment which,,, properly., -, 
speaking, gave rise to-it. 
The, 4essential-difference between textual criticism and... 
the, history, of ideas, isq-therefore, one-of approach and, emph-..,, 
asis. Both, ýfrom, their respective vantage points, seek to 
answer. different-types of. -questions-about, the, ýsame, subject-_ 
matter. Yet any,, cross-fertilisation is effectively prevented 
because the assumptions underlying either approach are: logic- 
ally incompatible with-each-other. John-, Plamenatz has-attempt--, 
ed to argue-, that although-l'theories-are-products-of, their age 
... 
[they]are alsoýagelesS. 11 
2, But clearly, if one takes the 
position, that-social and-political-theories are tied, to the 
context-in which they were, written, a full and complete under- 
standing of-their-meaning, requires a-knowledge other than the 
textsý-themselves; their-agelessness, then, does not spring - 
simply from the texts but from the complex interaction. of- 
cultural---assumptions whichýoperated on the-. mind, of, the-author. 
When students-of contemporary, politics,,, scan the texts of a 
past age-in. search of-solutions to-modern problemsp, they miss 
the point of the enterprise., Any solutionst-even if they, were 
appropriate inýtheir,. own timel-were applicable precisely, 
2 
because the confluence of religious, social, political and 
economic factors to which they were addressed, still obtain- 
ed and gave them particular meaning. It is often a more 
f 
fruitful way of approaching political texts to regard them 
as identifying certain recurring problem-areas what Sheldon 
Wolin has called "a continuity of preoccupations"3 - rather 
than the particular solutions they offer. The protection of 
4 
minorities, some scholars would argue, was the main concern 
which prompted the writing of Calhoun's Disquisition on Govern- 
ment, and continues to be a concern today for those who share 
liberal-democratic assumptions. Yet, while Calhoun's identific- 
ation of the generic problem persists, few would propose adopt- 
ing a twentieth-century version of the concurrent majority as 
a means of protection for ethnic, regional and occupational 
minorities. 
5 The mechanics of Calhoun's solution suited (even 
if t hey did that) the particular circumstances of mid-nineteenth 
America, but are hardly considered applicable today. 
But if there serious dangers involved in adopting a purely 
textual approach, there are equal objections to the most extreme 
claims of the contextualist school. The central danger lies in 
the mistaken supposition that an adequate historical understand- 
ing of the social context can effectively explain (or explain 
away) the meaning of a particular text. It presupposes, in 
other words, that a coincidence of cultural factors has caused 
the text to be written and once one has uncovered the relevant 
social and political factors involved one has effectively 
explained the existence of the text. It is1this. 
1mode 
of think- 
ing which has led some historians of ideas to speak of the 
3 
"real" or "true" meaning of a particular text with little or 
"h 
no reference to what it actually said. 
6 
Quentin Skinner has admirably pointed out that there is 
a very real sense in which an understanding of the causes of 
an action or an utterance is not "equivalent to an understand- 
ing of the action itself. " Skinner maintains that even though 
an understanding of an action presupposes a grasp of "anteced- 
,= 
ent causal conditionsIlp it also presupposes that the student 
grasps the "point of the action for the agent who performed 
it. " Skinner thus makes the distinction between understanding 
the circumstances which give rise to a text and the author's 
purpose in writing it. The difference is characterised most 
succinctly by Skinner as the intention to write the text and 
the intention in writing the text. While study of the social 
context is sufficient for explaining what forces operated on 
-1 
the author to persuade him to write the text, such a method 
is inappropriate for telling us precisely what the author 
wished to convey to his intended audience. 
7 The extreme vers- 
ion of contextual methodology can lead to a muddled kind of 
determinism where the'text is either disregarded entirely or, 
, worse, made to conform by means of agonising intellectual 
contortions to supposed historical reality. Thus, the "real" 
intention "behind" Calhoun's Disquisition is to provide an 
elaborate defence of slavery, irrespective of what Calhoun 
had actually written in the text. Commentators who engage in 
this kind of activity are no longer concerned with tracing 
the history of ideas but in creating intellectual my 
I 
thologies. 
It follows from what has been said that neither of the 
4 
two orthodox approaches to the study of political theory is 
entirely free from conceptual error. Although scholars have 
rarely pushed such methodological autonomy to its extreme 
limits, much of their research suffers from an imprecise and 
haphazard conceptual base which tends to denigrate the often 
valuable information it contains. Part of the difficulty lies 
in the fact that the history of ideas, as Philip Wiener has 
shown, is not a pure or original discipline "but a composite 
or derivative one because it is dependent on other disciplines 
whose borders it penetrates. " But given the genuine desire to 
understand, this is not an insuperable difficulty. It is 
unfortunate that what appears to be academic entrenchment 
often prevents an effective division of labour which might 
. . 11ý --",. I"Iý r"r, -,. I benefit both approaches and serve to clarify the ambivalent 
identity of the discipline. John Dunn has argued that too 
much valuable energy has been wasted in disagreements about 
the 
- 
appropriate methods of studying political theory and he 
has pleaded that the division between historians and philos- 
ophers be healed 
-so 
that both types of explanation can contrib- 
ute to an overall understanding; "the completion of both types 
of investigation", he maintains, "is a necessary preliminary 
to the construction of an indefeasible explanation of either 
ýý .ý., ,ý ý- 
type. 119 Neverthelessp historians of ideas 
I 
and textual exeget 
- 
es 
continue to confine themselves within self-imposed boundaries 
and attempt to ignore each other's existence. As a result, 
the research they engage in produces only a partial understand- 
ing of the subject-matter they study. 
Evidence of this general malady may be discerned in the 
. ý'Dt. 
ý- . -ý . .. °ýt 
5 
L 
existing studies of Calhoun's political theory. Two book- 
lengthýanalyses of his political ideas exist: August O. Spain's 
The Political Theory of John C.. Calhoun and Richard Currentfs 
John C., Calhoun. Although both adopt broadly the same approach, 
there are variations whichýbear individual examination. 
10 
Spain's book, researched during the 1930's, but not 
published until 1951, sought to offer "a comprehensive-expos- 
ition" of Calhoun's political theory and. to'correct-Ilerrors 
of analysis and interpretation" which earlier studies had 
embodied. Spain made a particular effort to identify theý 
historical origins of Calhoun's ideas, both within the main- 
stream'of western political thought and in the historical- 
events of his lifetime. One of Spain's main contentions was 
that although Calhoun's theory "arose in part out of ration- 
alization for the political defense of Southern civilization"i 
he also sought "to base his political doctrines upon concepts 
of universal andýenduring validity. 1l'As*if to prove the point,, 
Spain attempted to "point out some possible significance-iný 
Calhoun's thought, for, present day political problems, 1111 
As an exposition of Calhoun's thought, Spain's work-is 
comprehensivep but this is more than offset by its lack of 
critical analysis. Spain, made little attempt to'examine Cal- 
houn's theory on theoretical grounds-and to investigate the 
logical iMplications ofthe ideas he describes. His failure 
to do so is especially baffling in the light of his attempt 
to adapt the theory of the concurrent majority to the rural- 
urbanproblem of America. -We 
have already noted that by-and 
large this kind of exercise - seeking solutions to current 
hbý 
problems in the texts of a past age is sterileV' but Sp6Lin 
compounds the error by failing even to examine it for coher- 
ence. For a theory to be accepted as worthy of consideration, 
let alone implementation, it is reasonable to assume that its 
coherence ought to be established by means of logical analysis. 
If it can be shown that the conclusions do not follow from the 
premises, then the theory is said to be logically faulty. The 
purpose of the commentator who is interested in adapting theor- 
etical solutions of the past to modern problems even if this 
were a legitimate exercise - must surely include a rigorous 
testing of their logical consistency. If they are inconsistent, 
then they must either be discarded or, at very least, recon- 
structed. Spain's omission in this regard mars what otherwise 
is a sound exposition. 
One of Spain's main concerns was to attempt to relate the 
elements of Calhoun's thought to the ideas of other political 
theorists. This aspect of the worko arguably the most ambitious 
and useful, is also the one which contains major deficiencies 
of method. In attempting to relate Calhoun's ideas to the broad 
7 
categories of western thoughtt Spain apparently accepts that 
similarity of content and language indicates direct intellect- 
ual influence. In the course of two pages, Spain claims that 
"Calhoun drew from Aristotle the idea of natural inequality of 
individual men, added the idea of race inequalityp and combined 
these with the German concept of progress through exploitat- 
12 ion. " Nowv these claims might conceivably be true, but Spain 
nowhere develops fully the connections. We know from his corr- 
espondence that Calhoun had a high regard for some of Aristot- 
7 
le's ideas, but-we cannot-say with certainty which ideas, Af 
any, -he"derived-directly from Aristotle. ---Calhoun's failure to 
specify, his sources makes it difficult to*know-whichp even, 
of Aristotle's-works he read. Similarly,, while CalhounIsAdea 
of progress bears a striking resemblance to, ýcertain-German- 
ideasýonIhe subject'. there'l-is"no,, conclusive evidence-, to 
suggest,, as-Spain apparently doest that any direct influence 
e, ists. 
l3_It. 
-i- xs well-recogiiised that the concept,, 'of*. influence, 
whilst it has-proved'-an, attractiVe and-usefulr-ýdevice in tracing 
the morphology-, of'ideasv, -is itself open to grave theoretical 
objections:, when-Used loosely., The central-ýdifficulty'lies-in-- 
the*way in--which ideas are-transmitted. Karl Mannheim has,. -, -; -, 
suggested that all. thinking takes place within an"inherited-, 
tradition and'that when a-, particular writer brings his"-mind 
to bear, on specific problems-he, participates-, in the process- 
of thinking. The-implication-of'Mannheim's'suggestion isithat, - 
the-lineage, of ideas does---not", come-down, -in direct, descent from 
one author, to another, -butT*by-'a-much-more'ý-subtle-, process. Ideast 
once they"are given birthp"ar6 filtered-down into'ýhe society 
that receives"them, and over', a4'process of17-time they become-a 
part'--, of, -the'value-system of that society. -Thereýis, -then, a-- 
very positive connection'-between ideas and social reality; an 
idea is onlyýnourished-and nurtured if it,,, expresses the aspir- 
ations of society,, andý. -when'it fails to do thisit, becomes 
replaced by other ideas"',,. I-Sidney-Pollard-has eloquently reaff- 
irmed, -thb, point: ideas, he-writesq "arise-in the minds of men 
who have experiences and-social,, roles,, and not only must they 
accord with those-experiences'and-social roles, _or they will 
8 
be rejectedo but they will arise largely because of them.... 
ideas that do. not accord with. realityt as seen by contempor- 
ariep, will remain sterile and without influence.,. 
14 
It, follows fromthis that if. the origins of ideas. are to 
be fully grasped it is necessary to., have some understanding 
of-the intellectual milieu which gives them expression and 
force. But to say all this does not preclude the possibility 
that a particular political theorist, operating within a, part- 
icular intellectual climatep might indeed-have been influenced 
directly by a writer of an earlier period. What does need to 
be shown, when this, is argued, is that there is a demonstrable 
causal connection between the two writers; similarity of-content 
or expression is insufficient. evidence because "The discovery', 
that philosophers have used the same words, the same phrases, 
the same expression of. ideals as are found in a political doc- 
ument is not-a sound basis for the argument, even when an inf- 
luence is probable, that-the meanings are the same.,, 
15 Quentin 
Skinner has proposed a rigorous formula which satisfies the 
most, stringent, requirements of evidence. For the claim that one 
writer was influenced by another to be valid, three rules must 
be observed: in the. first placet there must be a genuine simil- 
. arity between the ideas of the writers concerned. Second, it, 
must be demonstrated that the writer who was supposedly influ- 
enced. could not. have found the ideas in any, other writing. 
Finally.,, the "probability of the similarity being random should 
be very low. ",, Skinner's rules, constitute the minimum requirement, 
for the establishing of influence, - 
16 
Skinner's procedure, whilst making it infinitely more 
9 
more difficult to establish direct influence, does avoid all 
the objections of the impressionistic approach which Spain's, 
study seems to embody. Similarity of ideas, taken on its own, 
cannot stand as evidence of influence unless it is supplement- 
ed by subsidiary rulesp but to be fair to Spain, he is not the 
only scholar to have committed this error: Charles M. Wiltse, 
author of the most painstakingly thorough biography of Calhoun, 
maintains that "Like the authors of the Federalist, Calhoun 
drew freely from Hobbes and Harrington and Locke. 060,17 Wiltse, 
like Spain, relies on the similarity of ideas as evidence of 
influence and the same criticism applies to his claim. In fact, 
it is more likely that influencep if it exists in a direct form, 
would mainfest itself in a negative sense. It is more plausible 
that one writer should. react against what has been said by an 
earlier writer rather than to reaffirm the same point. It may 
be argued with some force that many of Calhoun's ideas in the 
Disquisition were influencedt'in a negative sense, by ttie earl- 
ier ideas of Locke; this is particularly true of the self- 
conscious, way in which Calhoun dismisses the concept of-a state 
18 
of nature. 
Despite the drawbacks of Spain's,. work,, it remains the best 
introduction to Calhoun's political theory. Richard,, N. Current's 
volumeq on. the, other, hand, is less scholarly,, than Spain's and 
tends., more, inýthe direction, of an interpretive. essay. One, impor- 
tant, advantage it has, however, over Spain's work is that it 
attempted. to., evaluate the, significance-and influence of Calhounts 
theory. This, aspect, largely ignored by Spain, is, surely an 
essential focus, of interest for the historian of ideas. Current's 
10 
treatment of this area, however, is less satisfactory than 
other parts of the book. In the third part of the book, which 
he explicitly entitles "Significance and Influence", he manages 
to condense a potpourri of only tenuously related information, 
including an attack on Calhoun's use of logic (8 pages), an 
attempt to contrast'Webster the Conservative with Calhoun the 
Reactionary (9 pages), a portrayal of Calhoun as a catalyst, 
converting Jeffersonian liberalism into Southern Reaction (10 
pages), a description of the "Neo-Calhounism of the Twentieth 
Century" (12 pages) and finally, an attempt to characterise 
Calhoun's continuing relevance in terms of "defending, against 
external attack, institutions based upon a belief'in human - 
inequality-" (5 pages). 
19 What would have been of far greater 
value to the historian of ideas is an'assessment of what Calhoun's 
theory meant for the people who read it. Admittedly, Current 
does cite documentary evidence in this regard, but it is sparse 
and unconvincing. Current does make the revealing comment: 
"With the coming of the crisis of 1860-61, however, Calhoun 
reemerged-as a leading prophet (second only to Jefferson and 
Davis-) of the disaffected Southerners. , 
20 If Calhoun's theory 
only "reemerges" in 1860, this suggests tha It duri I ng the 1850's 
very little attention'was paid to-it which, considering the 
'dynamics of the sectional crisis, seefiis surprising. Current 
offers no explanation of why Calhoun's political theory should 
have been held in abeyance during this period. 
The most striking conclusion of Current's'research is the 
importance he attaches to the concept of clabs'struggle"in' 
Calhoun's thought. Current argued that Calhoun's notion of 
11 
conflicting geographical interests, could-lbe applied to less 
well-defined-social groupings, and maintained that Calhoun 
himself'had applied it-in such a wayýto capital and labour 
in his political'speeches. 
21 Calhoun-was thus, said to have., - 
"anticipated" many of the elements of(the Marxist critique-, 
of capitalist society, -, though arriving at startlingly oppos- 
ite conclusions. 
22 
readily apparent that Calhoun's-political, writings- 
and, speeches may-be. construed in such awayj, -but-it-is. of, fund- 
amental importance to-discover whether Calhoun intended that 
such a construction should have been placed upon them. Since 
this raises-the crucial question', of how-the political writings 
of a past, age are to be properly understood, it is worthwhile- 
considering, this aspect in some detail-, and focusing on what - 
are the gravest conceptual faults of both Spain and-Current's- 
work. Iý _'I 
-ý A-man is-considered, a-political theorist primarily, because 
of the existence of a-text he--has written. That'isp-, he, has made 
some-attempt, to-set down his thoughts in-some-zystematic-fashion 
and those thoughts are', recoverable-toýýus. -This-seems so, obviously 
true as, to be hardly, worth mentioning;. if-the-, political texts 
of, ý say, Hobbes or Lockeýhad, not been writtenýor_if they had 
been lost, there would simplybe no way-of, -knowing that they 
werej-orýhad beenj political-theorists. 
23-.: This, --of course,, -does 
not mean, to say that they, were-not other things too. -Peter 
Laslett has-rightly describedLocke as "a directive political 
influence-in his-, own right-and something-of a public personal- 
ity.,, 24 Locke's association-with the, Earl of Shaftesbury and 
12 
Lord Somers gave him some influence in the shaping of. public 
policy, but it is quite clear that Locke's reputation today 
is as that of a philosopher and political theorist, and that 
that reputation is based almost exclusively, onthe existence 
25 
of his texts. 
, 
The authorship of a text, then, is the first 
qualification of a political theorist. 
Calhoun may be considered a political theorist for 
precisely thislreason., His, two texts,, A Disquisition on Govern- 
ment and A Discourse on the Constitution and Government of the 
United States., written during the last years of. his, life but, 
not published until 1851t constitute an-attempt, to, put into 
systematic form his political, ideas. But-theýcentral difficulty 
in evaluating Calhoun's political theory lies in the fact that 
his status as a theorist is all but eclipsed by his stature as 
a politician of some eminence. Ralph Lerner, has. -rightly-main- 
tained that scholars have "all failed to solve the peculiar 
problem of how to study and interpret the writing of a man of,. 
26 
theory-and-practice. 11, The usual procedure, adopted by both 
Spain and-Currentp takes the form-, of examining Calhoun's texts 
in conjunction with his personal correspondencet, political 
speeches and reports. 
27 The conceptual implications of. this 
approach are serious: Spainp andespecially Currentl assumed 
that to fully recover and understand Calhoun's theoryl. it was 
necessary to scour all the available documentary sources, and 
to reconstruct the scattered remarks that Calhoun had made 
during the course of his career into systematic doctrines. 
This is an improper procedure for a number of reasons. 
In the first place, this procedure does not take into 
13 
n 
account the fact that Calhoun's letters and speeches were 
written over a period of 
I 
forty years in which timehis ideas, 
like the ideas of other men, changed and developed. By a skil- 
fulprocess of exegesis it is possible to collect all that he 
11 
wrote on a given subject and to present it as a unified and 
monolithic structure; but this, of course, would be a pure 
ý! 
distortion in the sense that. the author, in writing his letters 
and in making his speechesp. was acting with a specific intent- 
ion each time he wrote and spoke. By collecting the scattered 
remarks made in letters and speeches, a writer cannot necess- 
arily be made to accept that what he had written or said at 
various times is, a faithful representation of his ideas. Cal- 
houn in 1850P confronted with his admission in 1816 that the 
slave trade was an "odious traffic" and that slavery was at 
, ý> ý,, ý 
best a, necessary evil, could not say that this was a true 
28 description of. his, views in 1850. Letters and speeches prop- 
_: 
erly treated can only indicate what'an individual was thinking 
29 
at a particular moment in time. 
The second, and equally compelling objection to this 
kind of method is that it enables the commentator to bring 
his own preconceptions to bear on the scattered remarks. With 
the benefit of historical perspective, it is possible to appro- 
ach the writings of the past in such a way as to expect certain 
doctrines to have been elaborated by a writerp and when these 
fail to appear in the text to search personal correspondence 
for hints of them in order to impose some kind of intellectual 
coherence on them. It may well be that the nature of the exer- 
cise compels us to seek connections between the thoughts of 
14 
past thinkers and ourselvesq forg as Quentin Skinner has 
written, "We must classify in order to understandq and we 
can. only classify the unfamiliar in terms of the familiar.,, 
30 
The dangercomes when we are'tempted to make the unfamiliar 
conform to the familiar at any. price. Current appears to have 
done precisely this by finding in Calhoun's writings references 
to the class struggle. Although he is not wrong. to point out 
the similarity., of ideasp-he does, give the err. oneous, impression 
that somehow Calhoun. was deliberatýely contributing to thought 
on this subject which, since the idea did not exist in its 
Marxian sense, Calhoun could. not possibly have intended to 
do. 
There are, then? particular dangers associated with the 
method of attempting to reconstruct political theory from the 
letters and speeches of a writer. Thisdoes not implyp however, 
that an examination of such sources is inappropriate or unhelp- 
ful to the study of political theory. In. The Political Theory 
of Possessive Individualismq C. B. Macpherson has maintained 
that "where a writer can take it for granted that his readers 
will share some of his assumptions, he will see no need to set 
these out at the points in his argument-. where-wep who--. do not 
share those assumptions automatically, think they should have 
been stated to make the argument complete.. 
31 Lettersp speeches 
and personal diaries may be of great value in clarifying the 
way in which an author uses a particular wordv and hence may 
contribute to a fuller understanding of his language in the 
text. Yet, it must be borne in mind that the same reservations 
apply to this enterprise as to that of reconstructing; language, 
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like ideas, changes over time, but with greater subtlety. - 
Great care must be taken when using,, material,, which is external 
to the text,, -andishould be. -regarded as being-subsidiary to the 
main, , purpose --of -understanding 
the ý text. 
IfIthis sounds-, as-though it is an argument in. favour of 
textual autonomyt-It is so only in a restricted sense and quite 
unlike theýarguments of pure, textualists. eThey-, would, argue that 
the-text, -is; autonomous in the-sense that-no7information, -external 
to, the text is, -necessary for a full and, 'complete, understanding 
of that, text. What-I am arguing, here-is'that the text-should be 
theýmain focus, of, -study-and, that-all subsidiary enterprises- 
such as, examining, extraneous evidence like letterso speeches- 
and the-social-context -should', be geared, to-uncovering the - 
proper meaning-of the text.: The text is therefore, autonomous-. 
only in the sense,, that-its, -clarification, 
is the primary concern 
of the, commentator. Why-ýthe, text,, should have this'special status 
over andzbove-other political writingsand utterances of the 
author is the, subject, ', . of 'the next section.,. -, 
. fiC: 
5 
II 
5 
', Y 
In the previous 1. s eciion . som - e- . of th'e general'"c". on*cep'tual 
problems of studying political theory were discussed along 
with the more sp'6cific obje6tions'*to the mEýthods of existing- 
Calhoun scholarship. In`thisý-section I propose-to outline an 
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alternative procedure which, it is hoped, will avoid many 
of, the limitations, which, these studies-embody. 
To begin,! with, - it is necessary-to examine-the purpose, 
of'-studying political-theory and to clarify what, political 
theorists think they-, are doing when-they write on-such matters. 
Andrew, Hacker's contention that'the function of political-- 
theory is, -to provide causal'and'ethical generalisations which 
transcend"the cont-ext-, in which-it-is written, is often open to 
objection (mainly from political scientists)-on-the grounds 
that such an, enterprise, is non-verifiable by theýpolitical-,. 
theorist concerned. -It might be the case-that the ethical and 
causal'theories he propounds are true for all periods of hist- 
ory, -but-he can, have'no way of knowing it. The implicit,. assump- 
tion of this approach is that the causal and ethica1, relations 
among'men, are constant. -And even ifýa particular political, 
, theorist believed, -along with David Hume,. that-11there-is a- 
great uniformity among the actions of menp in all nations and, 
-ages, and that human motives remain the samev in'its principles 
and, operationslltýý it-does not follow that ethical statements 
are similarly constant. -The problem is, according to critics of 
this approach, that normative ethical prescriptions are-them- 
selves tied to'specificýcultural contexts. Attemptsq' therefore, 
at reducing the theory, of-, politics, to a few, universally valid 
principlesýýis! notýa, scientific enterprise, but a speculative 
-one. 
33 
ý Thisv, however,, does not-imply, thatýthere is noývalue in 
studying political, theory, or indeed in writing, itt only-that. 
the things we hope-to learn from it ought to be differently 
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conceived. -34 Even if there are no "timeless truths"t political 
theory serves the function of illuminating our understanding 
of the ways in-which particular individuals have grappled with 
the problems they have'encountered in their social environment. 
Political theory-then becomes a part of the process of histor- 
ical understandingt and its texts become'analagous to histor- 
ical-events. All the questions that historians-seek to ask 
about past events become applicable to the texts'of-political 
theory: what were their causes, what'Idid they-contain, *, what 
were their consequences. And once these, so to speak, "micro- 
historical" preliminaries have"been successfully tackled, the 
earnest process, of assimilation and, classification within the 
broad sweep of-history can begin. 
Viewed in this light, -, texts acquire a special significance 
over letters and speeches simply because they represent a'self- 
conscious effort on the part of the author to systematise his 
ideas into a coherent whole. It is not impossible, in the absen- 
ce of a political text, toýtake an indiVidual's letters and 
speeches and to reconstructkinto systematic doctrines thd 
principles which informed his politictLl.. actionsv'but the problems 
involved in this approach have been dealt with in the previous 
section. 'The crucial. point is that such a reconstruction is 
almost bound to be a distortion precisely because letters and 
speechesýembody a variety of partial intentions. Each letter- 
written and each speech delivered must presumably have been 
the result of a specific intention on the author's part at a 
particular moment in time. To string all his scattered remarks 
together in such-a way as to present'them asýa unified doctrine 
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would be misleading. We assume, of course, that there exists 
some measure of consistency in human beings, but frequently 
this is'an-overestimated quality; it is 'entirely possible 
that'over the course of time'an individual's ideas will change 
for perfectly honest reasons. But, this point is of secondary 
importance; what is essential to grasp, is'that a text is'the 
embodiment of a single, specific intention which the author 
wishes'to communicate to his audience, 'while letters and speech- 
es'represent a'multiplicity"of intentions'over a"given'period 
of'time* 
If what has been said so"far is correct, then the super-" 
iority of a text over other documentary'sources is'decisivelY_ 
established. 'The author's decision to set'down his political 
ideas in a systematic'form arises from'a particular intention'' 
toýcommunicate'something to his readers, and it follows that 
to gain a complete understanding of the text, it is"necessary 
to uncover that intention. If we assume, as we must, that the 
intention to write-the, -text is the result'of a prior cause, 
then a'grasp of the circumstances which give rise to the"intent- 
ion is not'only'proper, but essential. 'For a writer, -of a specif- 
ically political text, it is reasonable to'suppose that the 
spur*, to his intention is some crisis, actual or perceived, 
within the society in'which he lives. "Political theory". main-' 
tains-Alan Grimes, "is born out of the conflicts in a society 
or between societies, ' out of the struggle between the list and 
the 'ought'. It is politics -the contestfor authority 
distilled and articulated into systematic thought.,. 
35 If Grimes 
is right'in his contention that political theory is an abstracted 
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and systematised form of practical politics, this points to 
a very sharp distinction between political theory-, and politic- 
al-philosophy which, has beenr,, well-defined-by Thomas, -, P. Jenkin. 
36 
Political-philosophy, heýmaintainsq aims at discovering truth; 
the-impetusý, behind-itsý--vvriting lies-in its intention to uncover 
the true political relations among men. It-is not interested 
in persuading men to accept, a particular ideological point of 
view, except4nsofarýas. it testifies, ýto-the-. coherence, ofýits 
own intellectual: ýsystem. The role, of, ýthe, politicalýphilosopher, 
then, is thatof a-detached observer, --, attempting toidentify 
constancies in human, ýbehaviour and-portraying, them as., universal 
truths. He is optimistic,, in--the sense,, that, he believes, that man, 
like-the universe in-which-he lives,. cýLn ult; imately, be explained 
in terms of. a, few-generalýprinciples, ýwhich may be discovered by 
use of -the human mind. 
Political theoryjýon the other handpýdoes-, contain a, persuas- 
ive, element. It hasAts roots, ing and is-usually-a response to 
the current political environment*, It should notýbe-seen simply 
as ideology because it seeks, -to offer a, ýrational justification 
of, political,, behaviour based, on supposedly true,, generalisations. 
It differs-. from-, political-philosophy, -, above all, in, its. intent- 
ion which is to persuade-men that, a particular course of action 
,, is desirable or--_preferablev,, and then, to-show why it, is desirable 
or preferable. Unlike, the political philosopherl-the political 
theorist does not, concern himself. with.. cosmic speculations,. (or 
if he does, it is only incidental); his, purpose, is firmly, rooted 
in the present. 
If such a qualitative, difference exists between political 
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philosophy and political theoryp it is often difficult to 
detect in practice. John Locke, it, was argued earlier, is 
known equally as a philosopher of knowledge (from the Essay 
Concerning Human Understanding), and as a. political theorist 
(from the Two Treatises of Government), yet it seems clear 
that many of his philosophical ideas developed in response 
to specific questions of public policy. 
37 Similarly, with 
Thomas Hobbes; John-Plamenatz, has argued that, "If England - 
had remained domestically-at peacet, he[Hobbes] might never 
have written his two master works, De Cive and Leviathan, 
and mightýhave devoted his. mind entirely to other branches 
of philosophy and to classical scholarship.,. 
38_ Yetp even if 
Hobbest political texts were prompted by immediate events, 
it is not clear from their presentation that they should be 
regarded as guides to action rather than, philosophical inquir- 
ies. It is only, when they are-taken in conjunction with, his 
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later works that their function-appears hortatory. 
- It follows from this that before-1we can even begin to 
decide whether a political text is philosophical or theoret- 
ical, it is necessary to recover, the author's intention. The 
proper procedure must therefore include an examination of the 
circumstances and context: in, which, it, was conceivedýand written. 
Calhoun's political texts were written at a time when the 
United States was undergoing a crit-ical social and political 
upheaval; the American South, increasingly conscious of its 
status as a permanent minority within the Union,, and, fearing 
a threat to its social and economic institutionst developed 
a series of'arguments which it employed in its own defence. 
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hhý. 
Calhoun's Disquisition and Discourse have conventionally been 
viewed against this bacýground, and it has seemed reasonable 
that they should be. ' However, if it can be established that 
Calhoun's intention'to write the texts, springs from the tens- 
ions engendered by the sectional crisis - that is, if the 
crisis of the Union a: cts as a prior cause, to Calhoun's intent- 
ion to write the texts - it does not 'follow that-the texts 
themselves are successfully explained. The tendency to accept 
that once one, has uncovered the cause of an event or an utter- 
ance, then one has discovered the true meaning of it, is erro- 
neous in that it takes no-account of the purpose of that event 
or utterance. This isa difficult point which ought to be 
spelled out in more detail. 
, If we establish that Calhoun wrote the Dis(ýuisition and 
the Discourse'as a-result of the-sectional crisis, all we can 
possibly know (without-actually reading the texts) is that-the 
crisis, was the, cause of Calhoun's intention to-write. 'We might 
knowp or suspect, from other, sources what Calhoun's position 
might be, but we-cannot know-exactly what Calhounts intention- 
in writing the texts was unless we read the texts themselves 
and take careful note of their content. This is the case because 
the texts themselves are acts of communicationt embodying Cal- 
hounts-intention to be understood in a. particular way by his 
intended audience. Thus, the proper sphere of analysis for the 
commentator is not'either'the context or the text taken indiv- 
idually, ' but both-together. 'The-context may explain the exist-- 
ence of the text, butthe text itself, is the result of a specific 
intention of the author; to gain'a complete understanding of 
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the textýrequires not: only an analysis of the ideas it contains 
but also of-the format in-, which they are presented, Presumably, 
there-was; a range, of communications-open to the author and it 
is pertinent to inquire-why the particular, format he chose 
should-have fulfilledýhis. needs-better than, any-. other mode of 
communication. Whyp, for examplep did, *Calhoun,, feel-that an abstr- 
act-treatise--on government would, fulfil his, intention better 
than a speech in the Senate? And why, -once he-had decided to 
use the, written, word as hisýmedium, did he eschew the convent- 
ional pamphletform? And, againt-, what-possible significance, can 
the peculiar juxtaposition of his, ideas-containedý--in-the, texts 
have? The answers to all these questions bring us nearer to-a 
complete, recovery of, Calhoun's intentions, and, hence to. a. fuller 
understanding, of the, texts. - 
Ifall-this seems to be labouring--the, point excessively, 
it is, so-only because-it is of,, fundamental importance, in under- 
standing political texts generally. ý-. I--agree'strenuously with 
Quentin, Skinner-who hasýargued that, -this method ought not-to 
be accepted as an aesthetic preference-, but as a matter of con- 
ceptuallpropriety. 
40 The point is, above--all, one of'. logic: 
when-, an-author sits down to write something, he-does so-with a 
specific intention-in--mindt and further, he intends, that that 
intention should, beýunderstood by his audience. The, recovery, 
of these-intentions, -, 
therefore, must be, the starting point of 
any discussion of his, writingsp, -if they'are to be, properly 
understood., -Much, of the study of-political theory, is character- 
ised by., criticism of,. authors-, on the grounds that, they "failed" 
to addressýthemselves, to questions-which we., think they., ought, 
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to. have dealt with. But the point is clear that no author can 
be criticised on these grounds unless. it can be, established 
that he had a prior intention to treat of those subjects. It 
is perfectly permissible to-criticise, what he has written and 
the form of-words he has used to express what. he has written, 
because he has,, a. special, responsibilityfor his actions and 
utterances. But underlying his actions (indeed, all conscious 
human actions)., is an-intention which must be, uncovered if what 
he has written, is to be judged, fairly. 
4l.. 
" 
Of. course, it islentirely possible, maybe even common, 
that an author's intention to be understood has, in factv been 
misunderstood by his audience, and yet it remains a significant 
statement. In what sense can this misunderstanding be said to be 
a "meaning"9 Clearlyq to the people who believe it, it must be 
important and relevant to-the society in which they live other- 
wise it would have been discarded as being inapplicable. The 
misunderstanding might have arisen because the author's choice 
of words was imprecise and ambiguous; in this instance the 
author's intention to be understood has been unsuccessfully 
executed And he may be criticised on these grounds. But it 
would be logically improper. -to hold that the misunderstood 
construction placed on the text was, in fact, the "real" meaning 
of it. --The, real meaning of a-text can only 
be defined in terms 
of the author's intention. to be understood, andAt is the 
business-of the commentator to clarify this intention. This 
does not imply that a misconstrued text is any less meaningful, 
only that the meaning. attached to it by its audience is not the 
meaning intended by its author. Once this is grasped-it-becomes- 
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clear that two separate processes of understanding are necess- 
ary for describing and analysing a text a recovery of the 
original intention of the author and an assessment of the 
42 meaning ascribed by others to the words he has written. 
The uncovering of an author's intention, then, is of 
first importance in understanding the texts of political 
theory and serves as an essential preliminary procedure before 
other questions which have traditionally been the concern of 
N 
students of political theory, can be answered. In the next 
section, I shall examine some of the ways in which a political 
text may be evaluated once the intention of the author has 
I- 
been fully grasped. 
III 
In, The Problems of Political Philosophyp D. D. Raphael 
suggested that the purpose of political philosophy and theory 
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was to provide a rational justification for beliefs. It ist 
of course, not a necessary condition that for a belief to be 
held that it should be rationally defensible and there are 
many examples of such beliefs. It might be argued that a belief 
in the existence of God, though held by many millions of people, 
relies not on any rational grounds, but on faith. But this in 
no way diminishes the potency of the belief to those who hold 
it. 44 The essential importance of beliefs, whether rationally 
or irrationally held, lies in their ability to direct and deter- 
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mine the behaviour of individuals. If we'accept the distinct- 
ion betWeen political philosophy and political-theory outlin6d 
in th6'previous'-6ection, "it becomes clear that d, political 
theorist is conce: ýned'ýespecially-_vvith the modification of 
behaviour. It'i6 central to his pUrposev--ther6fore., that he 
should'oýfer convincing rational-grounds'-for persuading his 
audience thatý_'vihat-E6 vvrite6 is-tru-6. `Aný evdluat ion '6f '*a'pol- 
itical text - mustt .4 theng take'the form of--eiamining týepropos; -- 
itions and conclusions 'it contain 6_ on'16gical, "grounds 
The first criterion of ýhilosophical'quality i6-- consistency. 
If it can, be, -shown'that"a theory"contairis-log*lcal-falldeies"and 
inconsisteiici6s, 'it is reasonable'to suppose thatýthe theory'' 
ought to beýre'_Jected on these grounds. (I bay "reasonable to 
suppose" because 4-dite clýarly this is not'alWays -'the case- in. - 
political theoryý, ', scholars maintain that th6'-logic"al basis'of`-', - 
Marx's political-theory'is faultyi but-this has_'nOt4-: preve'n'ted 
it from bkercising-immen6e_ influence`all over'the world,., 
45) In 
establishing the'coherenc'e7of. -a"'theory the-'grav 6st difficulty 
involves the identification'of'the, -authorls- unstatedýassumptions. 
If the argument in the text does not seem to follow logically 
from the original'premiseso the commentator ought"'t6 a6k what 
stage of I the argument is missing aiid'Whý. -"If''it can b6`c"onclu! - 
sively shown'that the'author felt--ii6"*need'to'state'-]ýi6'ass-umpt- 
i0ýns'6A this'p6int because he_ý_f6lt* thatýJi , tywould-have-b6en clear 
to his audience, then the theory ought to survive ''the' examinat - 
ion. 
On&e a theory is'6stablished as being'iiiteinýally'consistent, 
it may be said to offer"a-r"ation'al'justification for the beliefs 
it seeks to defend. This alone, however, is insufficient grounds 
for establishing the superiority of one theory over-another. 
It might be the case that two theories,, both internally coher- 
ent.. but embodying diametrically opposite conclusions, are pit- 
ted against one another. If we assume that the theories-of Locke 
and Hobb. es are consistent in their internal structuresp then 
both would be acceptable asJustifying the beliefs each seeks 
to defend. Both theorists, beginning with the state of nature, 
come to quite different, conclusions about the type of government 
that ought. to be instituted - which., then, ought, to be rejected? 
The problem is that each, theory seeks to defend e. ertain, values, 
not fac. ts. In cases about matters of fact, the belief must not 
only be consistentp but true; thus, scientific theories remain 
tenable only until they are supplanted. by new theories which 
account for all the observable data. The principle of falsifia- 
bility, therefore, applies in the case of scientific theorising. 
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But in the philosophy-of practice, which is concerned with 
evaluating values not factst the process is more difficult. 
Ultimately, there is no way in which a value can be falsified 
because its existence depends on subjective factors personal to 
the individual.. 
In spite ofthist it is possible to go, some way towards 
evaluating a political theory on grounds other than consistency. 
Even if the values embodied. in a normative political. theory are 
ultimately, unassailable on logical grounds,, it is rare that a 
theorist will make no use.,. whatever of facts to support his value- 
judgements. In that instance, the facts used in evidence to but- 
tress the values become liable to be tested by accordance. 
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Hence, if a Political principle depends on a factual assumption,, 
the principle may be overthrown if the facts can be shown to be 
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false. Calhoun, for instance, bases his theory of government 
on the supposed fact that the main motivating force of human 
behaviour is self-interest. * If that-principle can'be shown to 
be false, then we would be justified in giving less credence 
to the theory of government. -The essential difficulty with 
this approach is that human behaviour is sufficiently varied 
that no amount of evidence, can conclusively demonstrate the 
primacy of one principle over another because. ' quite simply, ' 
it can always be, countered-withý-contrary evidence. It might be 
argued'that the preoccupationlof the social contract'writers 
withýthe state of nature falls into this category. It seems 
of nature 
clear that'Hobbes' conception of aýpre-social state A% was not 
meant to be literally construed as an'historical reality, but 
rather as alogical, necessity to the theory he propounds. 
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Locke, on the'other hand, is more explicit (though not conclus- 
ive) that his notion of the state of nature ought to be taken 
both as an historical truism, and a moral necessity. Both Locke 
and Hobbes survive the dilemma because it is not' demonstrably 
true that no state of nature existed in actuality. 
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In evaluating a political text the principles of accord- 
ance and consistency are essential, but they are'not the only' 
criteria which are used to judge the quality of a work. A 
theorist may be worthy of consideration'on the grounds that 
his text contains, original ideas. Originalityp-however, like 
consistency, is often an overestimated quality. Michael Levin 
has-ýaptly pointed out that the nature of political theory "is 
such that originality'is hardly to be expected in terms of unit 
See, Chapter- Six below. 
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ideas, for all, writers operate within a tradition of concern, 
social assumptions and methods of explanation. What-can elevate 
the, significance of a,, theorist-is not so'much the novelty of 
his ideas as the novel, manner in which he combinest arranges 
or juxtaposes them. It-is the-shifting emphasis rather than 
total novelty that is the most, we can reasonably expect,.,, 
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If'this ispthe-casev we are-able to appreciate'-3. n Calhoun's 
texts the-shifts in emphasis of'certain commonplac6'ideas. 'His 
combination, of-, two apparently opposing strands of-, thought in-- 
his, theory of human nature*and his-treatment of natural, law": '' 
concepts contain many ideas which-would have been familiar'to, 
his contemporariest-but it is his-peculiar-juxtaposition of 
these ideas, which makes Calhoun an interesting, and even origin- 
al, thinker. Furthermorep--ifýwe accept this criterion of origin- 
ality, the charge of eclecticism. - which is, invariably an accus- 
-51 ation - evaporates entirely. 
So farp we have discussed the various ways'in which the 
text can be evaluatedp as it-were, -int6rnally. But it is"certain- 
ly the case that other types of questions, equally important, 
may be-asked about the text, and which require for answers, -the 
use of different techniques. One of-the main'preoccupations-of 
the conventional"study of political theory is with locating'a 
particular-text or thinker within-a particular, )category, ofýpol- 
itical thought.. Both history and the history of ideas have evolv- 
ed certain categories by which similarities and*differences'bet- 
ween writers may be-emphasisedo. thus,, Burke'becomes classified 
under th6-heading of Conservatismt'Mill under Liberalism, -Descar- 
tes under Rationalism, and, Locke under Empiricism. But*this-appro- 
ach which is primarily designe 'd to aid our, comprehension, has, 
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as Levinýhas reminded us, several dangers. 'I'n the first place, 
categories "whose status ought to be suggestive, become'accepted 
as accurate descriptive'frameworks"'and this in turn can lead to 
distortion. By classifying Mill r under Liberalism, forý - example, 
wIe run theý--risk of oversimplifying his thought to the pol -I fit 
whereýit'rbe6omei-misreprese'nted. I Levin rightly pointsbut that 
Mill's Liberalism has its reservationsi particularly"when confron- 
ted, by-the claims"of'society over - th e right's' of - indi, ýiduals. 
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Philosophical'categorisations serve the same purpose as-historic- 
al ones, -, and the same dangers aýpply. Thus Locke, whom we'cited 
above as'an Empiricist, is grossly'parodied by th6'label'which 
underestimates entirely the a pri6ri-cont I ent of I his I thought. ý)-' 
'-. &nother, and related, danger of this process is - that there 
is a tendency to impute to certain thinkers ide , as vI which are sug- 
gested by our own*post hoc categ 10 ri6s. Thus, 'if we classify " Cal- 
hou'n as a "fabulous reactionary" as Richard - Hofstadter does54) 
there' niay'be the temptation to devalue tI he other elements' of 
his thought orv worsep to assume that he could not Possibly-'have 
written anything which might be relevant to a nominally'Liberal 
society., At"that point, Levin maintains, our categories become 
more real than the material'they'seek io classify. 'More6ver, I we 
som6tim6s tend to forget the nature of our classifications'by 
assumingý_that a particular-writer was intending to contribute 
ý55 directiy'-ýo a 'well-defined school 'of thought. 
Bearing these dangers , in mindp I it is I necessary t101 attempt 
to locate Calhoun in some tradition of thought, not as an'end 
in itself, but as an aid to comprehension. Calhou'nq it will be 
argued, poses a particular problem'of categorisation in5that 
his theory seems to contain elements of Burkean conservatism 
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and Lockean liberalism. This is not necessarily a contradict- 
ion, however, if "conservatism" is defined strictly as an 
attitude towards change. Samuel P. Huntington has maintained 
that there is no conflict in arguing that a writer may be cons- 
ervative about Liberal ideals. 
56 Louis Hartz in, The Liberal 
Tradition in America has put forward a more extreme version 
of this thesis. Hartz maintains that Calhoun, along With George 
Fitzhugh and other proslavery writers, 
lformed. 
what he termed 
the "Reactionary Enlightenment" . 
57 Calhoun's theoryp Hartz 
explainsv embodies two contradictory elements: Ithe need 
to 
defend the institution of human slavery in the Southern states 
led Calhoun to ground the theory on an organic conception of 
society, while the equally important need to defend the South 
within the structure of the Union led him to construct a series 
of mechanical, devices for its defence. 
-The 
result, according to 
Hartz, leaves Calhoun, as a "profoundly disintegrated political 
theorist .,, 
58 Hartz's comments-on Calhoun's political theory are 
perceptive and his concept of the'llReactionary, Enlighte=ent'I 
form. s. the conceptual basis of the second part of this study. 
We shall, in Chapter Three, be examining the paradoxical nature 
of the ", Reactionary Enlightenment" as an intellectual categoris- 
ation prior to examining its validity in relation to Calhoun's 
Disquisition on Government. 
Before that., however, the injunction that to fully under-, 
stand an author's texts one must recover his intentions, must 
be attended to. Although Calhoun protested continually that his 
loyalties were to the South first and then to the Union, 
59 he 
strives in his theory to serve both causes equally. Indeed, it 
is possible to argue that his theory suffers precisely because 
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of his'attachm'ent'to'the,, Union; had he been, able to release 
himself from the self-imposed obligation, of protecting the 
South within-'the, Union, asFitzhugh-later-did, his theory 
might-have been sparedtsome'of"theýmore-glaring inconsistencies. 
If there'is anything-tragic about Calhoun's-thought-'and career 
it is thislthat he'attempted, to reconcile the'irreconcilible. 
In the"following chapter'lwe'shall attempt, to recover 
Cal-houn's-intentions in, writing'the texts by examining and 
assessing evidence'which is extrane6us, to,, the, texts themselves. 
Following a'brief introduction in which-the main-issues raised 
by Calhoun scholars-'are surveyed''we, -shall-trace the historyýof 
the composition of the-texts, taking-into account-events. which 
were occurring, concurrently in*the political arena and which 
may have affected'their final, form,.,, -It-., should--be-noted at this 
point that although-the title of this study indicates that theý 
focus of our attention will be on the'ideas of, the Disquisition 
o1i Governmentp any historical account of its composition cannot 
be legitimately separated from-that of the Discourse,. This is 
simply the case'because, as-I hope to-showin the next chapter, 
Calhouri, conceiviad*the texts as'being related, in intention-, _ 
though not'in'function-o'The Discourse dealsralmost exclusively 
with what- may be termed "constitutibnal", --theory, as opposed to 
the' "political" theory-of'the Disquisition, and%this serves as 
a justification for treating the-ideas contained, in the Disquis- 
ition separately-. * 
The third section''of themext chapter is devoted to an 
This is argýied in greater detail in, Chapter Threep section one, 
"The Reactionary Enlightenment" below. 
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attempt to evaluate the relation of the Disquisition and the 
Discourse to the bulk of Southern writing of the period which, 
scholars maintain,, was overwhelmingly proslavery in outlook. 
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The fourth and fifth section are concerned-with identifying 
Calhoun's intended audience and attempting to assess their 
influence on the people who read them. By and largep biograph- 
ers of Calhoun have made little serious'attempt to estimate 
the reception, -of his texts beyond making impressionistic, and 
sometimes unwarrantedo deductions. Margaret L. Coit-p for example, 
maintains that "it is not difficult to surmise" how wide an 
audience the texts received in the South, while the North "had 
no desire to read or heed the warnings of the vanquished. " 
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Coitts interpretation-might be true, but without the present- 
ation of firm evidence it remains nothing more than an unjust- 
ified assertion. It might be expected that the texts would have 
appealed particularly to a Southern audience during the 1850s, 
yet references in diaries and letters of the period offer scant 
evidence of this. Jesse T. Carpenter has hinted that by the 1850S 
Calhoun's notion of the concurrent majority as a solution to 
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the sectional conflict had been rendered obsolbte. Indeed, 
there is evidence to suggest that even Calhoun's closest friends 
and political allies were never wholly convinced of the efficacy 
of the concurrent majority as a Southern defence mechanism. 
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And what of the North?, Gerald M. Capers believes that the texts 
were written specifically to convince a Northern audience of 
the South's determination to insist on her rights under the 
Constitution. 64 If that is the case, it is reasonable to expect 
that the North would have paid some attention to what he had 
written. Or did Calhoun suffer the ignominy of being ignored, 
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as other Southern writers were? 
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The essential problem in evaluating Calhounts significance 
as a political theorist lies in the facto which we touched on 
earlier, that he was an immensely influential politician. Much 
of the argument of his Discourse was presented in, and fore- 
shadowed byq his political speeches which were extensively 
reported throughout the Union. The mechanics of the concurrent 
majorityq moreover, were implied during the South Carolina Null- 
ification Crisis in the early 1830s. It is possible, even likely, 
that many Americans knew of the essential components of his 
constitutional theoryq at least, without having to read the 
political texts; if that is true, then the status of the texts 
is established not by virtue of their intrinsic value, but by 
the political reputation of their author. 
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Chapter Two: The Writing of the Disquisition and Discourse 
(a) Introduction 
In the previous chapter an alternative methodology was 
outlined for the understanding of political texts, based on 
the comments of Quentin Skinner. It was argued that an evaluat- 
ion of a text requires, as an indispensable preliminary exer- 
cise, that the student gains a grasp of the intention or intent- 
ions of the author in writing it. Such an investigation, if it 
is successfully performed, would necessarily include an account 
of the social and political forces which occasioned, in the mind 
of the authorp the intention to write the text along with an 
account of the authorts intention in writing it. Clarifying and 
establishing these intentions at the outset would, it was argued, 
avoid the possibility of reading into the texts ideas which the 
author could not have intended to conveyp and hence reduce the 
likelihood of distortion. It was not advocated that this proced- 
ure should supplant the traditional methods of treating political 
texts, only that it should be used as an essential and comple- 
mentary tool in uncovering the meaning of a text as it was con- 
ceived by its author. Once the author's intentions have been 
fully grasped, the ideas he articulates become subject to the 
usual processes of critical analysis and assessment. 
This procedure, it seems to me, is singularly appropriate 
for studying Calhoun's political texts, A Disquisition on Govern- 
ment and A Discourse on the Constitution and Goverr=ent of the 
United States. One of the central difficulties in evaluating 
these textst I hinted earlier, was that of unravelling Calhoun's 
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influence as a national statesmanfrom his work as a political 
theorist. The question arises as to what extent we are justif- 
ied in making such a division. It was not a distinction that 
Thomas Hart Benton was inclined to make when he announced to 
the Senate in 1850: "My people cannot distinguish between a man 
and his principles - between a traitor and treason. They cannot 
eulogize the one and denounce the other. " 
1 Nevertheless, from 
the perspective of the historian of ideas it is a necessary 
distinction and for this reason: the existence of a political 
text denotes that a man has self-consciously determined, for 
whatever purposep to set down his ideas about politics and that 
he intends that text to perform a specific function. The very 
choice of a text as the format in which to present his ideas 
suggests that the author believed that the function he envisaged 
it as performing could not be successfully accomplished through 
any other medium. For a man who was actively engaged in politics, 
as Calhoun wasq it is reasonable to conclude that the parliament- 
ary process was not an appropriate forum in which to articulate 
the ideas he sets down in the text. The division, then, between 
Calhoun's role as a politician and as a theorist is not one 
which historians have imposed on him, but one which he has 
appropriated for himself. 
Having said that, it is not at all clear that historians 
(whether of ideas or otherwise) have been able to achieve so 
clinical a division. Existing studies of Calhoun's political 
theory have been heavily coloured by preconceptions derived 
from his political career, which in turn have relied on contemP- 
orary comments and perceptions. In an age of political conflict 
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and increasing sectional tension, powerful passions were 
unleashed; there was a tendency to portray political allies 
and opponents in stark terms - black and white, hero and anti- 
hero. Calhounq standing in the forefront of national politics, 
became a symbol to both North and South, always characterised 
in extreme terms. In September 1863 -a full thirteen years 
after Calhoun's death - the young Englishman Henry Yates 
Thompson recorded in his diary a conversation with Professor 
Fisher of Yale in which Fisher referred to Calhoun as the 
"father of all lies". The allusion is biblical - St. John's 
Gospel refers to the devil as the "father of lies" - and since 
Fisher was Professor of Divinity, the insult could hardly have 
been unintended. 
2 Similarly, Robert M. T. Hunter of Virginia, 
writing to Lewis E. Harvie in March 1876t recorded the dilemma 
he found himself faced with. Hunter, deeply impoverished during 
the Civil War, had been asked by Calhoun's family to lay aside 
a book he was then working on and to undertake instead a biog- 
raphy of the dead statesman: 
What shall I do? If I undertake it my book 
is postponed for a long time if not indef- 
initely. If I can complete it, the book 
would sell for something and in my circum- 
stances I feel bound to eke out my scanty 
means of subsistence by the use of my pen. 
On the other hand no life of Mr. Calhoun 
which I could write would sell, so much is 
he maligned and misunderstood at present. 
Yet I am not willing that his life and 
works should be presented to the world by 
an indifferent or unfriendly hand.... I am 
anxious to vindicate myself and my friends 
especially Mr. Calhoun but if I do I shall 
die as poor as I am living and very unpop- 
ular -3 
Historical discussions of both Calhoun's political career 
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and his political theory have, to a greater or lesser extent, 
been unable to distance themselves from the heat of contemporary 
passion. This is, perhaps, an unavoidable outcome of all hist- 
orical writing, but it nonetheless continues to obscure a proper 
understanding of Calhoun's political texts. It is true that some 
twentieth century scholars have tended to view the texts in a 
more favourable light than their nineteenth century counterpartsý 
so much so that Louis Hartz was led to describe Calhoun as "the 
philosophic darling of students of American political thought, 
the man who is invariably advanced when a thinker of European 
stature is called for in the American tradition... 
5 Hartz may 
well have overstated the case, for while Calhoun's texts have 
commanded considerable respect, even from their critics, their 
true significance continues to be debated. Broadly speaking, 
interpretations of Calhoun's political thought fall into two 
conflicting categories. 
6 
The first, and older, view was stated 
by one of Calhoun's earliest biographersv Hermann Von Holst. 
Von Holst, writing in the 1880s, with the Civil War still fresh 
in his mind, maintained that the Disquisition and the Discourse 
"will always remain among the most curious books of the polit- 
ical literature of the United States. " There is little doubt 
from the whole tenor of Von Holst's book, that he regarded the 
texts as conforming to his monolithic interpretation of Calhoun 
as being obsessed with slavery. Von Holst maintained that Cal- 
houn was "the representative of an idea.... From about 1830 to 
the day of his death, Calhoun may be called the very imperson- 
ation of the slavery question. " Von Holst's conviction that 
Calhoun was "the greatest and purest of proslavery fanatics" 
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has been mitigated by subsequent scholars, but nevertheless 
they have continued to evaluate the texts against the back- 
ground of proslavery writing. 
7 Writing in 19660 J. L. Thomas 
maintained that "whatever new meanings Calhoun's political 
theory may have acquired in our own day, it was originally 
offered and for three decades served as a formidable defense 
of the institution of slavery. " 
8 
The connection between the 
texts and the issue of slavery, then, is a well-established 
theme in the scholarly literature. It assumes that they were 
written specifically to defend the South's peculiar institut- 
ion, and beyond that to establish the principle of minority 
privilege. 
The alternative interpretation, represented by Margaret 
L. Coit and August O. Spainp view the Disquisition and the Dis- 
course as being major contributions to democratic theory. 
Margaret Coit expressed the extreme version of this when she 
wrote that the texts were "perhaps the most powerful defense 
of minority rights in a democracy ever written. 119 The assumpt- 
ion underlying this point of view is that even if the texts 
were occasioned by the need to defend slavery, they nevertheless 
pinpoint with unerring accuracy a crucial and unresolved flaw 
in democratic theory and practice. The problem of maintaining 
the rights of a minority against the unrestrained power of a 
majority was one which had been inadequately treated by polit- 
ical theorists. The Lockean formula, whereby "the Body politic 
should move that way whither the greater force carries it", 
had proved in practice to be an increasingly unsatisfactory 
means of protection for dissenting minorities. 
10 To the South- 
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ern mind, an unbroken chain of political and fiscal measures 
had suggested that the North was determined to deprive South- 
erners of their property and their livelihood; it was against 
this form of constitutional tyranny that Calhoun was direct- 
ing his theory. August O. Spain concluded that Calhounts solut- 
ion to the problem was in many ways "unanswerable". 
" 
The divergence of scholarly opinion concerning the true 
significance of Calhoun's political theory exemplifies exactly 
the difficulty of placing Calhoun within a particular tradition 
or category of thought. So stark is the contrast between the 
two interpretations that it is hardly surprising that a degree 
of confusion has resulted. The two views are incompatible 
because they approach Calhoun from different frameworks of 
reference. If we were to accept the Von Holst view that the 
real significance of the texts is their attempt to defend 
slavery and that Calhounts ultimate concern was to provide a 
rationalisation of that institution, we cannot logically accept 
that the theory applies to all minorities at all times and in 
all places. The protection of minorities has traditionally been 
the peculiar preoccupation of liberal-democratic frames of 
reference and arises from the inadequacy of the Lockean prescr- 
iptions described above. If Calhoun's texts are tied specific- 
ally to slavery, both in intention and in substance, they can- 
not be adapted to suit other situations. This is what has con- 
fused scholars more than anything else: Calhoun appears to be 
utilising liberal mechanisms and liberal discourse to confound 
the liberal teleology they are designed to serve. In his appeal 
to minority rights he is appropriating liberal terminology to 
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defend a profoundly illiberal institution. If the incompat- 
ibility of interpretation is striking, it is at least under- 
standable because it is only a reflection of the deep paradox 
in Calhoun's thought itself. 
12 
In the light of this confusion over the true signific- 
ance of Calhoun's political texts, it is necessary to consider 
once more the possible ways in which their meaning may be 
clarified. Much of the confusion has arisen because scholars 
have paid insufficient attention to uncovering Calhoun's intent- 
ion in writing the texts. The recovery of an author's intention 
or intentions is essentially an historical exercise. A straight- 
forward reading of the texts themselves is an obvious and 
indispensable first stept but it is insufficient itself because 
there is a tendency to approach the texts with a series of pre- 
conceived ideas which have been gained from other sources. The 
mental set of the commentator will predispose him to assimilate 
evidence which buttresses these preconceptions and to give less 
weight to contrary evidence. This tendency is well-recognised 
in all forms of scholarly writingg and whilst it is perhaps too 
much to expect an individual to be able to divest himself of all 
preconceptionsv an awareness of the difficulty ought to encour- 
age a more positive approach. 
In attempting to gain an understanding of an author's 
intention it remains to be considered at this point as to what 
counts as evidence. The most convincing form of evidence is a 
clear and unequivocal statement by the author of what he was 
intending to convey by writing his texts. In the case of Cal- 
hounp we are fortunate in having a series of letters written 
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over the period in which the texts were composed. This corresp- 
ondence throws considerable light on Calhoun's intentions and 
it is curious that scholars have failed to make the best use 
of it as a source. Of course, in taking account of his letters 
we must allow the possibility that Calhoun may not have expressed 
his motives honestly, or even that he was unable to do so. This 
poses a considerable philosophical dilemma which covers all 
kinds of documentary evidence and from which there is no easy 
way out. Ultimatelyt we must assume that when an author gives an 
account of what he is doing, he is expressing to the best of his 
ability his belief that he is, in factv performing that action 
in that particular way. To assume the opposite, it seems to me, 
is even more fraught with conceptual danger for if historians, 
in seeking to explain actions and utterances, eschew documentary 
evidence in favour of "plausible hypotheses", their results, 
however interesting or convincing, must be open to question. 
This is not to deny that ultimately all historical explanations 
take the form of plausible hypotheses, only that the hypotheses 
they arrive at must be based on solid evidence and must not be 
a substitute for it. 
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In examining letters and documentsq one must also concede 
the possibility that the author may have had a variety of mult- 
iple intentions which it is impossible to rank in a clear-cut 
order. And similarly, if a text is written over an extended 
period of time, as Calhoun's texts werep we must take into 
account the possibility that there may have been a shift in the 
priority of intentions in response to the author's perception 
of events. All this, of course, assumes that there is a delicate 
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interplay between the author's perception of social reality 
and his motives in writing. I say "delicate" because this too 
is fraught with danger. It is tempting to conclude that an 
author's intentions change or shift in priority in conformity 
with events, actual or perceived, in the real world. It is not 
at all clear, however, that this is a proper way to understand 
the process. Historiansp operating with the benefit of hindsight 
necessarily not available to the actors involved, may too easily 
ascribe to them motives which conform to a subsequent interpret- 
ation of events. Thust it may be argued that Calhoun's intention 
in writing the texts becomes more directly related to his fears 
over the deepening sectional crisis of the 1840sq an eminently 
plausible view in the light of what we know occurred in the 
1850s and 1860s. But it is not clear that this was so from Cal- 
houn's perspective. It is therefore important to pay especial 
attention to his letters in order to gauge his precise intent- 
ions. 
Other less direct, though equally importantp evidence may 
aid us in this enterprise. A word has already been said about 
the format in which Calhoun's ideas were presented and this 
may serve as an example of what I mean. Presumably when Calhoun 
conceived the project of writing the texts, there was a variety 
of forms available to him in which he could have expressed his 
ideas. His deliberate decision to utilise the form of an abstr- 
act treatise of political theory suggests that his intentions 
could not have been satisfactorily performed in any other way. 
We may reasonably conclude from this that his purpose in writ- 
ing the texts was substantially different from his purpose in, 
say, making a speech in the Senate. What precisely those intent- 
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ions were may be gauged from considering the function convent- 
ionally performed by abstract statements of political theory 
within the society in which Calhoun lived. 
14 It has been said 
that Calhoun's texts are unique in the sense that no American 
author before him had undertaken the task of evolving a system- 
atic theory of politics. Admittedlyq the writers of the Federal- 
ist papers had engaged in deep discussions on the nature of man, 
society and governmentv but they were addressing themselves to 
the specific proposals contained in the draft of the federal 
Constitution, and although their discussions led them to consider 
the first principles of politics, their primary purpose was pol- 
emical. Similarlyt although the texts of John Taylor of Caroline 
purport to be dispassionate and reflective works of political 
theory, they are too closely allied to the polemics of Jefferson- 
Jan republicanism. 
15 One of the main problems, then, in deter- 
mining the conventional function of abstract Political theory in 
the early history of the United States is the apparent lack of 
'material. 
The substance of the remainder of this chapter is concern- 
ed with examining evidence which may help us in determining 
Calhoun's intentions in writing the Disquisition and Discourse. 
The evidence of written documents, the format of the texts and 
the conventional styles of writing on political subjects should 
lead us to a more complete understanding of what Calhoun wished 
to communicate to his audience. 
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(b) The Composition of the Texts 
It is difficult to establish with accuracy when Calhoun 
first conceived the idea of writing the Disquisition and the 
Discourse. The earliest reference he makes to the enterprise 
is a casual one in a letter to Francis Wharton in December 1843, 
but there is evidence to suggest that the project had been on 
his mind for some considerable time before that. 
16 A week before 
his letter to Wharton, Calhoun received a communication from his 
political ally Robert M. T. Hunter of Virginia in which Hunter had 
expressed a sense of anticipation over Calhoun's "contemplated 
book". 
17 Hunter must therefore have had some foreknowledge of 
Calhoun's intention to write the texts. But even before that - 
a good fifteen months before - there were rumours that Calhoun 
was intending to write something on political economy. In the 
fall of 1842, Robert Barnwell Rhett had informed Senator Roane 
of Virginia that Calhoun was preparing himself for such a project 
and Roane took the opportunity of questioning the South Carolin- 
an about it when he visited him a month later. Calhoun discussed 
the project openly with Roane who later reported to Van Buren 
that the finished product would be "John Taylor of Caroline with 
metaphysical variationse , 
18 
Calhoun's decision to write the texts was the result of a 
variety Of causes which tended to reinforce one another. By far 
the most potent of these was Calhoun's acute awareness of the 
threat of abolitionist attacks on the South's peculiar instit- 
ution. Throughout the latter half of the 1830s, the efforts of 
the radical abolitionists to make the extinction of slavery the 
central issue of American politics were mainfested in attempts 
to Jay antislavery petitions before Congress and to flood the 
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South with so-called incendiary literature. 19 On both issues 
Calhoun had taken a strong stand, arguing that any action on 
Congress's part was beyond its constitutional competence. For 
Congress even to receive the antislavery petitionsp Calhoun 
maintained, was tantamount to a tacit acceptance of its ultim- 
ate authority to act in the matter and this would be but a 
small step to assuming authority in deciding the ultimate fate 
of the institution. 
20 Similarly, he opposed the federal govern- 
ment's attempt to prevent incendiary literature being dissemin- 
ated in the South by means of the U. S. mails on the grounds that 
such action belonged constitutionally to the individual states 
of the Union. 
21 The efforts of the abolitionists and their 
Congressional supporters in the 1830st howeverg failed to make 
a significant impression on the agenda of politics. Except on 
the Gag Rule of 18369 national party lines were not seriously 
disrupted and both in the North and South the abolitionists' 
attempt to polarise the sections was singularly unsuccessful. 22 
It was Southern complacencyq induced by this situation, which 
worried Calhoun particularly. During a speech on the reception 
of abolitionist petitions in March 1836, he warned the South 
that the spirit of abolitionism would not lie down and die. 
23 
By the 1840s Calhoun's prophecy was being borne out. In the 
congressional debates over the settlement of the western territ- 
oriesp the abolitionist impulse reared its head in a way which 
was terrifying to the South. Northern attempts to restrict the 
extension of slavery into the western territories galvanised 
the South into active opposition to the measure; the hardheaded 
discussions over the settlement of the territories did more to 
polarise the sections than the largely academic debates of the 
46 
1830x. 24 
The dangerous course of these events made Calhoun 
acutely aware of the lack of a sound theoretical exposition 
of the American system of government, which incorporated the 
Southern viewpoint of the Constitution. In December 1840, he 
wrote to A. D. Wallace: 
There is no satisfactory work extant on 
our system of government. The Federalist 
is the fullest and, in many respects, the 
best, but it takes many false views and 
by no means goes to the bottom of the 
system. The Virginia and Kentucky resol- 
utions and the report to the Virginia 
Legislature by Mr. Madison on the Alien 
and Sedition Acts take far deeper and 
more correct views, but are less full. 
The South Carolina controversy with the 
General Government develops and carries 
out those views more fully, but have 
never been collected and can only be 
found in scattered pamphlets and essays. 
I regard Storyts Commentaries as essential- 
ly false and dangerous. 25 
Calhoun's desire to combat the pernicious doctrines of the 
abolitionists and the false constitutional interpretations of 
Northern jurists was the most powerful influence in his decis- 
ion to write the Disquisition and the Discourse. 
At whatever moment in time Calhoun decided definitely 
to write the texts . it is clear that the work could not begin 
on them in earnest until the pressure of public business had 
eased. On November 27 1842v Calhoun submitted his resignation 
as Senator from South Carolina to both Houses of Congress "to 
take effect at the close of the present Congressq the 4th March 
next". 
26 Charles Wiltse maintains that it was after his retire- 
ment from the Senate in March 1843 that Calhoun began working 
on the texts. 
27 If this is the casev Calhoun remains curiously 
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silent on the matter in his personal correspondence. Further- 
more, Calhoun's indication to Francis Wharton in December 1843 
that he may write something if he could find the leisure, seems 
to suggest that his vague and casual intention to write had not 
yet crystallised into a firm decision. Less than three months 
later, howeverv Calhoun was using his work on the texts as an 
excuse for not accepting the appointment as Secretary of State 
following the death of Abel Upshur. 
28 Evidently his researches 
did not pose an insuperable objection to his accepting the pos- 
ition, for precisely one week later he did exactly that, 
29 
Between March 1844 and March 18459 Calhoun had little 
time for further work on the texts. During this period, he was 
engaged in delicate negotiations over the annexation of Texas 
which his predecessor had initiatedo In his letter of acceptance 
to President Tylerp Calhoun had stipulated as a condition that 
he be allowed to resume private life after the successful negot- 
iation of the Texas treaty, though when Polk became President 
in March 1845 he was disappointed at not being asked to remain 
in office. 
30 Throughout his period as Secretary of Statet Cal- 
houn was thinking deeply, if intermittently, about the texts; 
indeedp the activities of English abolitionists and their Americ- 
an counterparts in the wrangling over Texas, made the completion 
of the texts a matter of added urgency. Francis Wharton reported 
a conversation with Calhoun in February 1845 in which he referr- 
ed to "concurrent majorities" being the essence of the constit- 
ution. 
31 Within a month of leaving office, Calhoun had recommen- 
ced work on the texts with a vengeance. On April 12, he was able 
to tell Charles Jared Ingersoll of his overall plan of the work: 
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it was to consist of "an inquiry into the elements of political 
science, preliminary to a treatise on the Constitution of the 
U. States. "32 Less than six weeks later, he was even more sang- 
uine about the progress of the work. Writing to his favourite 
child Anna on May 22, he reported: "I have recommenced in good 
earnest my preliminary treatise on the elementary principles 
of political scienceg and made good progress toward finishing 
the rough draft. When finished I shall commence the treatise 
on the Federal Constitutiong which I hope to finish in the 
course of the year, if I can remain at home.., 
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Calhoun, howeverv was not to be allowed to remain at 
home. Almost immediately after vacating the State Department, 
he came under great pressure to return to the Senate. On March 
24 1845, Daniel E. Huger, elected to fill Calhoun's Senate seat 
in 1843, renewed an earlier offer to step down in Calhoun's 
favour. Calhoun resisted the temptation to become once more 
embroiled in politics for a full six monthst but by September 
his resolve was weakening. On the 18th, he reported to his son- 
in-lawv Thomas G. Clemsonq "I am much urged to return to the 
Senate. My inclination is against it; but the state of our 
affairs, external and internal, is so critical, that I should 
feel it my duty to serve, if the state should request me.,. 
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Finallyq on October 9 1845, Calhoun capitulated and accepted 
HuRer's offer which was ratified by the South Carolina legislat- 
ure without opposition late in November. On December 22, Calhoun 
once again took his seat in the United States Senate. 
35 
For the next three years, no mention of the texts appears 
in Calhoun's correspondence. During this period other, more 
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pressing and immediate matters in the political arena engaged 
his attention. The introduction of the Wilmot Proviso in Aug- 
ust 1846, aimed at prohibiting the extension of slavery into 
the territories acquired from Mexico, once more inflamed the 
already smouldering sectional tensions. The extent of Southern 
disquiet over the Wilmot Proviso can hardly be overstated; in 
the Southq the possibility that slavery should be excluded 
from territory acquired by the shedding of Southern blood, 
seemed an intolerable injustice. Furthermore, the actual voting 
figures on the Proviso itself demonstrated just how tenuous the 
South*s capacity to frustrate measures designed to attack slavery 
had become. 
36 Most distressing, to Calhoun at least, was the 
ominous aligrment of votes amongst Northern Congressmen on the 
Wilmot Proviso; it seemed clear to him that whatever Northerners 
in general thought about the tactics and the fanatical zeal of 
the radical abolitionistsv a significant proportion of their 
representatives was not prepared to'sanction the extension of 
slavery into the newly-acquired territory. In November 1846, 
Calhoun wrote to an unidentified correspondent in the North 
that "the time has arrived when the two parties of the Union 
should fully and truly understand one another, on the important 
question involved. It is proper for the North to know, that vie 
have made up our mind to defend our rights, and if she has made 
up her mind to assail them, on her be the consequences. 
07 
Between 1845 and 1848 pressure of public business prevent- 
ed Calhoun from giving anything but sporadic attention to the 
texts. In April 1848, he confessed to his son, James Edward 
Calhoun, that he had hoped to have them ready for publication 
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in the fall of 1847, "but was so interrupted, as to fall far 
short of my calculation. .. 
38 Furthermore, the coming session 
of Congress promised to be a busy one and Calhoun anticipated 
that he would have no time to divert his energies to completing 
them. Neverthelessp there is no doubt that work on the Disouis- 
ition was already well advanced. Less than a fortnight after 
the letter to his son, Calhoun was contemplating the European 
revolutions of 1848 with considerable interest "as they afford 
me an opportunity to test the truth or error, of the principles, 
which I have laid down in my elementary discourse on Govem- 
ment .,. 
39 Calhoun reported that the Disquisition was "as yet in 
the rough draft waiting the completion of the rough draft of 
the discourse on our system of government ... 
40 By April 1848, 
then, Calhoun had substantially worked out what he wanted to 
say in both the Disquisition and the Discourse. Even so, it was 
not until fourteen months later that he had completed the Disquis- 
ition to his entire satisfaction . 
41 
Following the lull of three years between 1845 and 1848, 
during which time Calhoun was occupied fully on the Congressional 
front, he returned with renewed vigour to the completion of the 
texts in 1849. Moreover, the tone of his correspondence was more 
urgent than at any time in the previous six years. In June, he 
told Anna Clemson that he was devoting all the time left to him 
to the completion of the texts and that he "ought not to delay 
its execution any longer, and aim to put it to press, if I can 
finish it in the recess, next Spring, or Summer. , 
42 The reasons 
for this urgency were both personal and political. Since 1845 
Calhoun's health had been deteriorating rapidly; in the Memphis 
Convention in November of that yearg he had been forced to relin- 
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quish the chairmanship owing to the loss of his voice. 
43 When 
he returned to the Senate a month later, he had been obliged 
to decline the chairmanship of the powerful finance committee 
on the grounds of poor health. 
44 Since that time, the political 
battles in Congress had further taken their toll and by 1849 
he was both physically and mentally exhausted. Calhoun was 
perfectly aware of the precarious condition of his health and 
he took trouble to allay the fears of his family. Yet beyond 
this, Calhoun's only real concern as regards his health was 
that he should have sufficient time to complete his political 
writings and thereby leave to the nation a lasting memorial of 
his life's work. 
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That the United States as a whole, and not simply the 
South, would be the main beneficiary Of his Political theory 
was clear in Calhoun's mind. The political struggles over the 
previous four years centering on the settlement of the territ- 
ories had reached a level of intensity which threatened the 
existence of the Union itself. Although, since the 1820s, a few 
individual Southerners like Robert J. Turnbull andt laterp Robert 
Barnwell Rhett had vociferously advocated the idea of a separate 
Southern nationg they were not at all representative of the bulk 
of Southern opinion. 
46 Since the South Carolina Nullification 
Crisiso however, overt attacks on slavery from the northern 
. states 
had significantly eroded the loyalty of many Southerners 
to the Union. The acquisition of territory from Mexico made the 
possibility of Southern independence a distinctly more viable 
proposition; coupled with the increasing conviction, exemplifi- 
ed by measures like the Wilmot Proviso, that the North was unalt- 
erably opposed to the continued existence of slavery, Southerners 
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themselves began to take seriously the secessionist alternative.. 
Indeed, it is often forgotten just how near the South came to 
secessiorL, in 1850. For Calhoun, however, that course was absol- 
utely the last resort. He insisted in speech after speech that 
his purpose was not to destroy the Union but to save it from 
inevitable self-destruction should the North pursue its course. 
His support for a Southern Convention, called to meet in Nash- 
ville in June 1850, reflected his policy of restraint. Southern 
nationalists had urged immediate secession by the individual 
states, without recourse to a sectional convention. Calhoun and 
other unionists were convinced that an outward show of Southern 
solidarity would persuade the North that further attacks would 
provoke the South into secession; the realisation of this, Cal- 
houn hopedv would lead the North to moderate its policies and 
restrain its more vociferous elements. Calhoun viewed the emerge- 
nce of a coterie of Southern fire-eating nationalists as an 
ominous sign of the growing intractability of both sections. 
In this atmospherep the completion of his political texts, which 
were founded on the premise that the Union ought to be preserved 
if at all possibleg thus became a matter of extreme urgency. 
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The urgent tone of Calhoun's letters to his family and 
political associates was matched by the speed with which he set 
to work to complete the texts. On July 14 1849, he completed the 
Disquisition, except for a few minor revisions. The task, he 
admittedv had been an arduous one and the ground covered "nearly 
throughout new territory. " He looked forward to a few days of 
relaxation before coming to grips with the second part of the 
project. He anticipated that the Discourse would "be more than 
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twice as voluminous as the elementary work, but not near so 
difficult of execution. , 
48 After all,, many of the arguments 
that it would contain had been well-rehearsed in his speeches 
over the previous five years. 
The bulk of the Discourse - between three and four hund- 
red pages - was written between June and October 1849. Calhoun 
was now working to a deadline. Charles Wiltse maintains that 
Calhoun "undoubtedly" had some correspondence with Harper Broth- 
ers in New York in the summer of that year, and this may have 
given added impetus to the texts' completion. 
49 Writing to Anna 
on October 14, Calhoun clearly sensed that the task was drawing 
to an end: he tentatively set the date for submission to the 
press for the following midsummer and discussed more fully than 
he had previously done the organisational details of the final 
product. There were to be three parts: "a discourse on the elem- 
entary principles of government; a discourse on the Constitution 
and Government of the United States, and a collection of my 
speeches and other productions on constitutional subjects. , 
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Calhoun's decision to publish the texts in conjunction with a 
set of his speeches tells us much more about the polemical pur- 
pose he envisaged his texts as performing. His main aim through- 
out the period of composition had been to develop an incontrov- 
ertible and meticulously-argued interpretation of the American 
Constitution to offset the erroneous principles enshrined in the 
works of Northern jurists like Joseph Story. 
51 
Constitutional 
theory, rather than abstract political theory, was at the heart 
of Calhoun's intention in writing the Discourse, for the simple 
reason that it was around the Constitution and its proper inter- 
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pretation that all the political battles of the previous five 
years had revolved. If the Union were to be saved, it would 
have to be done so by coming to grips with the mechanics of 
constitutional interpretation. Viewed in this light, the Dis- 
quisition takes on a superfluous appearance: why, if constitut- 
ional questions were all-importantp did Calhoun spend so much 
time and energy (six years in all) in writing an abstract treat- 
ise of political theory? 
Much of the answer lies in Calhoun's psychological make- 
up. Gerald Capers has suggested that Calhoun's reluctance to 
openly campaign on his own behalf for the presidential contest 
of 1844 may be attributed to his desire not to be seen to be 
soliciting for support. 
52 The implication is that Calhoun felt 
a strong distaste for the unseemly scramble for office which 
characterised most of the presidential campaigns of his own 
lifetime. When that happenedo statecraft degenerated into squalid 
politicking and high principles were swamped by personal ambition. 
Not that Calhoun himself was above political wheeler-dealing. 
What is notablev howeverv is Calhoun's constant need to cloak 
all his actions and ambitions in a self-justifying set of prin- 
ciples. It was characteristic of him to write to J. H. Hammond in 
1843 disclaiming any intention of seeking the Presidency while 
in the same letter giving detailed instructions to his political 
lieutenants on how to further his candidacy. 
5.3 Similarly in 1845, 
Calhoun staunchly refused to accept Daniel Huger's offer to 
retire from the Senate in order to allow him to retake his former 
seat unless the state legislature should mimmon him. In the end, 
no summons came, yet Calhoun accepted the offer and justified it 
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on the grounds of duty. In these episodes, Calhoun showed no 
signs of a sense of self-contradiction, only an overwhelming 
sense of his own importance and indispensability; he believed, 
perhaps rightlyp that his personal accomplishments and abilit- 
ies would benefit the nation, but he hated the thought of being 
viewed by his contemporaries as a scheming and ambitious polit- 
ician. He wished always to justify his course on the unassail- 
able grounds of principle - and if no principle were obviously 
apparent on a subject, Calhoun could be relied upon to devise 
one. 
It was a similar and related trait of character which 
impelled him to write the Disquisition. Once Calhoun had final- 
ly decided to set down the states' rights case in written form, 
he was nevertheless aware that as an argument it was capable of 
dispute. The trend of Supreme Court decisions under Chief Just- 
ice John Marshallq backed up by more or less definitive legal 
commentaries like Story's, reflected an interpretation of the 
Constitution which was anathema to the states' rights school. 
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Moreoverp the federal government had increasingly trespassed on 
the powers which had been reserved, by the Tenth Amendment, to 
the respective states. Against these "consolidating" tendenciesp 
no appeal to an alternative constitutional theory was likely to 
succeed. What was needed to justify the constitutional theory 
was a coherent set of political first principles aRainst which 
it could be measured. The Disquisition was Calhoun's attempt to 
evolve such a set of principles which would at the same time 
give added respectability to his interpretation of the constit- 
ution by providing a sound theoretical basis. 
Involved in all this was a profound irony. The obvious 
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theoretical justification for the states' rights position lay 
in the classical liberal formula of limited government, which 
in turn derived its potency from natural rights philosophy. To 
a man like Thomas Jefferson, frequently invoked by Southerners 
as the champion of the states' rights cause, the power of gov- 
ernment was the means by which the natural rights of the indiv- 
idual were protected. Governments had no reason for existing 
except to serve the community which had brought it into being 
and had given it its lifeblood. When it ceased to fulfil this 
function, or when it attempted to over-extend itself, it was 
liable to be replaced by another. The problem which faced Amer- 
icans of the revolutionary generation, as the first people 
called upon to rationally construct a government, was that it 
was universally presumed that power had a natural tendency to 
accrue to itself even greater power at the expense of individ- 
ual liberty. 
55 The great question of statecraft which preoccup- 
ied the framers of the Constitution was how to reconcile suffic- 
ient power to protect the nation from external attack without 
creating an absolute sovereign which could turn its attention 
inwards against its subjects. The Articles of Confederation had 
exemplified the difficulties of excessive fragmentation of pol- 
itical power and the Constitution was designed in some measure 
to redress the balance. The jealousy with which the states 
guarded their power was based on the assumption that their lib- 
erty was best preserved by retaining for themselves the right to 
determine questions of purely local concern. 
56 
The federal struc- 
turep to a large extent forced on Americans by their previous 
colonial status, happily coincided with the new republican ideol- 
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ogy and became a crucial element (along with the separation 
of powers) in the diffusion, and hence, limitation of power. 
The states, in Jefferson's words, became the "true barriers 
of our liberty. . 
57 
The rationale of states' rights led back historically 
and logically to the liberal distrust of unlimited and concent- 
rated govermental power. But it was precisely because it was a 
liberal preoccupation that Calhoun was forced to abandon the 
traditional justification and seek instead a new one. Had he 
invoked the liberal justification of states' rightso he would 
have been obliged to accept the logical presuppositions of nat- 
ural rightst inwhich case he would have been unable to argue 
to his own satisfaction the morality of slavery. It was to Cal- 
houn's credit that he recognised the dilemma at the outset. If 
what he wrote was to be of service to the South, it could not 
incorporate premises which were inimical to the institution of 
slavery. The Disquisitionp then, was Calhoun*s attempt to form- 
ulate a set of principles which would justify the states' rights 
position without admitting the moral evil of slavery. 
Calhoun spent the last three months of his life putting 
the final touches to the manuscript. An immediate task which 
confronted him was to decide on a title for the respective 
texts. Throughout the period of composition, he had variously 
referred to the preliminary essay (which we now know as the 
Disquisition on Government) as an "inquiry", a "treatise" and, 
most confusingly, a "discourse" on the elements of political 
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science . As late as December 1849, Calhoun confessed that 
he had not finally decided on a namev though for the first time 
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he mentioned the possibility of calling it a "disquisition". 
to distinguish it from the longer essay on constitutional 
theory. 
59 
The rush to get the texts to printt however, may 
have forced his hand for scarcely two months later he was 
referring to it quite firmly as the "disquisition on govern- 
ment" in his correspondence. 
60 
When Calhoun died on March 31 1850, most of the work 
on the texts was complete. The Disquisition had been revised, 
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corrected and copied ready for publication. The rough draft 
of the Discourse was finished in December 1849, and since that 
time Calhoun had devoted all his spare moments to preparing the 
final manuscript. 
62 On the evening before his deathq Calhoun 
had persuaded his son to read him extracts of the text with a 
view to making further refinements. 
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Whether Calhoun would 
have been satisfied with the subsequently published version 
can only be guessed atv though various scholars have commented 
on its diffuseness of style and argument. 
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In contrast with 
the Disquisition, which is terse and unadorned, the Discourse 
is unnecessarily repetitive andp at times, rambling. Even Rich- 
ard Crallev Calhoun's editor, felt obliged to point out that it 
bore "evident marks of interrupted and hurried composition. " 
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Cralle, howeverv was under an obligation to Calhoun to 
supervise the publication of the texts, and this charge was 
repeated by Calhoun's family after his death; 
66 
the texts duly 
appearedp after some delay, in November 1851 in the form of the 
first volume of a projected six-volume collection of Calhoun's 
Works. Cralle made no amendments to Calhoun's style or to the 
orgarlisational details of the texts: they appeared, as Calhoun 
had written themp as two extended pieces of prose, without 
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sub-divisions or chapter headings. The lack of documentation, 
for which Cralle can hardly be blamedv makes it difficult to 
establish precisely the sources Calhoun used in their compos- 
ition, nor are any clues to be gained from his correspondence. 
Except for one occasion in which he referred to the false 
concept of the state of nature, Calhoun confined his remarks 
on the evolution of the texts to progress reports on the process 
of writing. 
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Neverthelessq on the evidence of his brother-in- 
law, Calhoun had prepared himself fully for the task of writing 
political theO3: 'Y* 
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It is difficult to estimate how many copies of the texts 
were printed or how they were distributed. In Crall'b's corresp- 
ondence with Appleton Co., the figure of 6,000 was discussed 
frequently but not conclusively. Distribution is even harder 
to gauge. By a resolution of the South Carolina General Assembly 
of December 16,1851, copies of the volume were to be distribut- 
ed to members of the legislature, judgesp professorsq and lib- 
raries in the statep and were to be presented to such other 
libraries and distinguished individuals (both within and beyond 
the state) as would be an appropriate tribute. 
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This included 
even Northern and European luminaries, among whom were the Fren- 
ch statesman Guizot and the English philosopher j. S. Mill. 
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The Southp as might be expected, showed more enthusiasm 
for the texts than any other part of the Union. Throughout the 
1850s. Southern journals published favourable reviews, though 
in the North the texts appear to have been cordially ignored. 
It was not until after the Civil War that the North American 
Review felt itself able to publish a review. 
71 Yet even within 
the Southp there was a qualitative difference in reaction to 
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to the respective texts. The Discourse, which contained not 
only a states' rights interpretation of the Constitution, but 
also a proposal for sweeping institutional changes by the 
creation of a dual executive, was quickly rejected by South- 
ern politicians as being unworkable and too "philosophic". 
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moreover, as the 1850s progressed Southern hard-liners became 
increasingly less inclined to consider compromise proposals 
for reforming the Union; to them, the salvation of the South 
depended upon her breaking away from the Union and establish- 
ing a separate and independent Confederacy. The Disquisition, 
however, enjoyed a greater degree of prestige. As an abstract 
treatise of political principles it did not have the disadvan- 
tage of being tied to a specific social situation, and especial- 
ly not to one which was made irrelevant by force of arms. The 
point was that the Civil War had rendered the, Discourse obsolete, 
along with all its convoluted arguments for a specific set of 
constitutional gadgets. The Disquisition, on the other hand, 
purported to be universally applicable; it contained no specif- 
ic proposals which called for immediate acceptance or rejection. 
While many Southerners spurned the concrete reforms offered in 
the Discourse, they saw no contradiction in enthusiastically 
embracing the theory which underpinned it. In the scattered 
references made to the texts by the leaders of the Old South 
in the 1850s and during the Civil War, it is invariably the 
Disguisition which is mentioned while the Discourse is all but 
ignore . 
73 
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(c) The Disquisition and the Discourse: Proslavery Texts? 
On no point is scholarly opinion more ambivalent than 
on the contribution Calhoun's texts made to the proslavery 
argument. In spite of the common perception of Calhoun as 
being preeminently a defender of slavery, scholars of the 
proslavery argument have been reluctant to commit themselves 
on the part played by the Disquisition and the Discourse in 
the history of the argument. William Sumner Jenkins' book 
Proslavery Thought in the Old South, still regarded as the 
seminal work in the field, took little account of Calhounts 
texts and relied instead on extracts of Calhoun's political 
speeches to demonstrate his commitment to the defence of 
slavery. 
74 Jenkinst work suffers from taking too narrow a 
sample of proslavery writings because he confined himself to 
examining pamphlets and articles which could be immediately 
identified as overt defences of the institution. A recent 
historian of the proslavery argument, Larry Edward Tise, was 
forced to "discard the notion that proslavery statements were 
limited to well-ordered, closely-argued essays on the virtues 
of slavery", and to conclude that the bulk of Southern writing 
- including fiction, poetry and essays - was shaped by the 
existence of slavery within the borders of the South. Tise 
argued from this that the definition of proslavery ought to 
be extended to include writings which had not previously been 
thought to fall within the scope of proslavery argumentation. 
Unaerlying his contention was the belief that proslavery "was 
a mode of thinkingt a concatenation of ideas, and a system of 
symbols that expressed the socialv cultural and moral values 
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of a large portion of the population of America in the first 
half of the nineteenth century.., 
75 
Despite the narrowness of its scope, the Jenkins thesis 
has exercised considerable sway over historical treatment of 
the proslavery argument, and his narrow definition has contrib- 
uted to the ambivalence with which Calhoun's texts are regarded. 
Both in form and in substancep they are quite unlike anything 
Jenkins or subsequent historians have conventionally viwed as 
falling within the spectrum of proslavery argumentation. It is 
necessary in this section to consider briefly the nature of 
proslavery argumentation in order to draw the contrast between 
it and the political texts of Calhoun. 
When historians speak of the "proslavery argument"t they 
usually refer to the outpouring of literature written in defen- 
ce of the institution in the years between 1820 and 1860. Alth- 
ough W. S. Jenkins noted that the proslavery argument predated 
direct attacks on slavery, it nevertheless acquired an added 
urgency in response to the crusading zeal of the radical abolit- 
ionists. "The course of proslavery theoryllp maintained Jenkins, 
"takes us from the apologist of the early period to the propa- 
gandist of slavery, from an attitude of passivity to one of 
militancyp from toleration to glorification of the institution. , 
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As the abolitionist indictment grew more vociferous, it was 
answered by a spate of arguments designed to meet all conceiv-. 7 
able criticisms of the institution. The most systematic of these 
arguments rested its case on scriptural authority. 
The essence of the scriptural argument was that the inst- 
itution of slavery could not be offensive to God precisely 
because it was sanctioned by the Bible. By a skilful process of 
63 
exegesis, defenders of slavery could demonstrate that slavery 
itself had been instituted directly by God as a Punishment for 
Ham's offences against his father Noah in Genesis IX. 20-25. The 
Curse of Canaan, described in those verses of Genesis, was to 
extend to all the descendants of Ham in perpetuity. This became 
the Biblical basis on which proslavery theologians claimed that 
so far from being an affront to God's law, slavery itself had 
been established by divine decree. The Old Testament yielded 
other, less positive, sanctions for slavery. From the scattered 
references to Abraham and Moses as owning slaves, it was inferred 
that herep toov was firm evidence of divine sanction. Ultimately 
the experience of Israel being held in bondage to Egypt afforded 
the supreme example of a whole nation or race being kept in 
servitude. 
The New Testament was similarly scoured for supporting 
evidence of divine acceptance of slavery, but this, like most 
of the Old Testament references, was mainly negative. The fact 
that Jesus did not condemn the practice of slaveholding was 
construed as another example of divine sanction. So, toop was 
the fact that Paul, in his letter to Philemont intended to 
return the escaped slave Onesimus to his owner. With meticulous 
care and exhaustive research the defenders of slavery prepared 
their arguments from scripture and moved to the attack. North- 
ern opinions which held that slavery was contrary to the spirit 
of christianityp were themselves attacked as being anti-Christ- 
ian for proslavery opinions were "the veritable opinions enter- 
tained on the same subject by the God of the universe. Any 
attemptp therefore to refute them would involve an open conflict 
with the God of heaven, and lead to the rejection of his reveal- 
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ed truth. , 
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But if the Bible proved conclusively, to the proponents 
of slavery at least, that the institution was of divine origin 
and received God's sanctionp it was more difficult to demonstr- 
ate that it applied directly to negroes. To defend the implicit 
racist element of slavery, defenders had to turn to science to 
seek a justification. 
78 The work of Dr. Josiah Clark Nott, Dr. 
Samuel A. Cartwright and others was especially important in this 
connection. Nott and Cartwright attempted to justify on scient- 
ific grounds what had long been a common assumption on the part 
of defenders of slavery - namely, that physiological differences 
between blacks and whites demonstrated the innate inferiority of 
the negro. Craniologists prepared evidence that the brains of 
negroes were smaller than those of whites and concluded that 
this was irrefutable proof of their incapacity for sustained 
rational thought. 
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All this evidence was presented in Southern newspapers, 
pamphlets, bookso sermons and public addresses in the thirty 
or so years before the Civil War. The South's increasing sens- 
itivity to internal and external criticism of its peculiar 
institution was reflected in the high incidence of proslavery 
articles contained in Southern Journals. Of the Southern mag- 
azinest the five most important were: the Southern Literary 
Messenger (1834-1864)v the Southern Literary Journal (1835- 
1838), the Southern Quarterly Review (1842-1857), the Southern 
Review (1828-1832) and DeBow's Review (1846-1880). The tone of 
many of the articles in these journals is visibly more strident 
in the early 1850s. In 1847, for example, the editor of the 
Southern Literary Messenge , Benjamin B. Minor, wrote: "The 
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Messenger so long as we have control of it, shall be a 
distinctive, but not exclusive? Southern periodical.,, 
8o 
Less 
than a decade later, a new editor, John R. Thompsonq was 
urging Southern writers to come to the aid of slavery in an 
article entitled "The Duty of Southern Authors. " 
81 
Four years 
later, in 1860, George W. Bagbyj yet another editor of the 
Messenger, was openly declaring that the South ought to 
secede from the Union. 
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Journals whose original purpose had not specifically 
been to disseminate proslavery arguments, after 1850 became 
vehicles for precisely that purpose. DeBow's Reviewp establish- 
ed in 1846, was originally designed to encourage the develop- 
ment of a rationalised industrial effort in the South, but 
after 1850 it was almost entirely devoted to the defence of 
slavery. Frank Luther Mott has written of DeBow's Review that 
after 1850 "it becomes almost a textbook on the Southern view 
of the slavery question; in the historical essay, the theol- 
ogical dissertationv the ethnological argument, the political 
editoriall in versep satiret fictionv sermon, the changes are 
rung on the defense of human slavery. " 
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Southern magazines like DeBow's and the Southern Quarter- 
22 Review provided a convenient and accessible outlet for the 
proslavery writers. Many of the names of the proslavery school 
appear in more than one periodical: Josiah Clark Nott, for 
example, was a frequent contributor to DeBow's. the Southern 
Quarterly Reviewt and the Southern Reviewq and his theory of 
the diversity of the races, moreover, was first published in 
the Southern Quarterly Review. George Fitzhugh, arguably the 
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most aggressive of the proslavery school in his counter- 
offensive against the northern system of wage slavery, 
published over one hundred articles in DeBow's Review, 
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Other eminent proslavery names included George Frederick 
Holmes, St. George Tuckerp William Gilmore Simms and Edmund 
Ruffin. 
If Southern magazines and periodicals were the main 
vehicle for the dissemination of the proslavery argument, 
the growth of newspapers and libraries in the South between 
1850 and 1860 afforded the timely opportunity of consolidat- 
ing a distinctively southern viewpoint on the question of 
slavery. In 1850, the number of books in southern libraries 
was 561V188; by 1861 this number had increased more than five 
times. Most striking of all was the growth in public libraries: 
in 1850 Georgia came bottom of the list with only three librar- 
iesp but by 1861 this had increased to 288. The most spectac- 
ular growth in libraries occurred in Virginia which between 
1850 and 1861 increased from 21 to 1350.85 Of course, the 
increase in the number of books and library facilities does 
not in itself indicate that the South was self-consciously 
attempting to coordinate a unified viewpoint on slaveryp but 
taken in conjunction with other actionsv this is not an unreas- 
onable supposition; it coincided, for example, with demands 
from Southern Commercial Conventions for a ban on text books 
produced in the North and insistent calls for southern authors 
to take up literary arms in defence of slavery. J. V. Ridgeley, 
in a recent study of nineteenth century Southern literature, 
has described what amounts to a mobilisation of literary 
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resources to stress the distinctiveness of southern literat- 
ure and institutions. 
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Ridgeley's conclusion, that the instit- 
ution of slavery infected the bulk of southern writingt supports 
the contention made by Drew Gilpin Faust and others that many 
southern writers felt obliged to defend slavery as a means of 
establishing their own cultural identity within the South it- 
self. 
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In the light of this backgroundp Calhounts Political 
textsv the Disquisition and the Discourse are doubly puzzling. 
If they were designed to defend slavery, as J. L. Thomas suggests, 
they utilised neither the accepted arguments nor the usual forms 
of conventional proslavery argumentation. Calhoun makes no use 
whatever of either the scriptural argument or the ethnological 
argument in the texts; indeed, in the Disquisition slavery is 
not mentioned at all and in the Discourse only as an historical 
controversy. Furthermorep if Calhoun's intentions in writing 
the texts were to provide an apology for slavery, why did he 
feel the need to use the written word anyway? Clement Eaton has 
suggested that Calhounts influence in the South was all-pervasive 
by virtue of his position in Congress: "More than any other 
propagandist for the righteousness of slavery, Calhoun could 
reach the popular ear. For a period of nearly fifteen years he 
spoke from the rostrum of the Senate urging a policy of no comp- 
romise with abolitionists. His speeches were spread broadcast 
over the Southp through newspapers and through printed pamphlets. 
To a people alert to the drama of politics they were more potent 
instruments of changing public opinion than the literary essays 
of Dewq Harper and Simms. " 
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Being in so well-placed a position 
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to propagate the Southern view of slavery, what Possible reason 
could Calhoun have had in adopting what was for him an entirely 
new medium'of communication? 
Furthermore, it was not as if Calhoun were uninterested 
in the usual arguments of the proslavery school. In 1845, Henry 
Bidleman Bascomp a leading Kentucky Methodist and proslavery 
advocatev wrote a tract entitled Methodism and Slavery in which 
he reviewed the causes of division in the Methodist Church bet- 
ween North and South. 
89 Calhoun was clearly taken with the tract 
which undertook to defend the Southern view of slavery using the 
Biblical argument. In a letter to his son-in-lawp Thomas G. Clem- 
son, Calhoun extolled the virtues of Bascom's work: it wasp he 
maintainedp "one of the fullest and most powerful vindications 
of the South and its institutions, which has yet appeared. It 
will do great good-" "It is gratifying"p continued Calhoun, "to 
see the South taking higher and higher ground on this vital 
oubject. "90 So enthusiastic was Calhoun's opinion of the tract 
that he urged J. H. Hammond to write an article on it in the. South- 
ern Review. 
91 Hammond's enthusiasm for Bascom's work, however, 
did not match Calhoun's; replying to Calhoun's request in August 
1845, Hammond declined the task on the grounds that Bascomes 
defence was basically unsound. "To compliment Dr. Bascom for this 
book, without noticing its unsound and dangerous doctrines in 
strong terms would have had a bad effect in more ways than one, 
and to notice it in such a manner would have been I think impru- 
dent just now. Judging by the difficulty I had in reading his 
confused and long spun essay, I am pretty certain you have only 
looked at it here and there and cannot have seen many passages 
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in it.,, 92 Calhoun, however, was insistent that the work should, 
at least, be noticed; the sound parts of the essay more than 
outweighed the bad points. Hammond concluded that Calhoun's 
enthusiasm for the tract was inflamed more by his desire to 
capture Methodist support in Kentucky for the approaching pres- 
idential contestp than for any intrinsic merit Bascom's script- 
ural argument might have had. 
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Calhoun's interest in scriptural arguments in defence of 
slavery was matched by his interest in scientific data collect- 
ed and collated by proslavery ethnologists. In April 1844, Cal- 
hounp as Secretary of State, wrote to the British Minister in 
Washingtonp Francis Pakenhamp in reply to a letter from Lord 
Aberdeen in which the Prime Minister had sought to allay Ameri- 
can fears over British designs in Texas. Aberdeen, however, 
under pressure from British abolitionists, had reaffirmed the 
British governmentts intentions of opposing the extension of 
slavery throughout the world, and in Texas in particular. Cal- 
houn saw his reply as an opportunity to state categorically that 
British abolitionist tendencies had no business interfering with 
the affairs of possessions outside the control of the British 
government. But Calhoun did not rest his argument entirely on 
the principles of international law; he went on to argue that 
so far from being a moral evil, the institution of slavery was 
a necessary relation between races. Citing evidence from the 
dubious Census of 1840, Calhoun maintained that the experience 
of the United States demonstrated beyond doubt that for negroes 
slavery was the most beneficent of institutions. The existence 
of free blacks in the North afforded ample proof of this; there, 
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negroes had "invariably sunk into vice and pauperism, accompan- 
ied by the bodily and mental afflictions thereto - deafness, 
blindnessp insanity and idiocy - to a degree without example. " 
94 
Calhoun envisaged the Pakenham, letter as being the open- 
ing shot in a protracted campaign over the relative virtues and 
vices of slaveryp and it appears that he looked forward with 
relish to the next salvo. In November 1844, he wrote to Francis 
Wharton expressing his disappointment that the debate had not 
continued: "My two letters to Mr. Pakenham. were intended but as 
the begfinn]ing of a long correspondence with the British Govern- 
ment which in its progress would involve all the subjects embrac- 
ed in her course in reference to our country on the question of 
slavery. In thato I was disappointed, as no reply was made to my 
second letter to Mr. Pakenham; but much, which I intend to bring 
outp has been brought out on other questions.,, 
95 
In preparation for the "long correspondence" which did not 
materialise, Calhoun had immersed himself in ethnological evide- 
nce which was designed to show the peculiar fitness of the negro 
for slavery. Calhoun sent for George R. Gliddon who happened to be 
visiting the capital at the time, and requested that he supply 
him with the latest scientific evidence of racial inferiority. 
Gliddon put Calhoun in touch with Samuel George Mortony a pioneer 
craniologistp who sent Calhoun copies of his two works Crania 
Americana and Crania AeRyptiaca. Gliddon also supplied Calhoun 
with three of his own pamphlets on ethnology. Gliddon was deligh- 
ted that so eminent a statesman as Calhoun was beginning to take 
notice of the findings of the proslavery school of ethnologists. 
He reported with confidence to Calhoun that ethnological findinRs 
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offered incontrovertible proof of negro inferiority. "Negro- 
Races". maintained Gliddon, had "ever been Servants and slaves, 
always distinct fromp and subject to, the Caucasian, in the 
remotest times. " In his eagerness to impress, Gliddon wrote 
that "we have any amount of facts at our disposal to support 
and confirm all those doctrines, that for so long and bright a 
period, have marked the illustrious career of John C. Calhoun. 11 
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It cannot be doubted, then, that Calhoun showed the most 
intense interest in the scriptural and ethnological arguments 
of the proslavery writers. Both on scientific and biblical grounds 
Calhoun accepted as an established fact that the negro was an 
inferior being and that, as such, slavery was the condition to 
which he was best suited. But the original question remains: if 
Calhoun accepted the conventional proslavery arguments why did 
he make no use of them in writing his texts? The absence of such 
arguments suggests that Calhoun's intention in writing the Dis- 
quisition and Discourse was not to provide an open and direct 
defence of slavery, but to attack the patterns of thought which 
gave rise to the abolitionist 
impulse. The structure of Calhoun's 
mind led him back naturally to 
first principles: from his very 
earliest days in Congressp he showed a 
tendency in almost all 
his speeches to view matters of policy in terms of a consistent 
body of underlying principles. 
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Many of his speecheso therefore, 
read like theoretical discourses. To Calhoun, the abolitionist 
indictment of slavery stemmed from an imperfect understanding of 
the , true" principles of political science; a doctrinaire obses- 
sion with abstract theories had obscured the 
fact that politics 
could only be conducted-on the basis of compromise and mutual 
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toleration. The attack on slavery was, ultimately, only a 
symptom of an irrational attachment to libertarian and egalit- 
arian ideals in the face of concrete realities. 
Calhoun's decision to attack the antislavery crusaders 
on the grounds of political theory accounts for the format of 
his political writings. In almost all the letters in which he 
discusses the progress of the works, he emphasises the point 
that he is attempting to evolve a consistent body of political 
principles. Moreoverg his repeated references to "Political 
science" suggest that he believed that for political institut- 
ions to be successful, they ought to conform to certain immut- 
able laws of human behaviour. In the opening paragraphs of the 
D_isquisitionj Calhoun makes explicit his assumption that the 
study of Politics is analagous to the study of natural phenom- 
ena; in his discussion of human nature, he breaks down political 
behaviour into its raw elements and attempts to construct a 
system of goverment based on the actualq observable behaviour 
of human beings. For without identifying the motivations of 
individualsq "it is impossible to lay any solid foundation for 
the science of government as it would be to lay one for that of 
astronomy without a like understanding of that constitution or 
law of the material world according to which the several bodies 
composing the solar system mutually act on each other and by 
which they are kept in their respective spheres. 1198 For Calhoun, 
a successful political system was one, thereforeq which accorded 
with the observed nature of man and took steps to minimise his 
moral weaknesses and develop his potentialities. 
In his decision to eschew the conventional forms of pro- 
slavery writing in favour of a treatise on political science, 
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Calhoun was both ambitious and optimistic. He was ambitious 
because he hoped to correct a habit of thinking which placed 
a higher priority on a priori ideals than. on observed experie- 
nce, which in his book was a short route to disaster. But at 
the same time he was optimistic in his belief that he could 
convince men, by the power of reason and logic, to accept the 
truth of his system. By going back to the first principles of 
politicsy Calhoun believed that he could expose the fallacious 
reasoning which gave rise to abolitionism. False conceptions 
of the nature of man, liberty and equality had produced a 
fundamental distortion of political reality which could only 
be remedied by a return to sound principles based on observed 
experience. Scriptural and ethnological argumentsp valuable as 
they were in consolidating southern opinion on slavery, could 
not answer satisfactorily the charge of the abolitionists that 
all men were created equal and were endowed by their Creator 
with certain inalienable rights. The moral equality of individ- 
uals might ultimately be a theological matter, but politics 
had to contend with the fact that were very real inequalities 
amongst men - inequalities of skillv intelligencev industry 
and ability. A sense of political realism demanded that a 
doctrinnaire attachment to abstract ideals should not obscure 
the way forward to sound political practice. As early as Feb- 
ruary 1837v Calhoun had recognised and had warned against the 
pervasive and fanatical appeal to abstract political concept- 
ions. He told the Senate on February 6th: 
Those who imagine that the spirit now 
abroad in the North, will die wny f it- 
self without a shout [sicv shock? or 
convulsion, have formed a very in dequate 
ýI 
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conception of its real character; it 
will continue to rise and spread, 
unless prompt and efficient measures, 
to stay its progress, be adopted. 
Already it has taken possession of 
the pulpitv of the schools, and to a 
considerable extent of the press; those 
great instruments by which the mind of 
ýhe rising generation will be formed. 99 
Against such "'political-fanaticismllv scriptural and eth- 
nological arguments in defence of slavery held no appeal. The 
scriptural argument in particular was unlikely to convince the 
abolitionist mind in its literal interpretation of the Bible. 
By the mid-nineteenth centuryp American Christianity had been 
largely remoulded to conform to the dominant liberal political 
ideology; the Calvinistic conception of a personalt intervening 
God had to a considerable extent been replaced by deistic noti- 
ons of a prime mover of the universe. The status of the Bible 
as God's written Word had been devalued, even replacedt as the 
sole repository of divine revelation, by a faith in man's capa- 
city for rational thought. 
100 Appeals to the authority of Holy 
Scripture in defence of slavery were therefore hardly likely 
to convince the abolitionists. 
101 Nor, it must be admitted, 
were they likely to convince Calhoun himself. Despite the lip- 
service he paid to Bascom's workt Calhoun was himself deeply 
imbued with deistic conceptions of God, and this is apparent 
in the Disquisition. * 
Calhoun, it appears, then, was attempting a more ambitious 
task in writing the texts than his proslavery fellow Southerners. 
The texts were a self-conscious attempt to lay down realistic 
principles of political behaviour based on the observed nature 
* For Calhoun's religious viewsq see Chapter Five below 
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of man. By elevating the debate to the realm of political theory, 
Calhoun hoped to demonstrate that the southern point of view 
could call on a respectable set of political principles which 
offered a "solid" basis for governmental institutions. It was 
another example of the South taking the higher ground in defence 
of her established institutions. 
(d) Calhoun's Intended Audience 
In November 1851, Richard K. Crall*e' informed Robert M. T. 
Hunter of Virginia that "The first volume of Mr. Calhounts Works 
is now published, containing his views on Goverment, and the 
Constitution-" At the same time, Cralle expressed his convict- 
ion that the work was destined to exercise a powerful influence 
on public opinion throughout the Union. "It cannot be otherwise",, 
he continued, "A few, and these prominent Whigs, to whom I have 
loaned the single volume I have, have openly and publicly decla- 
J02 
red that its views and arguments are unmeasurable. Cralle's 
optimism mayp in part, be attributed to the role he played as 
editor of the texts, but there can be little doubt that it was 
also a faithful reflection of Calhoun's own hopes of the effect 
that the Disquisition and the Discourse would have. 
Much has been written in recent years about the audience 
to whom the proslavery argument was directed. Historians follow- 
ing the lead taken by W. S. Jenkins, have generally assumed that 
the proslavery arguments took the form of a counter-offensive 
against the attacks of northern abolitionists. Jenkins' assert- 
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ion that "Slavery had defenders whenever defenders were needed; 
the exact nature of the defense was determined to a great extent 
by the degree to which and by the way in which the welfare of 
slavery was endangered"l seemed inevitably to point to the fact 
that proslavery writings were intended in some way to answer 
the charges of the abolitionists. 
103 But if abolitionist attacks 
were the occasion for proslavery counter-assertions, it does not 
follow that the abolitionists themselves were their targets. In 
1936, Professor William B. Hesseltine suggested that the outpour- 
ing of proslavery literature was designed specifically to win 
over the southern non-slaveholder to the side of the upper-class 
planter in order to produce sectional unanimity on the issue of 
slavery. 
104 Since Hesseltine's work was published (in the 1930s), 
other convincing arguments have been advanced to support his 
general conclusion that the proslavery argument was directed 
inwards towards the South itself. Ralph Morrow argued that the 
proslavery argument was intended to buttress the stricken consc- 
iences of slaveholders themselves who felt uneasy about the 
contradictions between the professed American creed of liberty 
and equality and the existence of the institution Of slavery. 
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Morrow presented convincing evidence to show that the North, by 
the 1840s and 1850s, was intransigent on the issue andq more to 
the Pointo that Southern writers realised this. Northern intran- 
sigence was manifested by its refusal to publish proslavery 
defences in the national newspapers and the reluctance of north- 
ern publishing houses to print them. 
106 David Donaldq dissenting 
from Morrow's conclusiong nevertheless reaffirmed that the South 
was the main target of proslavery propaganda. Donald found the 
main impetus for the proslavery argument in the psychological 
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make-up of the proslavery writers themselves. He argued that, 
in the main, the proslavery propagandists were men who were 
frustrated by their own position within Southern society and 
that in their writings they projected an idealised and largely 
mythical vision of a paternalistic South. They were driven on 
by a yearning to recreate a society which had never really 
existed outside their own dreams. 
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If the weight of historical opinion seems to suggest 
that the proslavery argument was directed to the South itself, 
this marks another point of departure between the texts of Cal- 
houn and the general proslavery dialectic. From the evidence of 
his lettersl it is clear that Calhoun intended his texts to have 
a considerable effect on northern opinion. Whether this was 
nothing more than an optimistic faith in his own ability to 
reach an intransigent audience, or a shrewd estimate of his 
political reputation within the North, Calhoun did not share 
the despondency of other proslavery propagandists over the Northts 
refusal to read southern defences of slavery. 
108 In October 1849, 
he wrote to Anna about the progress of the texts: "I think the 
vvork is called for by the times, and that it will make an impres- 
sion. I have stated my opinions on all points, just as I enter- 
tain themp without enquiring, or regarding, whether they will 
be popularv or not. Truth is my object, and to that I closely 
adhereoo*& , 
log In the same month, Calhoun wrote to his son 
Andrew Pickens Calhoung reporting that the texts were "looked 
to with great interest" in the North. 
110 
Calhoun's desire to reach a northern audience may have 
controlled his decision to have the texts printed in New York. 
Charles Wiltse maintains that Calhoun "undoubtedly" had some 
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correspondence with Harper Brothers in New York during the 
summer of 1849 and the Washington correspondent of the New 
York Herald reported inaccurately in his despatch of December 
30tho 1849 that the texts were already in the press. 
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It is possible that Calhoun felt he may have been more 
successful in presenting the southern case to the North than 
the more overtly proslavery advocates because of his position 
as a national statesman. Calhoun was well aware that his name 
carried considerable weight beyond the boundaries of the South; 
as a contender in at least two presidential elections, he had 
formed contacts in every state of the Union, and his name was 
more widely known than that of any other Congressional politic- 
ian, with the possible exception of Henry Clay and Daniel 
Webster. Furthermorep his political career had demonstrated 
that his interest extended over a wide range of policy decis- 
ions and was not confined to the single obsessive issue of 
slavery. Though the slavery issue increasingly came to dominate 
his coursev the awareness of his other contributions on matters 
of complexity and delicacy may have disposed the northern public 
to give Calhoun a fairer hearing than his proslavery counter- 
parts. 
Calhoun may also have believed that the format in which 
he presented the texts would encourage the North to view him 
not as a proslavery advocate, but as a serious political theor- 
ist searching for basic principles of political action. His 
emphasis on the scientific approach to politics in general would, 
he believedv appeal to all reasonable minds in the Northp and 
would "do much to explode errors and cast light on the subjects 
of which they treat.,, 
113 
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If Calhoun envisaged the texts as peforming a valuable 
function in themselves of correcting false notions of political 
action, they may also have served a more politically expeditious 
task. Gerald M. Capers has suggested that the writing of the texts 
was one element of a dual strategy of force and persuasion. Cal- 
houn, he arguesq devoted the last year of his life to a campaign 
designed to clarify once and for all the issues between North 
and South. The coercive element of this strategy manifested 
itself in his strenuous advocacy of a Southern Convention which 
would accomplish the double purpose of consolidating southern 
unity and at the same time of presenting a united front to the 
North. By defining the southern position as one of implacable 
opposition to further northern encroachments, Calhoun hoped to 
convince the North that the South was no longer prepared to tol- 
erate external attacks on her vital institutions. By drawing the 
line and in effect issuing the North with an ultimatumt Calhoun 
was hoping to persuade moderate conservative elements in the 
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North to restrain the extreme abolitionists. When Mississippi 
called a state convention to elect delegates to a Southern Conv- 
ention to be held in Nashville in June 1850, Calhoun gave his 
wholehearted approval: "Plississippi has acted well on the Slave 
question", he wrote, "and I hope Alabama and every other South- 
ern State will back her and send delegates to Nashville. It is 
all important that they should. Bad would be our condition, if 
the Convention should fail for want of backing., 9115 
The texts9 according to Capers, formed the persuasive arm 
of this strategy; the Discourse in particular, with its review 
of American constitutional history and its arguments about the 
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intentions of the framers, would show the North how the South 
was being tyrannised. Taken in conjunction, the strategy could 
not fail to convince the North that dissolution of the Union 
was the unavoidable consequence of further abolitionist assaul- 
ts. 116 
The North, then, seems to have been the main target of 
the texts in Calhoun's mind. Nevertheless, the effect they would 
have on the South itself should not be underestimated. The succ- 
ess of the proslavery arguments based on scripture and ethnoloay 
was considerable within the South, but they were insufficient to 
provide an all-embracing political defence of the section within 
the Union. Jesse T. Carpenter has identified the constitutional 
mechanisms that the South relied upon for the protection of her 
institutions as a sectional minority as being the principles of 
local self-governmentt the concurrent voicep constitutional guar- 
antees and finallyp the threat of secession. 
117 The theory of 
the concurrent majorityq with which Calhoun is preeminently iden- 
tifiedv was most fully and systematically set out in the Disquis- 
ition and it showed Calhoun's concern not only to justify south- 
ern institutions, but also to propose a workable mechanism to 
protect those institutions. In writing the textsv Calhoun was 
performing a most valuable service for the South in providing 
her with a fully worked-out means of protection. 
That the South itself looked with great interest to the 
publication of the texts is attested to by the letters of encou- 
ragement Calhoun received from friends and political associates. 
In April 1845t Prancis Wharton summed up the sense of anticipat- 
ion when he wrote: "The friends of constitutional law and of 
true political science, expect much from you. We want a full, 
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thorough, and just, disquisition on the theory of our constit- 
ution, and we want, in addition, to it, what Hallam has given 
to Great Britaing a sketch of our constitutional history. 
J18 
Similarly, J. H. Hammond writing to Calhoun three years later, 
expressed himself "extremely anxious to see your Book on Govern- 
ment". Hammond's main concern was to get from Calhoun a positive 
defence of property rights which could be used in the political 
arena to defend slaveholding. 
119 
Calhoun's intended audience seems primarily to have been 
the North2 though the South's lack of a systematic theoretical 
defence may have acted as an added incentive. Yet there is a 
clear sense in which Calhoun hoped to transcend the immediate 
political context and to make a positive and original contribut- 
ion to the study of government in general. The style of the 
texts, especially the Disquisition, is that of an abstract treat- 
ise in the tradition of classic political theorists. His preocc- 
upation with framing the system of governm. ent on supposedly 
value-free premises derived from direct observation of man's 
nature2 suggests Calhoun's desire to evolve a governmental frame- 
work based on a realistic apprehension of man's capacities and 
weaknesses. His repeated assertion that he was investigating 
"the elementary principles of political science" shows that, 
however interested a party he was in the sectional conflict, he 
believed in an absolute standard of political behaviour which 
applied to all communities at all periods of history. In this 
way, his texts may have been addressed to all serious students 
of government. 
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(e) The European Dimension 
If Calhoun envisaged the texts as performing a persuasive 
function within the Union - South as well as North - it is equally 
clear that he hoped for a wider audience. His letters to various 
correspondents over the period during which the texts were com- 
posed offer striking evidence that he expected his ideas to have 
some impact in Europe. In a letter to the young Francis Wharton 
in December 1843, Calhoun made the first reference to his intent- 
ion to write about political matters in a theoretical sense, and 
it is notable that the intention, casual as it then waso was 
prompted by a concern to correct European misconceptions of the 
American system of government: "The conception on that side of 
the Atlantick"O he wrote, 11 is universally false in reference to 
our system of government. It is indeed a most remarkable system; 
the most sop that ever existed. I have never yet discussed it in 
its higher elementary principles, or rather, I ought to say, in 
reference to higher elementary principles of Political science. 
If I should have leisure, I may yet do it., 1120 
Calhoun's impressions of the general state of European 
opinion in regard to the United States were formed by the numerous 
contacts he made with visiting Europeans and with official Amer- 
ican representatives abroad. Amongst the visitors to Washington 
who sought out his company were Harriet Martineau, the indomitable 
British social reformer and antislavery crusader. Miss Martineau's 
opinion of Calhoun was ambivalent; the portrait she painted of him 
in her account of her travels, as the "cast-iron man" obsessed 
with the single aim of perpetuating human slavery, is tinged with 
a perverse kind of admiration which found later expression in her 
Autobiography. "Mr. Calhoun", she wrotep "whom with all his absurd- 
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ities,, I respected by far the most of the three[Clay, Webster 
and Calhoun], in the long run. All were hugely ambitious: but 
Calhoun was honest in the main point. He lived and died for 
the cause of slavery; and, however far such a career is from 
the sympathies of the English peoplep the openness and direct- 
ness of his conduct were at least respectable. He was infatuated 
by his sectional attachments: but he was outspoken and consist- 
ent. " 
121 
Other eminent European visitors included Robert Owen 
and Charles Dickens. In the winter of 1824, Robert Owen is 
recorded as "having spent the evening in a t6te-a-tke with 
Mr. Calhoun, whom he considers a man of considerable genius 
and extensive speculator into the progress of events.,, 
122 In 
March 1842p Charles Dickens visited the capital and met with 
a series of "very remarkable men", including Calhounp though 
it appears that the Dickenses made a more lasting impression 
on Calhoun than he on them. 
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It is difficult to estimate accurately the precise 
effect of these contacts in forming Calhounts impressions of 
English and European opinion. Calhoun would certainly have 
known of the antislavery sympathies of Harriet Martineau and 
Charles Dickens. It is more likelyp howeverg that Calhoun's 
information was gained from other sources more intimately 
attuned to political matters. During the course of the 1840s, 
Calhoun was in constant communication with trusted associates 
who travelled extensively in Europe. His son-in-lawp Thomas G. 
Clemsono was appointed charge d'affaires in Brussels in May 
1844, taking Annap Calhoun's favourite daughter, with him. 
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It seems that as an informant, Anna was more useful to Calhc---- 
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than her husband. Charles Wiltse has commented that her 
"thought processes were so like his Calhoun's own as to be 
almost an extension of his faculties. " 
125 The frequency of 
their correspondencev coupled with Annals extensive comment- 
ary on European affairst suggests that she was the main agent 
in shaping his impressions of the European scene. Another 
important source was Calhoun's close friend and political 
supporterv Duff Green. Green had been an ardent admirer and 
confidant of Andrew Jackson and a member of his kitchen cabin- 
et, but broke with him over the Eaton affair. After that, 
Green's political sympathies were transferred to Calhoun and 
were consolidated when Greents daughter married Calhounts son, 
126 Andrew Pickens Calhount in May 1836. In December 1841, 
Green was given the important post of President Tylerts person- 
al representative to the British governmentp where he remained 
until January 1844. Throughout his time in Londong Green corr- 
esponded frequently with Calhoun and kept him informed of the 
state of British opinion, both in the government and in the 
country at large. Through his own personal contacts and writings, 
Green attempted to shape British public opinion to accommodate 
American policies and institutions - including the institution 
of slavery. It was to this end that he urged Calhounp amongst 
othersp to publish letters and articles directly in the British 
press. In September 18439 Green reported to Calhoun that he had 
arranged for the prestigious Edinburgh Review to publish a 
review of his, Calhoun's. life and speeches and "Judge Upshur's 
review of Judge Story's book on the Am. Constitution. 11 A concerted 
campaign in the British press would go a long wayg Green was 
convinced "in disabusing the European Public as to our character 
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and institutions. 1,127 
A similar concern motivated the efforts of William R. 
King, American Minister to France. late in 1844, King wrote 
to Calhoun expressing his frustrations over the inability of 
American institutions to receive a faithful representation in 
the French press. King's anger was stimulated by the efforts 
of British abolitionists to agitate the issue of emancipation 
in the French colonies which culminated in the impending dis- 
cussion of the measure in the French legislature. King comp- 
lained to Calhoun that "many of the prominent Journals in 
Paris are in the pay of Exeter Hall; and they abound in public- 
ations containing the most false and exagerated statements on 
the subject of slavery. If France influenced by the efforts 
now makinap should abolish slavery in her Coloniest Spain and 
Brazill will be compelled to yield to the pressure which will 
be brought to bear upon them; and the United States will be 
left to stand alonev with the whole civilized world against 
her. " King's suggested remedy for this state of affairs was to 
urge Calhounp as Secretary of State, to appropriate money from 
"the secret or contingent fund at your disposal" to finance a 
carefully-orchestrated propaganda campaign in the French press. 
Unless such a campaign were initiated, official diplomatic rep- 
resentatives would have to sit idly by "and see our Institutions 
stigmatized and our people calumniated without the means of 
counteracting the false impressions made to our prejudice. " 
128 
Calhoun was thus well aware of European attitudes towards 
the United Statesv and her institutions. His distrust of these 
attitudes was further reinforced by the activities of British 
abolitionists and the support they gave to their American count- 
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parts. The most visible British intervention in American 
affairs developed over the question of the annexation of 
Texas. In the mid 1830s, Texas had broken away from Mexico 
and had established herself as an independent republic, but 
had indicated that she was not unwilling to become a part of 
the United States. The southern states saw in annexation an 
opportunity to extend the boundaries of slavery within the 
Unionp since Texas had maintained the institution even though 
it had been abolished by Mexico. It was for precisely this 
reason that some elements in the North were reluctant to 
accede to demands for annexation. If Texas were annexed as a 
slaveholding statep the balance between the sections would be 
upset to the disadvantage of the North, 
129 
The situation was complicated by the fact that the 
British government and British abolitionist societies looked 
to Texas with interest. To the British governmentq an indepen- 
dent Texas linked to Britain by a commercial treaty would serve 
the dual purpose of checking the growth of the United States 
and of providing a base from which to launch commercial exten- 
sion into the American continent. To the English abolitionists 
Texas was viewed as a test case; they believed that Britairl 
should support an independent Texas, but make emancipation 
condition of recognition. This policy was urged on the govOýn- 
ment by John Scoble in his pamphlet "Texas, Its claims to 
be 
R_ecognised as an Independent Power by Great Britain", publi5hea 
in December 1839.130 
The effect of foreign censure of American institutiO110 
seems to have confirmed in Calhoun's mind the need for a Vui" 
able corrective to the "false" impressions created abroad. 
In 
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the letters where he refers to the writing of the Disquisition 
and the Discourse this seems to be a recurring preoccupation. 
Following the Revolutions of 1848 in Europe, the completion 
of the texts became a matter of added urgency. It was not, Cal- 
houn feltv that the European countries had misconceived the 
nature of American government so much as they had misconceived 
the nature of liberty and equality in their own countries. 
Writing to his daughter Anna in June 1848, Calhoun explained 
that France's "conception of liberty is false throughout. Her 
standard of liberty is ideal; it belongs to that kind of liberty 
which man has been supposed to possess, in what has been falsely 
called a state of nature, -a state supposed to have prec eded 
the social and political, and in which, of course, if it ever 
existedv he must have live da part, as an isolated individual, 
without Societyr or Government. " It was this habit of thinking 
that Calhoun was concerned most of all to combat because it led 
to utopian dreams which could never be realised in practice. 
Furthermore, the pernicious effects of this mode of thought 
was threatening American institutions: "Abolitionism originates 
in ito which every day becomes more formidable, and if not speed- 
ily arrestedv must terminate in the dissolution of our Union.,, 
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Evidence of American receptivity of transatlantic 
principles had already been graphically demonstrated in the 
Dorr uprising in Rhode Island in 1842. Discontent over the 
restricted franchise granted by the colonial charter under 
which Rhode Island was still governed, burst forth in 1841 
when an unsanctioned constitutional convention framed a new 
constitution. The "People's Constitutionllp as it was called, 
extended the franchise from a small group of freeholders to 
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all adult males. In April 1842, a state-wide election was 
held under the illegal constitution, and Thomas Dorr Wilson 
was elected Governor. The constitutionally-elected Governor 
of the state appealed to the Federal government for support 
when Dorr prepared to take control by force. The uprising 
collapsed in June 1842, but the episode had a lasting effect 
on public opinion in the United States. 
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Calhounp writing 
in April 1848, to James Edward Calhoun, made the explicit 
connexion between "Dorrism" and the revolutionary principles 
of France. Explaining to his son the delay in the completion 
of the textst he wrote: "I do not think anything will be loast 
[sic] by the delay. I do not think the public mind is yet 
fully prepared for the work, nor will be, until there has 
been such failure and embarassment in the French experiment 
as will bring into distrust and doubt, Dorrism, so as to 
prepare the publick mind to have its errors and consequences 
pointed outy and to reflect seriously on the question; what 
are the elements, which are indispensable to constitute a 
constitutional popular government?....,, 
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It seems clear, then, that Calhoun intended the texts 
to have some influence on European opinion and that hope was 
made explicit in a letter to Andrew Pickens Calhoun in July 
1849- Commenting on the progress of the textst Calhoun wrote: 
"The work will hit the lines both here and in Europe; and, I 
thinkt cannot fail to make a deep impression.,, 
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Calhoun 
, hoped 
that the Disquisition and the Discourse would perform 
a dual function in Europe: in the first place, they would 
clarify beyond doubt the principles upon which the American 
system was based and present a cateRorical assertion of the 
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consistency of American institutions. This task devolved 
primarily on the Discourse, in which Calhoun drew his 
principles from the intentions of the Founding Fathers. 
By demonstrating the compatibility of American practice 
and theory, he hoped to forestall direct criticism from 
Europe of American institutions. But Calhoun was not 
content to rest his case there; the Disquisition was design- 
ed to provide a tightly-knit body of principles upon which 
all constitutional governments ought to be built. He believed 
that political knowledgev like all scientific knowledge, came 
from the patient observation of behaviour combined with the 
careful framing of tentative hypotheses. In April 1848, he 
reported to Anna that he looked "with greater solicitude for 
the unfolding of the great events now in progress in Europe, 
as they afford me an opportunity to test the truth or error 
of the principlesy which I have laid down in my elementary 
discourse on Government .... I cannot doubt the correctness 
of the principles for they are drawn from facts in the moral 
worldv just as certainp as any in the physical; but I am 
solicitous to see, how far they are subject to modification 
in their practical application to the present condition of the 
civilized world, which is so very different from anyt that 
ever preceded it in many respects.., 
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It seems clear that the European dimension to the texts 
was not an unimportant one in Calhoun's mind. His deliberate 
decision to frame the, Disquisition,, at least, in the form of 
an abstract and supposedly universal theory would have appealed 
to a European audience. Calhoun hoped that it would provide a 
much-needed corrective to the dangerous political doctrines 
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which were emanating from Europe, and from France in part- 
icular; moreover, he hoped, somewhat optimisticallyt that 
the texts in themselves would produce a revolution in the 
patterns of thought which had given rise to abstract and 
unrealistic political creeds. 
(f) Conclusion 
From the evidence of the foregoing sectionst certain 
conclusions may be drawn about Calhoun's intentions in 
writing the Disquisition and the Discourse. In the first 
place, although they were occasioned by the constitutional 
debates over slavery and its place within the Union, the texts 
do not fall within the accepted spectrum of proslavery argu- 
mentation. The abandonment of scriptural and ethnological 
arguments in favour of a general theory of government suggests 
that Calhoun was taking an "enlarged" view of the situation, 
pursuing the consequences for politics back to their logical 
conclusions. For the proslavery school, the preservation of 
slavery was the beginning and the end of their vision; so 
deeply embedded in the southern psyche had the institution 
become - as an economic relation certainly, but more import- 
antly as a social relation - that they contemplated its 
demise with dread; and from that dread they conjured up the 
ghastly spectre of a society and system of values uprooted 
and overturnedv of mass slaughter and rape, of political and 
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and social anarchy. The prospect of the termination of their 
distinctive way of life was unthinkable. 
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There is no doubt that Calhoun shared their fears. In 
his speeches to the Senate, he presented a variety of arguments 
in favour of perpetuating slavery: on the grounds of the natur- 
al inferiority of the negrop the economic ruin it would entail 
for slaveholders if the relation were ended, on the notion that 
the enslavement of one social grouping was a prior condition of 
the progress of the remainder, even on the old Jeffersonian 
argument that abolition would cause greater evil for society 
than if it were left untouched. 
137 Yet what disturbed Calhoun 
most was the frightening prospect that the central pillar on 
which southern civilisation rested could be pulled down by 
constitutional means. Since the founding of the republict the 
South had become increasingly aware of her minority status 
within the Union. Economically and industrially she had watch- 
ed the North expand while she herself remained static. In the 
Halls of Congressp especially in the House of Representatives, 
northern growth was reflected in the number of Congressmen she 
sent to Washington. In the Senate the South had maintained 
parity of numbers only after bitter and divisive debates over 
the admission of new states, resulting in uneasy compromises. 
All this might not have mattered so much had there existed an 
ideological consensusp a basic agreement between the sections 
on the principles and values which governed Political life. But 
whatever consensus there had been in 1787, it had been a fragile 
one; James Madison had prophetically pointed out to the Const- 
itutional Convention that "the great danger to our general 
goverment is the great southern and northern interests of the 
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continent, being opposed to each other.,, 
138 Since the Missouri 
Compromise in 1820, the consensus was in danger of splitting 
apart on the issue of slavery. The agitation of the northern 
abolitionists in the 1830s brought the issue out into the open 
and demonstrated to the South that once her northern neighbour 
had achieved a constitutional majority capable of doing so, she 
would abolish slavery throughout the Union. By 1850v the split 
between the sections on the slavery question was so far advanced 
that Calhoun wrote just three weeks before he died that it was 
"difficult to see how two peoples so different and hostile can 
exist together in one common Union.,, 
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For Calhoung as for most southerners, abolition was an 
horrendous thought; but that it could be accomplished under 
existing constitutional arrangements was intolerable. To his 
mindp trained in the intricacies of constitutional argument, 
it demonstrated a fundamental defect of the Constitution. That 
a majority couldv with the full sanction of lawp deprive a min- 
ority of her rights appeared manifestly unjust. Had not the 
writer of Federalist No-51 claimed that "Justice is the end of 
government" and "In a society under the forms of which the 
stronger faction can readily unite and oppress the weaker, 
anarchy may as truly be said to reign as in a state of nature, 
where the weaker individual is not secured against the violence 
of the stronger'19 But had he not significantly added that "In 
the extended republic of the United States... a coalition of 
a majority of the whole society could seldom take place on any 
other principles than those of justice and the general good'19 140 
The problem that Calhoun recognised and confronted head on was 
that on the issue of slavery, there were two antithetical senses 
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of justice. The Northv holding fast to the traditional 
liberal creed, condemned outright the notion and practice 
that one category of human beings could be held in slavery 
as the property of other human beings, while the South, on 
the contrary, believed that its liberty could only be secured 
by the frank recognition of its rights to hold such property. 
The implications for American politics were profound. 
Calhoun perceived that it was possible for any majority to 
unite on an idea and to tyrannise the minority party. The 
elaborate safeguards which the Founding Fathers had built into 
the Constitution had been unable to prevent it from occurring 
in the United States, and, he reasoned, other countries less 
sensitive to the rights of their minorities, might suffer from 
the same defect. Important as the threat to slavery was, it 
was nonetheless an example of how inadequately constructed 
governments could turn on one section of its citizens. This, 
in some measure, accounts for the differences in style between 
the Disquisition and the Discourse: while the latter addressed 
itself to the immediate problem as it appeared in the United 
Statesy the former considered the wider implications for polit- 
ical systems in general. This, too, is the reason why Calhoun's 
texts differ so strikingly from the usual arguments of the pro- 
slavery school. Where they contrived an exhaustive set of 
arguments to defend the institution of slavery directly, Cal- 
11oun looked beyond the immediate threat to explore the ramific- 
ations for government. In this sense, Calhoun may justly be 
called a political theorist. By returning to first principles 
he was seeking to close a loophole which had been left in lib- 
, eral 
theory by John Locke, and which had worked itself out in 
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its practical operation in the crisis over slavery. Taken 
together, the Disquisition and the Discourse dealt with 
both facets of the problem: the Disquisition attempted to 
resolve the theoretical difficulties while the Discourse 
addressed itself to the practical problem of protecting a 
particular minority in a particular time and place. Slavery, 
as the critical issuev was hardly touched on at all for there 
was no great merit in repeating arguments which one section 
passionately believed and the other studiously ignored. What 
was needed was a fully worked-out method of protection which 
had a sound basis in theory. It is this, more than anything 
elsey that separated Calhoun from the proslavery school. Their 
obsession with defending the institution directly displayed 
an ideological commitment which is not apparent in Calhoun's 
texts. 
Not apparento at least, on the surface. For there is 
an intriguing aspect to Calhoun's Disquisition which will 
receive fuller treatment in the second part of this study, 
but which deserves a mention here. The protection of minorit- 
ies which Calhoun was so anxious to secure was ultimately an 
extension of the protection accorded to all individuals under 
natural rights theory. Indeed, there is no logical reason'why 
minorities should be protected at all except insofar as they 
are aggregations of individuals, each possessing inalienable 
rights. The proper tradition of concern which Calhoun ought to 
have been contributing to was, therefore, the liberal one which 
was based entirely on natural rights theory. But instead, Cal- 
houn launches a systematic attack on its most cherished theor- 
etical postulates; he strikes 
down the notion of a presocial 
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state of nature, from which the whole concept of natural 
rights originally derived; he dispenses with the social 
contract which was the device by which those rights were 
secured in society. In the place of these unabridgable 
personal rights which predate society, he interposes a set 
of rights which is determined by the community and which is 
subject to periodic revision. Calhoun thus ends up by arguing 
against himself. So far from producing a theory which safe- 
guards the rights of minorities, he effectively eliminates 
the logical justification for such protection and in the 
process creates the rationale for a kind of communitarian 
coerciveness. If society - in whatever way - determines the 
rights of its citizens, what is there to stop it from tyrann- 
ising a dissenting minority in the name of the common good? 
Had Calhoun been solely interested in evolving theor- 
etical techniques to protect minorities, there would have 
been no need for him to have abandoned the philosophy of 
natural rights. That he felt the need to do so suggests that 
he had another purpose in mind, that is, to include in his 
scheme of government no premises which, when traced back, 
could be construed as giving support to antislavery doctrines. 
While the Disquisition contains no ideas which are obviously 
proslavery, it does attack concepts on which the abolitionists 
had relied heavily. 
Whatever the logical difficulties of the texts (and 
these will be examined in subsequent chapters), it seems clear 
that Calhoun would have been unhappy in writing in any other 
genre. The proslavery school of writers relied too much on 
evidence which was capable of being overthrown when confronted 
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by a good argument. Its reliance especially on scriptural 
authority would not have appealed to Calhoun9s deistic 
inclinations. What he was primarily interested in, and 
what compelled his attention most, was the appeal to princ- 
iple: for years in the Senate he had exasperated his colleag- 
ues by meticulously extracting the principles involved in 
each question of public policy. It was not always the most 
obvious principle that he extracted, but once he had decided 
he defended it with a powerful logic. The Disquisition, 
especially, reflects this distinctive style. Calhoun's 
faith in the ability of his principles to persuade others 
to accept his point of view rested on his belief in the 
reasonableness of the human mind. It was this belief that 
encouraged him to think, perhaps over-optimisticallyq that 
he could reach an audience in the North which had long since 
closed its mind to the arguments of the proslavery South. 
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PART TWO 
THE DISQUISITION ON GOVERNMENT AND THE CONCEPT OF THE 
"REACTIONARY ENLIGHTENMENT" 
Chapter Three: The Intellectual Ethos of Enlightenment 
Thought in Europe and America 
(a) The "Reactionary Enlightenment" 
Up to this pointp attention has been focused on the 
external details of Calhoun's political texts with very 
little reference to the ideas they contain. Moreoverp they 
have been treated as a conceptual whole, united in purpose 
in the mind of the author, but comprehending different areas 
of concern. That this procedure was appropriate in gauging 
Calhoun's intentions seems confirmed by the evidence; at no 
point in the composition of the texts did Calhoun conceive 
of them as having an existence independent of one another. 
The possibility of publishing them separately did not occur 
to Calhoun because from the outset both texts were necessary 
to fulfil the function he intended for them: to convince the 
North and the South that the only hope for saving the Union 
was by means of a constitutional amendment by which the vital 
interests of both sections could be protected. 
1 The Discourse, 
which contained the proposal for a plural executive, was the 
heart of the matter; but to a man of Calhoun's cast of mind, 
an argument unsupported by a consistent set of underlying 
principles was incomplete and infinitely capable of contra- 
diction. What was needed to give force and vitality to the 
specific proposals of the Discourse was such a body of prin- 
ciplesp and it was this function which devolved upon the Dis- 
Oui; ition. An intimate,, purposive connection was thus estab- 
lished between the texts by Calhoun at their inception. 
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It nevertheless remains the case that however united 
the texts were in purpose and intention, they appear in style 
and content to bear very little relation to one another. Cal- 
houn's assertion in April 1848 that the Discourse was to be 
"a philosophical discussion on its 
[the U. S. Constitution's I 
character and constitution in illustration of the elementary 
treatise.,... " seems not to have been borne out. 
2 Except inso- 
far as the concurrent majority is discussed, the Discourse 
makes no use of the theoretical elements laid down in the 
Disquisition; its arguments are essentially historical and 
legalistic. 
3 In the first place, Calhoun establishes with 
great plausibility that the framers of the Constitution 
intended to construct a government based on the principle of 
concurrence. By dividing the federal government into three 
branches and carefully apportioning each with powers which 
interlocked with the others, the framers, Calhoun argued, 
ensured that no one arm of the government could act unilater- 
ally without the concurrence of at least one other department. 
The different bases of representation for each branch ensured 
also that no governmental action could be undertaken without 
the consent of a wide spectrum of divergent interests. Thus, 
for a law to be enacted, the consent of a majority of the 
House of Representatives and a majority of the Senate plus 
the consent of the chief magistrate was required; since each 
was elected by different modes of representation and was res- 
ponsible to different electoral constituencies, the interests 
of a large proportion of the electorate were consulted, at 
4 
least nominallyt before a bill could become law. 
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Having established to his own satisfaction that the 
Constitution embodied the concurrent principle, Calhoun 
moved on to consider whether or not political events since 
the 1780s had conformed to it. Beginning with the Judiciary 
Act of 1789, Calhoun maintained that the federal government 
had displayed a tendency to invade the powers reserved to 
the respective states. The Act, by making the Supreme Court 
the final court of appeal in cases involving state, as well 
as federal, law had converted the federal government into the 
"sole judge3, in the last resort, as to the extent of its 
powers, and to place the States and their respective govern- 
ments and institutions at its mercy.., 
5 Thist coupled with the 
rise of organised political factions and the spoils system, 
had tended to subvert the concurrent principle and to consol- 
idate power in the hands of the general government. 
The finalv brief section of the Discourse contained 
Calhoun's remedy for the evils resulting from this situation. 
Despite the checks and balances which the framers had written 
into the Constitutiong political power had accumulated in the 
hands of the general government. Moreover, this irresistible 
power was now threatening the vital interests of a large 
minority of the Union. The South, marked off from the rest of 
the United States by the peculiarity of its institutions and 
by an awareness of pemanency of its minority status, came 
under attack from the radical abolitionists; it was only a 
matter of timet Calhoun felt, before the competing political 
parties would adopt ab-olitionist platforms in an effort to 
win abolitionist support and votes. To prevent this, Calhoun 
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maintained that the government ought to be restored to its 
federal character and to this end he proposed five reforms. 
The repeal of section 25 of the 1789 Judiciary Act was an 
indispensable first step, by which the individual states 
would regain their equal status with the federal gover=ent. 
The power of Congress to lay duties and to make appropriat- 
ions was to be severely circumscribed in order to prevent it 
from exceeding its constitutional competence; the executive 
department would be divested of all discretionary power and 
held to a strict construction of the Constitution; the unoff- 
icial power of presidential patronage would be closely checked 
by the other branches of government. These reformsp Calhoun 
arguedv could be accomplished by Congress acting in the inter- 
est of the general good. But one other reform - one of an 
organic nature - was necessary. Correction of previous abuses 
was crucialp but further measures were needed to ensure that 
similar abuses could not arise in the future. Calhoun proposed 
that the nature of the executive department be altered by means 
of a constitutional amendment to accommodate a plural executive, 
whereby each of the two great sections of the Union would be 
represented. Every bill would require the assent of both pres- 
idents before it passed into law, thus ensuring equal protect- 
ion for the sec lons. 
6 
Two central points emerge from the arguments of the Dis- 
_course. 
In the first place, Calhouvis vindicated from the 
charge that he was actively seeking the dissolution of the 
Union. The elaborate constitutional reforms that he was putting 
forward in the Discourse were designed to avert the danger of 
102 
IL, 
dissolution by eradicating the source of the political evil. 
He did not condemn the framers of the original constitution 
for constructing a government which left loopholes through 
which power might be consolidated; on the contrary, he was 
generous in his praise of their remarkable work. They had 
achieved as much as could reasonably be expected of them 
given the information about political mechanics that they 
were working from. Now, it was up to later generations to 
determine what defects the system contained in the light of 
experience. Calhoun conceived his task as remedying those 
defects and thus continuing the work of the framers, rather 
than seeking to destroy it. 
7 In this sense, his oft-repeated 
claim that he was evolving a "conservative" principle was 
true; he wished above all to preserve the essential princip- 
les of the original Constitution, even if that meant reform- 
ing some of its mechanisms. 
Yet if constitutional restoration was Calhoun's pro- 
fessed aimp it was to be accomplished on his own terms. Towards 
the end of the Discourse he commented: "Ours, like all other 
well constituted constitutional governments, is the offspring 
of a conflicto timely and wisely compromised. " 
8 
But in the 
current crisis over slaveryp Calhoun was leaving no room for 
compromise; however moderate the proposals of the Discourse 
may have seemed to Calhoun, ultimately they did not constitute 
an appeal for compromiset-but an appeal for the rules of the 
Rame to be changed. The proposals laid down in the Discourse 
were actually the minimum requirements demanded by the South 
as the price for remaining in the Union. If the South could 
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not obtain the guarantees she needed for her protection, 
then she would withdraw from the Union altogether. 
The second point about the Discourse is that it is 
clearly not theoretical in the same sense that the Disquis- 
ion is. It deals with no abstract concepts nor does it pos- 
tulate any explanation of political behaviour. Its arguments 
are derived entirely from constitutional history and from 
inferences about the intentions of the framers of the U. S. 
Constitution. Moreovert it is programmatic in that it advoc- 
ates specific reforms of the existing system of government. 
Its applicationg so far from being universal, can only be 
applied to the United States, and even then only to a part- 
icular period of her history. 
This substantive distinction between the Disquisition 
and the Discourse is by no means unimportant because it has 
been the source of much confusion in evaluating Calhoun's 
political theory. Bearing in mind Andrew Hacker's definition 
of political theory (that it should provide causal and ethical 
generalisations about political behaviour), it becomes clear 
that the Discourse does not qualify for this category. Its 
arguments are designed to meet the needs of a specific hist- 
orical and cultural situationo and it is best classified under 
the heading of constitutional theory. The distinction may seem 
a semantic onev but its significance extends deeply into a 
proper understanding of Calhoun's political theory. As const- 
itutional theoryv the Discourse can have no greater significance 
than in illuminating our understanding of how the Union was 
viewed by one group of people at a particular moment in time. 
In the light of subsequent eventso where that viewpoint was 
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defeated on the battlefields of the Civil War, its interest 
for us can be no more than an antiquarian one. It left no 
general theory of politics which could be adapted to other 
situationsv as the Disquisition purported to dop and its 
arguments were rendered obsolete and outmoded by the passage 
of historical events. This is the single most powerful reason 
why the Discourse, is not read today. 
To recover Calhoun's political theory, then, it is 
necessary to concentrate on the Disquisition on Government. 
Although the two texts were intimately related, it is the 
Disquisition alone which contains what is properly called 
political theory-9 It offers explanations of human motivation 
and behaviour and lays down prescriptions of ethical right, 
which are framed as universal generalisations; it seeks to 
account for the existence and nature of government and for 
the origin of societies. In short, the Disquisition attempts 
to discover, by means of scientific investigationy how govern- 
ments should be constructedv given the unpredictable and 
mercurial nature of man. It is these basic concepts which 
make up Calhoun's political theory, not his detailed arguments 
about American constitutional history. 
The confusion as to what precisely constitutes his 
political theory is apparent in existing studies of Calhounts 
thought. Both August O. Spain and Richard N. Current insist on 
prefacing their remarks with an examination of the background 
to 
of states' rights. Nowt while this is an understandable and 
appropriate procedure for examining the Discourset the Dis- 
quj.,, itj. on requires a broader landscape against which Calhoun's 
ideas may be traced. The reason is simply this: the states' 
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rights doctrine is itself no more than a particular orientat- 
ion of thought towards the American Constitution. Its applic- 
ation cannot be universal because it is deeply rooted in the 
fundamental law of the United States. The form of discourse 
it utilises is juristic rather than theoretical. This is, of 
coursev not to deny that Calhoun both drew on and contributed 
to the doctrine of states' rights: the arguments of the Dis- 
course put that question beyond dispute. What it does mean is 
that as a context for examining Calhoun's political theory it 
is inadequatep even irrelevant. The states' rights doctrine 
cannot tell us anything about how Calhoun's ideas of human 
nature, for example, were formed or how coherent they are 
because it does not address that type of question. Even if we 
look beyond the juristic content of the states' rip ,, hts doctrine 
to its underlying philosophical principles, we find there the 
theory of natural rightsp a set of ideas so repugnant to Cal- 
, 
houn that he deliberately takes time in the Disquisition to 
attack it. All this suggests that an alternative framework is 
required in which to evaluate his political ideas. 
The question remains, what kind of background, what 
peculiar configuration of ideas, best represents the pattern 
of Calhoun's thinking? In The Liberal Tradition in America, 
Louis Hartz has suggested that the bulk of political writing 
which came out of the South in the decades before the Civil 
Warg and which found its ablest expression in the writings of 
Calhoun and Fitzhught is best characterised by the phrase, 
"Reactionary Enlightenment". 
11 The paradoxical conjunction 
of the two terms captures brilliantly the inconsistencies and 
tensions inherent in Calhoun's Disquisition. Hartz begins with 
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the premise that the American political tradition is firmly 
grounded on liberal foundations. The absence of a genuine 
feudal tradition in America meant that the Revolution of 
1776, unlike its French counterpart of 17899 did not have to 
tear down the fabric of society in order to establish the 
freedom of its citizens. The great achievement of the Revol- 
ution was not its successful wresting of liberty from the 
hands of a tyrannical feudal elite, but the protection and 
consolidation of rights which Americans had traditionally 
enjoyed as Englishmen. 
12 In comparison with the virulence of 
the French Revolution, the American one appears a very minor 
affair and its rhetorical battlecries out of all proportion 
to the alleged evils suffered by Americans at the hands of 
King and Parliament. Yet the vehemence with which the American 
colonists replied to, say, the Stamp Act -a relatively minor 
measure when compared with the excesses of the French ancien 
regime - testified to the pervasiveness of the liberal consen- 
sus. What would have been regarded as minor infringements in 
Francep became systematic steps to tyranny in America. 
13 
One of the effects of not having to endure a feudal 
structure was that America had no need to develop a genuinely 
radicalt revolutionary tradition; not having an ancien regime 
to pull down, it did not bother to fashion the intellectual 
tools to do so. But neither did America have the experience 
of an authentic tradition of reaction. It had no entrenched 
class system to defend, no clerical domination to support, no 
restricted franchise to uphold. 
14 Political and social condit- 
ions in the American colonies did not favour the transplanting 
of European feudal structures and it was this singular fact 
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which ensured the primacy of the liberal ideal. Having 
neither an extreme right nor an extreme leftq Americans 
settled down comfortably with a liberal consensus which 
was born out of the practical necessities of the environment 
they inhabited. It is this ethosq maintains Hartz, which "like 
some ultimate Hegelian force keeps showing its face in the 
various aspects" of American history. 
15 
The pervasiveness of the liberal or Lockean ethos has 
proved to be an intellectual straitjacket on American thought, 
inhibiting the development of both left- and right-wing syst- 
ems of thinking. Nowhere is this intellectual tyranny more 
poignantly exemplified than in the attempt by Southern think- 
ers to evolve a set of theories in defence of slavery. Slavery 
as an institution was the only real vestige of feudalism to 
flourish in America, but even then its theoretical justificat- 
ion was tenuous indeed. 
16 Thomas Jeffersong more than anyone 
of the revolutionary generationg typified the agony of the 
liberal mind confronted with the awful reality of slavery. 
Jefferson's solution, intellectually unsatisfying as it was, 
was to condemn the practice in the abstract and to hope the 
problem would go away of its own accord. If the wolf were kept 
by the ears long enough, it might justp hopefullyp die of star- 
vation. 
17 
Jefferson's view of slavery was shared to a greater or 
lesser extent by his slaveholding contemporariesp though 
through force of economic circumstances they came to depend 
more and more on the profitability of the slave labour system. 18 
It was notv howeverp until the wave Of moral indignation swept 
the northern states in the 1830B that Southern thinkers were 
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called on to actively support the institution with reasoned 
and reasonable arguments. The problem then became acute; for 
if the intellectual defence of slavery belonged anywhere, it 
was in the feudal mind which America had never fully experie- 
nced and whichp therefore, it could never fully understand. 
The southern intellectv no less than the northern, was shaped 
by the liberal mentality which had held so powerful a grip on 
American thought processes. The task that southern apologists 
were called on to perform was of truly gigantic proportions: 
to make a meaningful and coherent defence of slavery they had 
to transcend the confines imposed by liberal thought patterns, 
to somehow "get out of themselves". Of course, in doing so 
they would pose for themselves an even greater dilemma; if 
they succeeded in creating a feudal thought structure, as it 
were, out of nothingg they would at the same time surrender 
any possibility of being understood by the very people who 
were attacking them. Their only consolation would be that they 
had defended slavery to their own satisfaction, but if their 
primary purpose was a proselytizing one what kind of consolat- 
ion would that be? 
19 
The point was that in the 1830s and 1840s, the former 
Jeffersonian position was no longer tenablep even if it had 
been in Jefferson's own lifetime. The overriding concern of 
his generation had been to reaffirm and to buttress the rights 
Americans had traditionally enjoyed under the English Constit- 
ution; making these rights secure in the general turmoil of 
the transference of power was the main business before them. 
They were prepared to tolerate minor inconsistenciesp which 
could be ironed out at a later datev between theory and practicep 
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in the interests of achieving what was practically possible 
at the time. Compared with the magnitude of their own contem- 
plated bondage to the British Crown, the existence of a relat- 
ively small number of black slaves was, at least temporarily, 
tolerable. To the generation which succeeded themt having no 
pressing business like the reconstruction of a workable polit- 
ical systemv the inconsistencies appeared glaring and no longer 
acceptable. If they were to live in peace with themselves and 
their liberal consciencesq all trace of inconsistency had to 
be removed. The defenders of slavery thus found themselves 
assailed by a system of thinking which they shared with their 
assailants. 
In the writings of Calhoun and Pitzhugh, the foremost 
southern apologistst the tensions caused by this intellectual 
conundrum are readily apparent. Unable to free themselves from 
the shackles imposed by the Lockean mental outlook, the social 
theories they produced groped towards a defence of slavery, but 
never really arrive at a satisfactory solution. In Calhoun's 
case the result was a diluted form of liberaliomt peppered with 
inconsistencies and faulty logic. It was Pitzhught howeverg more 
than Calhoun who sensed the need to base the arguments in favour 
of slavery on pre-liberal grounds, and sensed too the stunning 
magnitude of the task. In 1863 he wrote: "We begin a great con- 
servative reaction. We attempt to roll back the Reformation in 
its political phases. "20 But for Americans,, rolling back the 
political phases of the Reformation meant going somewhere in 
terms of thought where they had never been before. It did not 
mean uncovering some lost feudal paradise, but creating one; 
but even if their romantic imagination could conceive itt they 
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lacked the intellectual equipment to construct it. 
Calhoun, unlike Fitzhugh, could not conceive it even. 
More than Fitzhugh, Calhoun's mental universe was bounded by 
the limits of traditional Lockean liberalism. In the Disquis- 
ition we do not find an overt defence of slavery; instead we 
find the problem masquerading as a defence of minority rights. 
It is a measure of the stranglehold that liberal thought patt- 
erns had on his thinking that he could only address the problem 
in terms of liberal discourse. Calhoun begins along the right 
lines by dispensing with the notion of natural rights because 
it was to natural rights that the abolitionists made their 
appeal. But having done so, he immediately reintroduces a set 
of mechanical contrivances designed specifically to prevent 
government from tyrannising the individual. At one moment he 
gives the community the authority to determine the rights of 
its citizens, and the next he takes it away by imposing on it 
immensely complicated devices. The inconsistency is repeated 
throughout the Disquisition and, in Hartz's wordsv "is not 
merely strikingg it is doubly and triply striking. " 
21 
This, then, is the essence of Hartz's notion of the 
"Reactionary Enlightenment". It portrays the profound intell- 
ectual dilemma which southern defenders of slavery faced in 
their attempt to evolve a systematic justification of the 
institution. They were reactionary in the sense that they 
were upholding a vestigial remnant of feudalism which was 
fundamentally incompatible with the ideology they professed 
to live by. At the same time, they lacked an authentic feudal 
vision which alone could supply them with the over-arching 
defence they needed because they could not free themselves 
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from the liberalism they had inherited from generations of 
political practice. Somev like Fitzhugh, came closer to re- 
creating the dream than others and suffered as a consequence 
the ignominy of being ignored altogether. There was a curious 
and agonising logic involved in the dilemma: the more the 
proslavery writers divested themselves of their liberal pre- 
conceptions the less chance they had of being understood by 
other Americans for whom the liberal framework was the only 
point of reference. This accounts in no small way for Calhounts 
continuing stature as a political theorist - his relevance 
is not established by his success in breaking out of the 
liberal mould and in conjuring up a feudal image, but by his 
failure to do precisely that. When Calhoun talked of the 
rights of the minority, he was using language which liberals 
understood and cherished. One has to dig deep into the Disquis- 
ition to find a defence of slavery, and even then it is frag- 
mentary and incomplete. But this is not an indication of 
Calhoun's lack of commitment, only a lack of ability to find 
a fully-fledged and coherent defence within the liberal frame- 
work. 
The crux of the Disquisitiong ultimately, is this: 
Calhoun was either unwilling orp more likely, unable to 
escape the liberal ideas of John Locke which shaped his 
mental outlook and to pursue unhindered a full-blooded 
reactionary theory of slavery. At the same time he was 
reluctant to abandon entirely either course and attempted to 
fuse the two incompatible strands. All the inconsistencies 
and logical non sequiturs can be traced back to the uneasy 
co-existence of these strains of thought in the Disquisition. 
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On the reactionary side we have the concern to protect the 
institution of slavery by including in his political theory 
no proposition which might be inimical to a justification of 
it. On the other side of the same coin, there is the apparent- 
ly enlightened concern to protect minorities. The problem 
that Calhoun found was that no unified political theory 
could coherently embrace both positions. It was one thing to 
argue the case for slavery - let alone racial slavery - but 
quite another to then turn around and argue that certain 
individuals are exempt from this scheme of things. What poss- 
ible logical basis could this exemption have? If slavery is 
advocated in principle as being a sound basis of political 
organisationp logic would seem to require that it apply to 
all men equally. If one dispenses with the protection afforded 
to individuals by natural rights, on what basis can one coherent- 
ly claim protection for any individual rights? Some of Calhounts 
contemporaries argued that the absence of any overtly racist 
justification of slavery in the Disquisition indicated Calhoun's 
intention to establish it as a general principle for whites as 
well as blacks. In October 1842, the antislavery poet John 
Greenleaf Whittier labelled Calhoun "the dark, coldv heartless 
advocate of human slavery UPON PRINCIPLE - slavery, not of the 
black man alone, but of the laboring man everywhere, of what- 
ever complexion-" 
22 But if this argument is justified it does 
not eliminate the problem, but rather makes it worse. There 
might have been some spurious appealt though little logic, in 
arguingt as the proslavery Biblicists and ethnologisto did, that 
the negro was biologically and theologically sub-human and 
therefore did not qualify for natural rights, but Calhoun 
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specifically rejects this course. Instead he chooses to 
abolish the whole notion of natural rights and thus leaves 
the way open for a defence of human slavery - not racial 
slavery - which his subsequent propositions nullify. In 
this is to be found the secret of Fitzhugh's apparent lucid- 
ity of thought: his notion of slavery is not a narrowp legal- 
istic one which applied only to blacks as a means of control- 
ling their race or of creating wealth for their masters; it 
wasp instead, an entire social system, an Old Testament patr- 
iarchy which applied to whites as much as to blacks and in 
which justice and compassion could only be dispensed within 
a framework in which authority was unquestioned and absolute. 
Fitzhugh rightly perceived that there was no place for racial 
slaveryp or indeed slavery of any kind, in a liberalv bourgeois 
world and he was sufficiently determined to be able to emancip- 
ate himself from the dominant American thought patterns which 
held these views. His repudiation of the bourgeoist capitalist 
ethic forms the larger coherence of his social thought. 
23 Cal- 
houng howevert was unable to achieve the same degree of mental 
emancipation as Fitzhughq for the Disquisition attempts to 
reconcile the existence of slavery with the liberal ideology 
which seeks to destroy it. 
Hartz's concept of the "reactionary Enlightenment" 
appears to be a more satisfactory framework in which to analyse 
the elements of Calhounts political theory, though one word of 
warning ought to be issued at the outset. Unlike the usual 
categorisations in political theory which seek to emphasise 
the unity and consistency of a particular set of ideas, the 
Hartz thesis is founded on a deliberate paradox; it emphasises 
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rather the disintegration caused by attempting to combine 
into a unified whole two conflicting strains of intellect- 
ual thought. In IdeologZ and Utopi . Karl Mannheim has 
perceptively pointed out that the categories we impose on 
related groups of ideas necessarily contain their own logic 
(otherwise they would be meaningless). 
24 In this sense, by 
attaching the label "Reactionary Enlightenment" to Calhoun's 
theory we are not pointing to his success in reconciling 
incompatible ideasq but to his failure. The Reactionary 
Enlightenment should therefore not be seen as a coherent, 
well worked-out ideology or system of ideas, but as a short- 
hand designation for the disjunctive ideas which characterise 
the writings of the antebellum South. 
If the usefulness of the Hartz thesis is to extend 
beyond the coining of a felicitous paradox, it remains to 
be shown that its application to Calhounts Disquisition is 
valid. It needs to be demonstrated that the text embodies 
elements of both reactionary and enlightened thinking. The 
process of isolating and identifying the components of either 
traditiong however, is not as straightforward as it may first 
appeare The peculiar antithetical relationship between the 
two systems of thought is such that we ought not to expect 
Calhoun to have openly embraced the inherent contradiction 
implied in the combining of each; we must, at leaett credit 
Calhoun with attempting to maintain a semblance of coherence 
and categorical logic. What procedurep therefore, is best 
suited to exposing the logical tensions contained in the Dis- 
quilition? One means of achieving this is to examine the 
enlightenment content of the theory and to take special note 
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of departures from it. If9 for example, it can be shown that 
the Disquisition is deeply imbued with Enlightenment concepts, 
we may legitimately inquire as to why on certain occasions 
Calhoun deliberately rejects major principles associated with 
Enlightenment thinking. His dismissal of natural rights is a 
case in point; already we have intimated that although Cal- 
houn does not defend slavery openly in the Disquisition, he 
did recognise the need not to include in the argument any idea 
which might have implied a criticism, however indirect, of the 
institution. It is clear that if Calhoun had retained the idea 
of natural rights, it would have been difficult to argue that 
slaves did not possess such rights, except on the dubious 
grounds that slaves, or rather black slaves, were not actually 
human at all. 
25 Consequently, Calhoun dispenses with the whole 
notion of natural rights - that isq individual rights - and 
substitutes instead the idea of the collective riRhts of the 
community and the corresponding duties of individuals. * 
In succeeding chapters we shall be examining the useful- 
ness of the "Reactionary Enlightenment" as an explanatory con- 
cept and considering the ways in which it might be applied to 
Calhoun's Disquisition on Government. The procedure is as 
follows: since the ideas of the Disquisition which we shall be 
evaluating are dictated by the way in which the intellectual 
movement known as the Enlightenment affected western patterns 
of thoughtt the remainder of this chapter is devoted to describ- 
ing the substantive ideas of the Enlightenment in its European 
and American contexts. Thereafterg we shall investigate individ- 
ually such topics as Calhounts philosophical method, his 
These points are argued more fully in chapters sixt seven 
and eight below 
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religious viewsp his ideas about human nature, progress and 
liberty, and finallyp his celebrated theory of the concurrent 
majority. In each instancev we shall be considering to what 
extent Calhoun's ideas on these topics conform to the spirit 
of the Enlightenment and attempting to judge what elements of 
his theory may be called "reactionary". In the conclusion,, we 
shall draw attention to certain refinements which may be made 
to the "Reactionary Enlightenment" as an explanatory category 
in order to give it a sharper focus as a conceptual tool of 
analysis. 
(b) The style of the Enlightenment in Europe 
The importance of the movement known as the Enlighten- 
ment as a turning point in the intellectual development of 
western culture can hardly be overestimated. To ourselvesq no 
less than to the men who effected it, it signified the dawning 
of a new ageg the crossing of the boundary from the gloomy 
world of the Middle Ages into the modern era of light and 
understanding. Although the optimism which accompanied this 
transformation has long since evaporated, the thought patterns 
which the Enlightenment established persist today, In a very 
real sensey as Paul Hazard has maintained, "it is the eighteenth 
,, 26 century of which we are the direct and lineal descendants . 
Yet despite its importance, as an intellectual movement 
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the Enlightenment remains nebulous and elusive. A part of the 
problem is its location. At different times throughout the 
eighteenth century there were three centres of Enlightenment 
thinking - London, Paris and Edinburgh - each emphasising 
clusters of ideas which were most applicable to the social 
environment that nurtured them. 
27 London, it is true, dominated 
by the towering genius of John Locket influenced profoundly the 
course of the French Enlightenment, being transmitted there in 
28 the early decades of the century by Voltaire and Montesquieu. 
But ideas which are transplanted from one social context to 
another radically different grow new and unexpected roots; in 
Francep the cool, detached and moderate ideas of Locke became 
politicised to a degree unparalleled in England and were enlist- 
ed in the ideological campaign against the ancien regime. When 
Locke spoke of "natural rights" he was referring not only to 
an abstract conceptionp but to something concrete which English- 
men had enjoyed under a tradition of common lawp and which the 
Glorious Revolution of 1688 had attempted to conserve. In 
Francev howeverv where the Bourbon dynasty had established the 
most effective of autocracies, and where the notion of the 
rights of the citizen and subject was a meaningless concept, 
his ideas acquired a radical quality in the hands of the phil- 
osophes. 
29 
Although the content of Enlightenment thinking contained 
local variations, subtle nuances and shifts of emphasis, it 
found a degree of cohesion in its underlying assumptions. The 
great achievement of the Enlightenment was not the formulation 
of a tightly-knit substantive ideology (unless one counts the 
destructive French anti-authoritarian one), but rather the 
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communication of a distinctive attitude towards all forms of 
knowledge, out of which fresh ideas of politics, religion 
and ethics could grow. 
30 The central feature of the Enlight- 
enment style was the belief that man could understand his 
place in the universe without recourse to either superstition 
or received authority. During the Middle Agesq intellectual 
activity had effectively been concentrated in the hands of a 
priestly class which, with the support of autocratic govern- 
mentsp had ruthlessly enforced a religious and political 
orthodoxy. All thinking, including political and scientific 
inquiryp took place within a theological context and was made 
to conform to the accepted orthodoxy laid down by the eccles- 
iastical establishment. The doctrine of original sin was the 
starting point for all theorising; man's natural corruption 
and the need to seek redemption was the premise on which the 
medieval mentality was founded. In politics it led to a 
justification of absolutism: man, being naturally sinful, 
needed a strong goverment ordained by God to keep his baseness 
in check. 
31 
In eighteenth century France, where the medieval ethos 
was most securely established under the ancien regimep the 
rejection of superstition and authority, when it camet was 
fused into a violent anti-clericalism. 
32 
The priestly class, 
as a privileged and politically powerful minority as well as 
being the official keepers of religious dogma, drew the harsh- 
est fire from the zealous philosophes of the French Enlighten- 
ment. But criticism of priestly domination was not confined to 
France; in his essayp What Is Enlightening? q Immanuel Kant 
urged men to shake off the inertia which allowed them to 
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16, 
surrender their responsibility to think for themselves to the 
religious elite. 
33 Kantv like his French counterparts, was 
primarily attacking the authority of the priests and the 
intellectual tyranny they imposed, but it was only a short 
step away from attacking the very foundations of the Christian 
faith itself. Some extreme French writers, like La Mettrie and 
Baron d'Holbachp were more openly atheistic in their critiques; 
to d'Holbachv Christianity was no more than a "castle in the 
air"y and the principles of theology "only hazardous supposit- 
ionst imagined by ignorancev propoagated by enthusiasm or 
knaveryv adopted by timid incredulity, preserved by custom 
which never reasonst and revered solely because not under- 
stoode', 
34 
dtHolbach's polemic against organised Christianity, for 
all its invectivev reflected accurately the major preoccupat- 
ions of the Enlightenment style. In the first placep there was 
the powerful belief that mankind had reached a stage in its 
history where blind faith could be replaced by true understand- 
ingg where "hazardous suppositions" were banished in favour of 
certain knowledge. Thomas Paine gave the Enlightenment its 
alternative title when he wrote The Age of Reason, but in some 
ways this is a misnomerp for "reason" in the Cartesian sense 
was never strictly a part of Enlightenment thinking. 
35 Certainly 
the influence of Descartes' system of methodical doubt was 
apparent in the writings of the _philosophes, 
but it was hie 
Mistrust of received knowledge rather than his pure rationalism 
that they found appealing. The Enlightenment style is perhaps 
better represented as "the age of understanding" because it 
attempted to apply the assumptions and methods of natural 
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science to the study of man and society; its aim was to 
discover as far as possible the true relations between man 
and the environment he inhabited. 
The greatest contribution that the scientific advances 
of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries made was not so 
much in the area of new discoveries, but in the formulation 
of an epistemology through which new discoveries could be 
assimilated. In this respect, the work of Francis Bacon is 
outstanding. Bacont largely in reaction to the pure rational- 
ism of the medieval scholastic tradition (which had followed 
Aristotle in teasing out the logical consequences of definit- 
ions of objects in the world), had maintained that true acient- 
ific inquiry consisted of the patient observation of events in 
the naturalp observable world and the construction of tentative 
explanatory theories which could be verified by repeated 
experiment. Formal logic alone was insufficient because however 
val a purely rational hypothesis might bet there was no way 
of establishing its truth, or at leastf its correspondence with 
observed reality. In place of purep unaided reason as the means 
to knowledgep Bacon substituted the experimental method of 
empirical induction; the true scientist did not begin by setting 
up certain general principles or axioms and then move, by 
abstract inferenceg to particular instances of fact, but quite 
the reverse - he began with the data of experience and observat- 
ion and after repeated experimentg proceeded to formulate 
covering principles which would account for all aspects of the 
behaviour of the object under study. The stress that Bacon laid 
on a proper scientific method reflected his concern to establish 
the realm of certain knowledge not in a priori deductive systems 
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t 
but in the natural environment of man. The experimental 
methodv "the architecture of the sciences". was the only 
reliable way in which order could be brought out of chaos 
and in which man could come to understand the forces which 
governed his life. 
36 
If Bacon supplied the method of modern scientific 
inquiryq it was Newton who applied it in his synthesis of 
natural physicsv and thereby gave to the Enlightenment its 
most important impulse. In the Mathematical Principles of 
Natural Philosophy (1686)9 Newton presented an all-encompase- 
ing view of the universe as operating according to fixed laws 
which interlocked harmoniouslyl and which were discoverable 
by the Baconian method of induction. In the Newtonian world 
viewp the intricacies and infinite variety of nature became 
intelligible to the human mind by the formulation of organising 
principleso or lawsp which could be refined and adapted to take 
new evidence and data into account. 
37 The accumulation of 
scientific knowledge thus took on the appearance of a systematic 
search for certainty in the field of natural phenomenav rather 
than the discrete and disjointed collection of validp but not 
necessarily truep logical hypotheses. 
38 
I have spoken at some length about the scientific 
advances made by Bacon and Newton because the methods and 
assumptions they developed informed almost every area of 
Enlightenment thinking in the eighteenth century. The intellect- 
ual debt that the philosophes owed these pioneers was acknow- 
ledged in the extravagant praises they heaped upon Newton 
especially. Newton, in factq became deified by the writers of 
the Enlightenment; in poetry and prose they celebrated his 
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massive achievement in showing the way forward to a true 
understanding of the natural world. The lines of Alexander 
Pope, 
Nature and Nature's laws lay hid in night. 
God said, Let Newton be! and all was Light. 
became a cliche of the adoration they conferred on the scient- 
ist. Voltaire, eschewing the poetic literary convention, simply 
declared him to be "the greatest man who ever lived.., 
39 Such 
examples were repeated endlessly in the writings of philosophes 
of all countries. 
40 
The attraction of the Newtonian system for the writers 
of the Enlightenment lay both in its method and its assumptions. 
By assuming that the universe was orderly, in the sense that 
it did not deviate from certain regular patterns of behaviour. 
and that by means of patient observation, coupled with common- 
senset those patterns could be perceived by the human mind, 
Newton was providing a complete model of rational explanation 
which could be fruitfully applied to all areas of human know- 
ledge. If material objects were seen to confoxm to fixed patt- 
erns of behaviourv was it not likely that similar regularities 
existed in the realm of moral choice? And if so, would not the 
experimental method of induction reveal set standards of moral 
behaviour? It was this exciting prospect that generated the 
optimistic spirit of the Enlightenment more than anything else. 
By adapting the techniques of science to all areas of human 
endeavour, the philosophes believed that they had found the 
way towards systematic knowledge of everything that was worth 
knowing. Long-established and cherished opinions on a wide 
variety of activities were drawn into the vortex and subjected 
to critical scientific analysis. Thus, d'Alembert, co-editor 
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with Diderot of the Encyclopediev could write in that most 
illustrious organ of the Enlightenment that "from the 
principles of the secular sciences to the foundations of 
revelation, from metaphysics to matters of tastev from music 
to morality, from the scholastic disputes of theologians to 
commercial subjectsv from the rights of princes to those of 
peoplest from natural law to the arbitrary laws of nations, 
in a word from those questions which touch us most deeply to 
those which concern us least, everything has been discussed, 
analysed or at least brought into question.,, 
41 
Although Newton had himself implied that his system 
was adaptable to other branches of knowledge, he had left the 
development of these ideas to his close friend John Locke. 42 
In the. Essay ConcerninR Human UnderstandinR (1689)t Locke 
turned the scientific method onto the investigation of the 
human mind itself and onto the nature of knowing. The basic 
principles of epistemology which Locke laid down in the Essay 
were essentially empirical: ideas, so far from being innate as 
the medieval tradition had postulated, were in fact derived 
from the senses. The mind, Locke maintained, is a tabula rasa 
on which experience either of the external world or of its own 
operationsp imprints ideas. The basic and irreducible components 
of thoughtg the simple ideas, are reflections of the outside 
world perceived by the mind through the senses, and complex 
ideas are built up by piecing together these basic components. 
Although Locke denied the existence of innate ideast he was 
careful to point out that there was a category of ideas which 
he called "self-evidentllp by which he meant that "the mind 
perceives the agreement or disagreement of two ideas immediately 
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by themselves, without the intervention of any other; and this 
I think we may call intuitive knowledge.,. 
43 
Locke's adaptation of the Newtonian method to the realm 
of psychology and epistemology provided the invaluable connect- 
ion between scientific inquiry and the diverse branches of study. 
The prospect of accumulating certain knowledge inspired the 
Enlightenment thinkers with an optimism which pervades their 
writings and which became one of their most distinctive charact- 
eristics. Bacon had stated an important truth when he said that 
knowledge was powerv and for the philosophes the possibility of 
attaining complete knowledge signified, too, unlimited power 
to control man's destiny. 
44 By being able to understand the 
complex operations of Nature, it became possible to harness 
her resources for the benefit of mankind generally. The area 
in which this was most directly and obviously applicable was 
medicine 
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- true, scientificp empirical medicine, not the 
superstitious astrology and alchemy which had reigned in the 
Middle Ages - but the philosophes did not confine their optimism 
to the physical and chemical sciences alone. In the political 
sphere they applied the general criterion of utility - that is, 
the greatest happiness of the greatest number - as the guiding 
principle on which governments should operate. A scientific 
appraisal of human nature, the raw elements of politicop would 
show the way in which this could best be realised. The general 
mood of optimism which characterised the Enlightenment's sub- 
stantive contributions, itself became systematised into a 
supposedly scientific theory of progress- Turgot, surveying 
the course of world history in the Discours aux Sorboniquen 
(1750) was able to proclaim that "the totality of humanity, 
125 
fluctuating between calm and agitation, good times and bad, 
moves steadily though slowly towards a greater perfection. , 
46 
"Perfection" in the enlightened sense of the word, did not 
simply mean material progress but also the moral improvement 
of man himself. Condorcet found good reasons in the spirit of 
the age for believing that there was no limit to the moral, 
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intellectual and even physical perfectability of man. 
The surge of optimism which the scientific revolution 
unleashed stood in stark contrast to the gloomy pessimism of 
medieval religious dogmaq which emphasised the inherent sinful- 
ness of man. Man, tainted by the sin of his first parents, was 
a helpless being unable to restore himself by his own feeble 
endeavours to a right relationship with God. His primary 
concernp so the various Churches taught, was to live by faith 
in the hope that God's infinite mercy might envelope him at 
the moment of death and preserve his soul in perfect bliss 
throughout eternity. This preoccupation with the hereafter, 
coupled with the eechatological belief that the Kingdom of God 
on earth was at hand, infused a spirit of resigned submiesive- 
ness to the things of this world which the Church - Catholic 
and Protestant - encouraged. 
48 So far from being a perfectible 
creaturep man was continually reminded of his sinfulness and 
unworthiness before God; moreover, any attempt to improve his 
condition on earth merely compounded the error, for the stain 
of sin was uneraseable and infected everything he touched. 
The religious opinions of the Enlightenment writers were 
profoundly influenced by the scientific world-view, though it 
produced little unanimity other than the universal condemnatiOrl 
of medieval dogma. Baconv Locke and Newton - especially NewtOrl 
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had all been devout believers in the existence and goodness 
of God, and their work had largely been inspired by the desire 
to understand the world He had created. 
49 Yet the irony of the 
scientific method they formulated was that it demanded rigor- 
ous standards of evidence and proofq based on systematic obser- 
vation and repeated experimentv before proceeding to frame 
hypotheses. In the hands of the philosophes, where the scient- 
ific method was extended to other branches of inquiryy including 
speculation on the existence of God, a strain of sceptical 
thought arose which ranged from the benign deism of Voltaire 
to the violent atheism of d'Holbach. Voltairep less atheistic 
than he is often given credit for, in some ways resembles 
Newton in his religious convictions: he saw in the symmetrical 
harmony of Nature evidence of design, and hence, of a Designer. 
50 
Indeedp it is this metaphor, of the master mechanic or master 
clockmaker, that most nearly characterises the religious temper 
of the age. 
51 The image of God as a wrathfulp intervening Sover- 
eign Lord was remoulded to suit the prevailing rationalistic 
frames of thinking. Some, of course, pushing the empirical 
method more relentlessly in the direction of POSitivismp dis- 
pensed with God altogether. Helvetius's Atheistp in the 
cc 7ersation between a Deist and an Atheist (MbS) summed up 
this position: "A philosopher should believe only when he is 
forced to it by overwhelming proof. I reason only on the basiO 
of what I see, andv in the whole of nature, I see nothing but 
immeasurable matter and a boundless force.,, 
52 Few were prepared 
to go to such extremest mainly because they found no need to; 
liberating mankind from medieval superstition and received 
authority meant repudiating the doctrine and practice of the 
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Church, but not necessarily calling into doubt God's 
existence. God was allowed to remain in their cosmology, 
but only on their terms, as the passivep non-intervening 
Author of Nature. 
53 
Nature, indeedv replaced God as the object of the 
_philosophes' 
veneration. God was one step removed from the 
scene, but Nature and its forces were what men had to contend 
with in their daily lives. The surest foundation of human know- 
ledge, and knowledge of God too, was an understanding of the 
Nature He had created; knowing God depended not on the revel- 
ation of the Scriptures, but on the revelation of Nature as it 
was progressively revealed to the human mind. Conceived in this 
light, God lost the sectarian quality which had characterised 
Him in the Middle Ages: he was no longer the Hebraic YHWH or 
the Christian Lordv but the Supreme Being, knowable not to an 
exclusive and privileged few, but to all men who would but use 
their minds. Voltairev againv expressed the universality of 
the idea of God-in-Nature: 
Last night, I was meditating, absorbed 
in the contemplation of Nature. I was 
filled with wonder at its immensity, at 
the stars in their courses, at the mutual 
interaction of those countless orbsp one 
upon anotherv which people looked upon 
unmoved. And I marvelled still more at 
the Mind which governs the whole mighty 
scheme. A man must be blind, I said to 
myself, not to be dazzled by such a 
spectacle, a fool not to acknowledge its 
Authorg a madman not to adore him. What 
tribute of adoration can I pay him? Must 
it not be the same, wherever it is offered? 
Whatever thinking being inhabits the Milky 
Way owes him the like homage. The light 
shines for Sirius, even as it shines for 
us. 54 
If God manifested himself in Nature, the Philosophes 
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reasoned that Nature must be both beneficent and right, and 
that the proper study of natural processes would reveal a 
true guide to living. In terms of political thought this 
proved to be awkwardt for if Nature (understood empirically) 
decreed a blueprint to which all human institutionsp includ- 
ing the politicalt should conform, did this not provide a 
sanction for the status quo? Scientific study of physical 
phenomena revealed fixed laws of behaviour in the material 
worldv and the. philosophes hoped that the application of 
scientific methods to social institutions would reveal 
similar laws in that sphere. But by that token they would 
have had to admit that historical experience demonstrated 
that mant so far from being a freedom-loving animal, was 
more or less content to live in subjection under absolute 
governments. Kant had spelled it out in What Is Enlightening? 
when he maintained that man found it less irksome to forego 
the responsibility of thinking for himself: thinking required 
sustained effort, and man, more often than not, was prepared 
to renounce that effort and recline happily in ignorance. 
The Enlightenment's method of scientific empiricism 
seemed to clash with their cherished ideal of liberty, for 
wherever they looked in historyp they could not find a factual 
basis for human freedom. Man might have been born free, as 
ROUSSeau had contended (even though that in itself was a 
dubious claim)t but "everywhere he is in chains.., 
55 No 
impartial reading of history could conclude otherwise. The 
same was true of their notion of equality -a fine ideal, 
perhapsy but unsanctioned in Nature. What J. R. Pole has 
recently written of the American Enlighter=entt applies as 
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well to its European forerunner: its "moral system... 
constituted a closed circuit. The great difficulty in 
grounding it 
[equality] into moral life was that it purport- 
ed to derive its conclusions from observations which in fact 
conflicted with them. Observation did not show that all men 
were equally endowed even in respect of those attributes 
required to protect their equal rights....,, 
56 The dilemma was 
considerable: either they held on to their method, in which 
case they would have had to admit that, empirically-speaking, 
slavery was the condition that nature had seemed to decree for 
man or else they could elevate liberty and equality into moral 
axiomsy self-evident a priori truths, and thereby agree to 
live with the inconsistency of paying lip-service to the 
empirical method. Characteristically, the Enlightenment writers 
chose the path of compromisep or, as Peter Gay has saidt "they 
preferred effectiveness to consistency", 
57 
and this trait 
speaks volumes about their polemical stylev for ultimately 
the movement was distinctive as much for its preconceived 
values as it was for its supposedly neutral and scientific 
method. In their search, for example, for a coherent argument 
in favour of universal liberty they returned to the medieval 
conception of Natural Law, a rationalist construct which their 
empirical temper should have led them to reject. Indeed, to 
salve their consciencest they did make an effort to waive the 
more exotic moral fictions implied in natural law theory, but 
this merely reinforced the sense of inconsistency; David Hume 
was willing to accept the moral consequences of a fictitious 
state of nature so long as it was remembered that the actual 
condition itself was "fallacious and sophistical". 
58 It might 
130 
be argued that the transmutation of the medieval conception 
of Natural Law at the hands of the Enlightenment writers, 
into the modernised doctrine of Natural Rightsp constituted 
the creation of a generically new political conception. This, 
however, is hardly tenable for the critical element of both 
medieval Natural Law and Natural Rights was the belief that 
there existed a form of law which was superior to the positive 
law of states and which provided a standard of moral behaviour 
which was binding on rulers and subjects alike. The existence 
of an objective standard of behaviourv whether it derived 
from God or Nature, was the crucial factor in both cases. 
How this law was discoverable was left purposefully vague, 
for to claim that it was knowable by pure reason, as the 
medieval scholastics did, was too great a betrayal of the 
empirical method for the Enlightenment to stomach. 
59 
The philosophes were never happy with their compromise 
over Natural Lawv even though it was its rhetorical appeal 
that they were most interested in. Their attachment to certain 
preconceived social and political values was as great as their 
devotion to scientific empiricism; indeedv freedom of thought 
and inquiry was an essential precondition of the rigorous, 
questioning scientific method. Yet when utilitarian doctrines 
began to emerge in France in the 1750s, the philosophes eagerly 
seized the opportunity to bring their epistemology into line 
with their values. Utilitarian ideas enabled them to discard 
entirely their dependence on a priori abstractions and to base 
their ideas on more solidly empirical foundations*60 
In this section we have looked at some of the dominant 
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ideas of the Enlightenment stylep though we have by no means 
exhausted the list of areas into which their thinking penetr- 
ates. It is perhaps as a style, or a distinctive attitude, 
that the Enlightenment is best represented rather than for 
any one overriding idea or set of ideas. It connoted, above 
all, a fresh way of looking at the world and of assimilating 
new knowledge, and questioning old. With the discovery of the 
"new way of ideas" came an optimism which expressed itself in 
a more rational approach to religion and in a more tender 
regard for human rights and liberties. In Europep emerging 
from the medieval mentalityt the optimism of the Enlightenment 
acquired an intoxicating quality in its belief that no area 
of knowledge was shut off to the human mind. Knowledge, too, 
once gained could be put to practical use: in medicine, in 
scientific invention, but also in politics and ethics. Know- 
ledge to the philosophes was "useful knowledge" (as the 
Victorians might have said) in that it could be applied in 
such a way as to increase the sum of human happiness. The 
philosophes were acutely aware of their role in propagating 
the new ideas; they were under no illusions as to the origin- 
ality of their thinking - they saw themselves as popularisers, 
radiating the ideas of other more profound thinkers into the 
mainstream of common thought. 
61 It was to the American colon- 
ies that the European Enlightenment looked with hopefulness 
to see its vision fulfilled. There they saw a people unencum- 
bered with the burdens of a decadent feudalism, sensitive to 
their rights as men and possessing a vast exapanse of land to 
explore and to exploit. America was "the redemptive land which 
had escaped European corruptions and 
Chad] recovered the 
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the liberty of nature. " 
62 
Soon, Americans themselves came 
to recognise that they were "aptly circumstanced to form 
the best republicks upon the best terms that ever came to 
the lot of any people before us.,, 
63 
(c) The Style of the Enlightenment in America 
In America, as in Europe, the Enlightenment represented 
a style rather than a single cohesive doctrinep but a style 
which nonetheless held a singularly powerful grasp on the 
American imagination. In Europe - and in France particularly - 
the self-conscious excitement engendered by the "new way of 
ideas" was as much due to their novelty as it was to the 
intrinsic value of the ideas themselves. Standing in such 
stark contrast to the superstitious and authoritarian ideas 
which underpinned the ancien regime, they could not fail to 
have the intoxicating effect they did. The context into which 
Enlightenment ideas penetrated the American colonies wasp 
howeverp quite different from France, for there was no sharp 
and cataclysmic break with past thought-patterns. Many of the 
religious and political ideas which prevailed in mid-eighteerlt 
h 
Americat and which we have come to associate with the style of 
the Enlightenment, were actually natural outgrowths of sixteenth 
and seventeenth century Puritanism, and as such acquired VL 
matter-of-fact quality. The American Revolution, to be sure, 
echoed the enthusiasm of French litterateurs, p but it was the 
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enthusiasm of men putting ideas into effect rather than 
proposing them for detached discussion. 
64 
Both the intellectual climate and the social circum- 
stances of the American colonies provided a suitable environ- 
ment for Enlightenment ideas. In place of a decadent feudal 
regime, the American colonial experience was informed by the 
Puritan mind. 
65 Puritanism, despite its reputation for austere 
theocentrism and the rigid enforcement of religious orthodoxy, 
contained strands of thought whichg when developed fully, 
would give rise to peculiarly enlightened ideas. Curiously, it 
was the strngth of the Puritans' religious convictions that 
enabled them to explore ideas which were potentially destruct- 
ive of their theocentric world-view. Believing unquestioningly 
in God's omnipotence as Creator and Sustainer of the Universe, 
they were led to investigate all aspects of the human condition 
without fear of the direction their studies might lead them. 
This attitude is most clearly apparent in their treatment of 
education and science. For decades before Newton's Principia 
was publishedp America Puritans had been following closely 
the scientific advances made in medicine, physics and astron- 
omy. 
66 No less than eleven New England Puritans were elected 
Fellows of the Royal Society in London. In 1721, a clinical 
treatise on innoculation against smallpox was published in the 
Transactions of the Royal Society, based on experiments carried 
out in Boston and championed by Cotton Mather. 
67 
To the Puritan intellect, scientific investigation of 
the natural world was neither impious nor contrary to Scripture 
because God had created both kinds of revelation for the 
instruction and edification of mankind. Puritanism was not 
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simply a religious attitudet but a complete intellectual 
system in which all created existence found an explanation 
in God's authorship. Science was therefore not viewed as an 
alternative to religion, but as a supplement. Cotton Mather's 
Essa XVI "Of Thunder and Lightning" exemplified the Puritan 
combination of searching inquiry and pious reverence: Mather 
begins his essay by discussing the natural processes whereby 
thunder and lightening occur, referring to the scientific 
experiments of Dr. Hook and Dr. Wallis. Butt continues Mather, 
"The natural Causes of the Thunder do not at all release me 
from considering the Interest and Providence of the Glorious 
GOD, concerned in it.,, 
68 Mather was thus making the distinct- 
iong which all the Puritans made, between understanding the 
process of how thunder and lightening occur and understanding 
why it occurs. To the latter question there was no doubt of 
the answer: it happened because God made it to happen, but 
that did not absolve man from using his mind to discover how 
it occurred. 
The Puritan preoccupation with improving the mind 
found practical expression in the establishment of educational 
institutionsv the most famous of which was Harvard College in 
Massachusetts. As early as the 1640s, the Harvard curriculum 
displayed a breadth of learning which was remarkable; under. 
graduate students were required to study logic, ethicsv Politics, 
physics, arithmetico geometry and astronomy as well as the 
formal elements of grammar and rhetoric. Students at Harvard 
werev howeverv left in no doubt of the central importance 
accorded to theology: "Let every Student be plainly instructed, 
and earnestly pressed to consider well, the main end of his 
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life and studies is, to know God and Jesus Christ which is 
eternal life, Joh-17-3 and therefore to lay Christ in the 
bottom, as the only foundation of all sound knowledge and 
Learning. " 
69 
The single requirement for the awarding of a 
Bachelor's degree was that the candidate "is found able to 
read the Originals of the Old and New Testament into the 
Latin tongueg and to resolve them Logically.,. 
70 The Puritans 
thus found no inherent incompatibility in the blending of 
theology with a liberal arts education, for the two were 
indissolubly linked: all knowledge flowed from God who had 
given man the ability to comprehend the environment in which 
he lived. To the Puritansp a wilful disregard of God's bounti- 
ful gift would have been a sign of rebelliousness no less 
sinful than neglecting to pay Him due reverence and worship. 
John Cotton, Minister of Bostont declared that "To study the 
nature and coursep and use of all God's Works, is a duty 
imposed by God upon all sorts of men; from the King that sit- 
teth upon the Throne to the Artificer... *,. 
71 
The Puritan acceptance of science and learning as a 
part of Godts endowment to man meant that one of the major 
barriers to enlightened thinking was absent in the American 
colonies. In Europev scientific investigation and artistic 
expression, when it was allowed at all, was made to conform 
to religious precepts promulgated by the Church and enforced 
by ascetic religious orders. 
72 The suppression of scientific 
tracts and the persecution of individual scientists underlined 
the sense of suspicion which the Church entertained towards 
the ideas of dangerous "innovators'l. 
73 In Puritan America, 
scientific inquiry was regarded as a Positive benefit for man 
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and also as a divine obligation, to be used to draw closer 
to an understanding of the Universe God had created. Of 
course, the Scriptures remained the primary and ultimate 
authority for the Puritans in all areas of lifet but it was 
find. 
not difficult for theologians to biblical sanction for the 
use of the mind in determining ethicall political or scientif- 
ic questions. 
74 This in itself was a prelude to the American 
Enlightenmentp for it signified a fearless attitude to new 
ideas whichp though firmly rooted within a theological con- 
text, could develop along secular lines. 
Political and social conditions in colonial America 
also favoured the development of Enlightenment ideasp and 
again, in this respect, it is the absence of feudalism which 
is notable. Bernard Bailyn has pointed Out that Enlightenment 
ideas were easily assimilated into colonial thinking precisely 
because many of the social reforms that European writers had 
been contending for had already been realised in practice in 
America. The great achievement of the Revolution was actually 
the ideological transformation it effected by bringing political 
theory into line with what had already occurred in Practice. 
75 
The formal abolition of primogeniture and entailp for example, 
which was accomplished during the revolutionary period, was in 
fact nothing more than recognition of what had already occurred 
earlier in the century by natural means. The aristocracies of 
France and England had relied heavily on primogeniture as the 
legal device by which estates of land were transmitted by 
lineal descentv thus ensuring the perpetuation of privilege 
for a few landed families. In the American coloniesp where land 
war. plentiful and thus inexpensive, the concentration of social 
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wealth in the hands of a privileged minority was a remote 
prospect. Nevertheless, it was a part of the anti-aristocratic 
rhetoric of the American Revolution that formal hereditary 
devices be legally terminated: by 1786 every state of the 
new Union had abolished or rendered innocuous the principle 
of entailment and primogeniture was similarly abolished by 
1792.76 The effect of these measures was not to alter estab- 
lished practices so much as to legitimise the changes which 
had naturally taken place as the result of transplanting 
English institutional practices to a wholly different environ- 
ment in America. A similar example is that of the franchise. 
In Englando the franchise was accorded only to freeholders - 
a provision which effectively meant that a significantpropor- 
tion of the population was deprived of the right to vote. In 
the coloniest howeverv where the abundance of land meant that 
almost all adult males were freeholders, the provision could 
hardly be described as restrictive. 
77 
Tolerance in matters of religion -a central plank in 
the reforming programme of the European Enlightenment - was, 
in America by the time of the Revolution, more or less an 
accomplished fact. Although at the beginning of the 1770s, 
legal provision existed in all the colonies to ensure the 
supremacy of one or other religious sect, in practice religious 
discrimination was mild and tolerant. 
78 In Virginia, where the 
Church of England was established by lawy dissent was toleratea 
well beyond the English Act of Toleration; dissenters were 
required to be licensed by law, but they were not prevented 
from devising and practicing their own forms of worship. They, 
were exempt from paying parish taxes and they were not barred 
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from the franchise. 
79 It would be easy to overstate the 
extent of religious freedom in the colonies prior to the 
Revolution, but nevertheless the heterogeneity of religious 
practices made toleration a practical necessity for minorit- 
ies forced to live together. Toleration in this sense did not 
mean an acceptance of denominational differences on points of 
doctrinev but the absence of active and systematic persecution. 
During the Revolutiong provisions for establishing formal 
religious freedom took on the appearance of a mopping up 
operation, bringing legislation into line with what already 
existed in practice. 
8o 
There are good grounds for believingv therefore, that 
the colonial experience furnished a suitable environment for 
Enlightenment ideas or even that the American Enlightenment 
developed independently of the influence of European ideas, 
as it were out of the "mundane exigencies of the situation. 1181 
It is certainly true that Enlightenment ideas in America bore 
the unmistakable stamp of her social conditions: lacking the 
intellectual facilities of Europe, and hence the luxury of 
discussing ideas for their own sakeg Americans were forced to 
calculate the value of such ideas on the basis of their use- 
fulness in practice. 
82 
Nevertheless, it is important to 
distinguish the ideas which were indigenous to the colonies 
and which were transmitted there from Europe. 
Much recent scholarship has been concerned with identif- 
ying the sources of the American Enlightenment. 
83 
Henry F. May 
has reminded us that that the American Enlightenment comprehends 
more than the ideas and events of the Revolutionary period, 
and that for most of the eighteenth century Americans had been 
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importing ideas from Europe. 
84 
May has divided the Enlighten- 
ment in America into four overlapping phases, though for our 
purposes we shall be concerned with the first three only. In 
the first phaset which extended from the late seventeenth 
century through to the American Revolutionp Enlightenment 
ideas filtered through to the colonies in the form of the 
works of British philosophers, especially Newton and Locke 
(though it was Lockets, Essay Concerning Human Understanding 
rather than his Two Treatises on Goverment which Americans 
seized upon primarily. ) This "Moderate Enlightenment", as May 
terms itp reflected the intellectual climate of England with 
its emphasis on orderliness and balance in politics and 
religion. Its restrained optimism, moreover, was portrayed 
in the cautious acceptance of the scientific method as a 
further means of demonstrating the benevolent design of God. 
The Moderate Enlightenment in America, as in England, stood 
in marked contrast to the radical scepticism which developed 
among some French writers; neither America nor England prod- 
uced an atheist of comparable stature or influence to rival 
a d'Holbach. The intellectual sway that England held over 
America proved sufficiently strong to deter widespread dissem- 
ination of radical French ideas which formed the second phase 
of the American Enlightenment. From 1750 to 1789, May argues, 
the centre of the European Enlightenment gravitated away from 
London towards Paris, where the moderate implications of the 
scientific method became fashioned into a tool of social 
criticism. The influence of French ideas - particularly its 
extreme form of religious scepticism - was limited in America 
for many reasons. In the first placev although many well- 
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educated Americans had some knowledge of the French language, 
it was superficial and insufficient to guide them through the 
intricacies of Enlightenment passion and rhetoric. 
85 
Another, 
more compelling reason was that despite their protestations 
that they were proposing concrete reforms, the works of the 
French writers seemed doctrinnaire and utopian. Americans, it 
is trueg shared the French enchantment with applied science 
and technologyp and members of the American Philosophical 
Society in Philadelphia corresponded with their French colleag- 
ues in this fieldp 
86 
but that was the extent of Franco-American 
cooperation. In matters of religiono French ideas appeared more 
radical than they actually were, coloured no doubt by the 
passionate atheism of men like d'Holbach and La Mettrie. But 
whatever the reason, Americans found little need to go beyond 
the rational and reasonable deism of English freethinkers. The 
predominantly French "Sceptical Enlightenment" (again, it is 
May's term) had relatively little lasting effect on American 
thinking. 
It was the third phase of the Enlightenment - the "Rev- 
olutionary Enlightenment" - which left the deepest impression 
on American patterns of thinking, and crystallised many of the 
disparate strands which were already present in the American 
consciousness into a unified doctrine. America's war of indep- 
endence acted as a catalyst on the various ideas which had been 
imported during the course of the eighteenth century; again, 
and ironicallyt it was the influence of British writers which 
was decisive. Bernard Bailyn and Caroline Robbins have convinc- 
ingly argued that the single most important source of revolut- 
ionary theory was a group of disaffected "oppositiont, polit- 
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icians and pamphleteers which from the end of the seventeenth 
century had been persistently haranguing successive British 
governments. 
87 
These writersq men like Algernon Sidney, John 
Trenchardt Thomas Gordon and Bishop Hoadlyt were united in 
their opposition to ministerial power conferred by the Crown; 
they drew the substance of their criticism from the radical 
tradition of the commonwealth period. The main thrust of their 
ideas was the belief that the English Constitution, of which 
they were justly proud, was in danger of being subverted by 
the close connection between the Crown and Parliament. The 
primary function of Parliament, as they saw it, was to safe- 
guard the liberties of the people against the encroachments 
of the Crown. The King's prerogative in choosing and in dis- 
missing his ministers at willt effectively meant that they 
were responsible to the Crown and not to Parliamentq and hence 
matters of public policy were dependent on the will of the 
monarch. The Commonwealthmen argued that to ensure individual 
liberty and proper constitutional accountability, the executive 
and legislative branches of the goverment ought to be more 
fully separated. It was, in effect, another phase in the argu- 
ment for constitutional government. 
88 
Few of the radical whigs achieved election to Parliamento 
which in no small measure accounts for their literary rather 
than parliamentary style. In pamphlets and newspapers, and in 
societies specially formed for the purpose, the excoriated the 
government and presented extreme libertarian views. 
89 
Through- 
out the eighteenth century successive generations of radicals 
continued to disseminate their ideas, though to little effect 
in England. In America, howeverv their writings were devoured 
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avidly and reprinted over and over again, and served to 
inspire many of the leaders of the Revolution. Prom the 
1720s onwards the speed with which English radical ideas 
appeared in American pamphlets and newspapers testified both 
to the special relevance of America's English heritage and to 
the peculiar political divergencies between the mother-country 
and her transatlantic colonies.. Cato's Letterst written by 
John Trenchard, first appeared in the London Journal in 1720, 
though it attracted little attention outside radical circles 
in England. Less than eleven months later, howeverv the 
Letters were being serialised in James Pranklints New EnRland 
Courant from which time they seem to have been constantly in 
print. They were quoted extensively in the writings of Americans 
for the following seven decades. 
90 
The popularity of English radical writings in America 
derived in large part from the changed political conditions in 
the colonies. The constant tension between colonial legislatures 
and the Royal Governors sent to administer colonial affairs,, 
made the radical argument for separation of legislative and 
executive functions more relevant to the American experience 
than could be imagined in England. Certainlyt English constit- 
utional opinion universally subscribed to the theory of the 
separation of powers as the surest means of safeguarding indiv- 
idual liberty, but as a description of the actual working of 
the English constitution it was inaccurate; the harmony of 
English politics was achieved not through any formal separation 
of powersv but through an unarticulated though well-understood 
agreement on certain crucial issues. 
91 It was generally agreed, 
for examplet that the arbitrary power of the Crown should be 
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limited to constitutional procedures, though the King's right 
to appoint and dismiss ministers did not imply a formal separ- 
ation of powers. 
The tacit constitutional compromises worked out in 
England did not, however, extend to the colonies. There, the 
Royal Governors used the power of veto more extensively than 
the King did in England; furthermore, all colonial legislation 
was scrutinised by the Privy Council in London before it could 
receive the Royal kssent - hence, a double opportunity existed 
within the imperial structure for negating the will of the 
legislatures. In the most sensitive area of the administration 
of justicep the Royal Governors exercised powers which were 
specifically denied to the Crown: they appointed and dismissed 
judgesp and could create new courts at will. In their relation- 
ship with the legislaturesq they exercised a more absolute 
control than the sovereign in that they could prorogue and 
dissolve the assemblies virtually at will. In England, it was 
accepted that the King's right to dissolve Parliament should 
only be exercised when the House of Commons refused to sustain 
his ministers and their policies. In these areas, then, any 
resemblance between the structure of colonial goverment and 
the English Constitution was entirely superficial; indeed, if 
colonial goverment resembled anything it was the English 
Constitution prior to the Glorious Revolution of 1688. The 
writings of the English radicals in the late eighteenth century, 
out of tune with prevailing political opinion in their own 
country, found in the colonies an audience which understood 
from their own experience the arbitrariness of imperial govern- 
ment and which was eager to seize the arguments they offered. 
92 
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But what exactly were their arguments? Colin Bonwick 
has maintained that radical ideology "comprised not a logic- 
ally integrated system but an amalgam of moral principles 
and political ideals that gave philosophic purpose to the 
state and provided a set of normative values through which 
fundamental beliefs could be assimilated in specific situat- 
ions.,, 93 At bottom, these writers shared many of the assumptions 
of Enlightenment thought, though in a more restrained English 
version: Harringtono John Milton, Algernon Sidney and Locke 
were the main sources of their ideas, though frequently new 
emphases were given. Central to their beliefs about government 
and society was the fundamental premise that the universe was 
orderly and intelligible to the human mindp but again, as with 
other Enlightenment writerst emphasis was laid on reason 
coupled with observation. In the writings of Richard Price and 
Joseph Priestly the search for concrete historical evidence to 
support their moral and political arguments is especially 
apparent. But neverthelesst they were moral arguments and no 
amount of empirical veneer could disguise the fact: they 
accepted the existence of a universal moral orderv ordained by 
God and apparent in Nature, to which human institutions ought, 
as far as possiblet conform. 
94 
Liberty, to the English radicals, was undoubtedly the 
brightest jewel in their intellectual crown* The natural order 
of the universev they reasonedv demonstrated that manv though 
he was palpably not so, ought to be free to enjoy the rights 
which God had bestowed on him. Among these rightst according to 
Richard Pricev were the freedom to determine one9s actions 
according to the judgement of one's conscience and the freedom 
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to determine one's actions without the intervention of 
another's will. Liberty in these matters could only be 
achieved if the individual were guaranteed political and 
civil liberty. Essentially, the radicals' arguments for 
liberty were a restatement of Lockean doctrines of natural 
rights and social contractv and it seems reasonable that we 
should take the ideas of Locke as paradigmatic of his later 
publicists. Locke had argued that each individual had held 
within his own person, by virtue of his humanity, a certain 
category of rights which derived directly from God, and 
which consequently no human power could legitimately abridge. 
Among these "natural" rights Locke listed the rights to life, 
liberty and property as being inalienable endowments to man, 
(The concept of inalienability is important because it conn- 
oted not simply the illegitimacy of depriving an individual 
of his rightst but also the illegitimacy of an individual 
voluntarily resigning his rights to another, sincev properly 
speakingt they were not his to resign. ) In order to emphasise 
the inviolability of natural rights, Locke built his social 
theory on the philosophical device of the state of nature. 
95 
He maintained that prior to the formation of societyt men had 
existed as dissociated individuals in "a state of perfee free- 
dom to order their actions and dispose of their possessions 
and persons as they think fit, within the bounds of the law 
of nature, without asking leave, or depending upon the will of 
any other man. , 
96 The one limiting factor on an individual's 
freedom of action was the "law of nature", which Locke charac- 
terised as human rationality. 
97 Each individual was divinely 
endowed with the faculty of reason which enabled him to perceive 
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himself and his fellows as being the created property of God. 
No one, therefore, held the right to deprive any other person 
of his life, liberty or estate because these gifts came from 
God the Creator directly. 
To Locke, the Law of Nature was an adequate means of 
regulating human affairs so long as each individual lived 
according to the dictates of his reason. The problem arose 
when men laid aside the law of nature and allowed their unbrid- 
led passions of greed and self-love to set the tone of their 
actions. The inevitable conflict which proceeded from such a 
state of war was punishable - but by whom? God's judgement 
would be rendered at the end of time or at the moment of death, 
but in either case this was a long-te= prospect which lacked 
the immediacy the situation demanded. Locke proposed that since 
there was no visible divine power to which appeal could be 
immediately madeg it had to be the right of each individual 
in the state of nature to punish offenders; each mant therefore, 
became his own judge and was empowered to enforce the law of 
nature. 
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It was the inconvenience of this state of affairs which 
made civil society necessary. Man's natural rights had to be 
protected in a more concrete and efficient manner than the 
state of nature would allow. In the first place, the law of 
nature would have to be set down so that all would know and 
recognise it. Then, an impartial and identifiable arbiter 
would be established to settle disputes between individuals 
according to the law. Finally, an independent power would be 
invested with authority to execute the law. All these provis- 
ions could only be effectively accomplished within the frame- 
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work of a civil community. 
99 
The social contract was the legal and philosophical 
mechanism by which society was brought into being; the term 
"contract" was aptly used since it implied the existence of 
mutual obligations voluntarily concluded. The dissociated 
individuals of the state of nature would voluntarily agree to 
surrender their sovereignty of action and bind themselves 
together into a social community. The powers that they 
surrender would be placed at the collective disposal of the 
community as a wholev to be used by its agent, the government. 
In return for all this, the community was obliged to insure 
the best possible conditions for the citizens to enjoy their 
natural rights. The government had no authority to invade or 
to usurp the natural rights of any citizen since any such 
action would be contrary to the purpose for which it was formed. 
The obviousp indeed necessary, corollary to this was that if 
the government attempted to extend its sphere of activity 
beyond the bounds prescribed by the terms of the contract, it 
was liable to be overthrown legitimately. 
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It was these argumentst most cogently (though not 
exclusively) articulated by John Locke, which the English 
radicals of the late eighteenth century reiterated in their 
pamphlets. Their restatement of these principles was in many 
ways imperfect and less attentive to theoretical detail than 
the original had been, but what they lacked in logic they made 
up for in passion. It was these ideas, too, which were trans- 
mitted and absorbed almost wholesale in the American colonies 
and which formed the rationale of colonial resistance during 
the war of independence, and a blueprint for institutional 
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reconstruction after it. The Declaration of Independence, 
America's most revered political document, embodied Lockean 
precepts in their pristine purityt and nor was it an isolated 
expression. Jefferson himself confessed that the Declaration 
was not intended to posit original principles, but to be "an 
expression of the American mind. " 
101 In American polemical 
tracts of the revolutionary period the theme of natural rights 
is repeated endlessly: James Otis paraphrased the whole of 
Lockets Two Treatises in his Vindication of the Conduct of the 
- 102 House of the Province of Massachusetts-Bay in 1762; precisely 
a decade laterv the Boston Committee of Correspondence, under 
the guiding hand of Sam Adams, echoed Lockean principles in a 
litany of natural rights. 
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The colonists' appeal to natural rights was in practicev 
if not strictly in theory, an appeal for the preservation of 
their rights as British subjects. Their admiration of the 
English Constitution remained undiminished even after the 
conflict with the mother-country had ended, yet they deplored 
the corruption and rottenness which had infiltrated and thus 
perverted it. There was a very real sense in which the colonists 
believed that they were preserving the truep unpolluted essence 
of the English Constitution and enshrining it in a new environ- 
ment. "They sincerely believed",, Gordon S. Wood has writterli 
"that they were not creating new rights or new principles 
prescribed only by what ought to be, but saw themselves 
claiming 'only to keep their old privilegesIt the traditional 
rights and principles of all Englishmen, sanctioned by what 
they thought had always been.,, 
104 But if natural rights t1jeory 
proved a useful and adaptable rhetorical tool for dissolvilIg 
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the political bands which had connected America to Britain, 
the depth of American commitment to the theory remained to 
be seen in the construction of a new set of institutions to 
replace the old. 
The task of reconstituting the governmental structure 
of the colonies after the conclusion of the war called for 
quite different skills than those needed for tearing down the 
old. It was during this period of constitution-forming that 
Enlightenment concepts long discussed in Europe and America 
became built into the public philosophy of the community. 
Universal disgust at the decadence of the British and French 
Courts smoothed the way for the American transition towards 
republicanism. But for Americansq republicanism did not simply 
mean a particular way of organising the goverment; it conjured 
up a completely new ethosq a new way of looking at the purpose 
and function of social institutions. It connoted, toot the 
traditional public virtues - of patriotism, of moral rectitude, 
of lofty disinterestedness - which the constitutionalists of 
ancient antiquity had cherished. Thomas Paine expressed the 
sentiment well when he said: "Our style and manner of thinking 
have undergone a revolution more extraordinary than the polit- 
ical revolution of the country. We see with other eyes; we 
hear with other ears; and think with other thoughtst than 
those we formerly used. " 
105 Looking at government with other 
eyesq Americans savv its purpose as being the public good - 
that isq the good of its citizens not its rulers. How best to 
secure the public good became the preeminent Political question 
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of the age. 
Certain basic assumptions accompanied this nevi style 
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In the first place, for the public good to be guaranteed, a 
settled legal structure which acted as the repository of the 
rights and duties of the citizens had to be plainly visible, 
to which all could appeal for redress. Closely related to 
this, and indispensable to its realisation, was the notion 
that the arbitrary power of government ought to be kept 
within severely prescribed bounds by means of a constitution. 
Fundamental to both these beliefs was the idea that the law 
and the constitution should be the genuine expressions of the 
popular willt and to accommodate this American political 
theorists revived the Lockean notion of the social contract. 
When David Hume had attacked the social contract as being 
"fallacious and sophistical" he had not reckoned with the 
experience of the American Puritan Fathers. The "Holy Common- 
wealth" which they had formed was based on the covenant theol- 
ogy of the Old Testament and bore a remarkable resemblence to 
the later Lockean version. 
107 The essence of both was voluntar- 
ism: the creation of government and society was the result of 
the consent of the individuals involvedy freely given. In some 
of the newly-formed statesg Pennsylvannia notablyp arguments 
were tediously expatiated as to the number of contracts which 
were necessary to establish society and its institutions. Did 
the social contract bring into being both the society and the 
government simultaneously or were two separate contracts 
necessary for the purpose, the one between the dissociated 
individuals of the state of nature and the other between the 
newly-constituted citizens and the government? These questions, 
and ones like them, formed much of the agenda of debate during 
the constitution-forming period. 
108 
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It was in discussions on the nature of government 
itself that Enlightenment ideas were particularly pronounced. 
Government, like dresst maintained Paine in his immensely 
popular Commonsensev was the badge of lost innocencev and it 
was in the nature of man that Americans looked to find both 
the purpose and the form of government. Opinion on this 
supremely important point was virtually unanimous: man was a 
fallen creature, a selfish animal who was more likely to 
follow his passions than his reason. Indeedq Benjamin Frank- 
lin, the doyen of American philosophes, agreed wholeheartedly 
with David Hume that reason was the servant of the passions, 
enabling man to follow more efficiently his selfish whims. 
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This view of human nature, prevalent among American and Scot- 
tish philosophesv would have seemed curious to their French 
counterparts who generally believed that man was essentially 
a moral and virtuous being who had been corrupted by imperfect 
social institutions. The mercurial optimism of the French 
Enlightenment lay in the belief that if defective institutions 
were swept awayv underneath would be revealed a Rousseaunian 
Noble Savage whose natural goodness might be nurtured by a 
proper education. The writers of the American Enlightenment, 
howeverp took their conception of man from Calvinist theology 
and found him to be permanently infected with pride and sin; 
their solution was quite the opposite of the French, for they 
did not wish to abolish social institutions, but to realign 
them so that they conformed to nature. American writersp like 
John Adamsp were not overly optimistic about man's nature, 
but they did believe with a proper understanding they could 
construct institutions which would minimise the harmful effects 
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of man's natural baseness. The awareness of this fact coloured 
most of their discussions of government and led them to devise 
a fragmented system of politics in which self-centred elements 
were counterpoised against one another. Since government was 
unavoidably operated by men who were by nature selfish and 
self-seekingg and since the collective power of the state was 
at the disposal of the government, it was of first importance 
that all opportunities for abuse of that power were denied. 
The elaborate system of checks and balances and the separation 
of powers was intended to accomplish precisely this purpose 
by diffusing power amongst the various branches of goverment. 
The Constitution of the United States drawn up in 
Philadelphia in the summer of 1787 was both a masterpiece of 
practical politics and an experiment in the divine science of 
government. It represented the belief that the human mind was 
sufficiently advanced as to be able to construct a set of 
social institutions which could embody moral preceptsv but 
which at the same time was consonant with observation and 
experience. Reason combined with experience, not opposed to it, 
was the Founding Fathers' guideline; they scoured history to 
find clues as to how governments should be constructed. 
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But if the distinction between rationalism and empiricism is 
insisted uponp at bottom the Founding Father's political 
system rested on moral foundationst on certain self-evident 
principles which ultimately required no empirical validation, 
simply because they were self-evident. Human libertyg the 
most emotive of these, they attempted to give practical 
expression to within the fabric of government itself, though 
this was not without its difficulties. The Declaration of 
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Independence had proclaimed that "all men are created equal". 
though faced with the exigencies of the revolutionary situ- 
ation few of the Founding Fathers could go so far as to 
extend liberty to slaves. Indeed, the Americans' effusive 
professions of their attachment to the cause of liberty made 
the subsequent discrepancy over slavery doubly embarassing. 
Neverthelessq what was achieved by the Founding Fathers was a 
remarkable reconstruction of governmental institutions and 
provided an unparalledled example of the Enlightenment-in- 
practice., 
ill 
None of this could have been accomplished, however, 
had not Americans grasped fully the distinctive scientific 
world-view which dominated European mental habits since the 
days of Newton. The understandable concentration on the 
political aspect of the American Revolution has often over- 
shadowed the fact that behind the polemical argument lay a 
deeply held scientific attitude which gave revolutionary 
thought patterns a degree of cohesiveness. The most eminent 
historian of American science, Brooke Hindle, has written 
that "Science was so central to the thought of the Enlighten- 
ment and it lay so directly behind the Revolutionary argUMerjt, 
that the men who made the American Revolution were thoroughly 
committed to the pursuit of science. " 
112 Scientific inquiry 
flourished in late eighteenth century Americap and formed the 
basis of the American optimism in progress. The Puritanst we 
noted earlier, had not shown the general mistrust of science 
which had characterised religious groupings in the Old VIOrlds 
but at the same time their scientific speculations tooX Place 
within the context of a strong biblical faith. Their descend- 
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ants, however, less shackled to theologyv were thus released 
to probe deeper into the mysteries of nature. Philadelphia 
fittingly became the scientific centre of the American 
colonies during-the late eighteenth century when Benjamin 
Franklin founded the American Philosophical Society there in 
1769, though it was in Boston and in Cambridge that the most 
important scientific discoveries were achieved. 
113 In medicine, 
in experimental philosophy (physics) and in the arts, Philad- 
elphia attracted men of unusual talent and penetrating intell- 
ect - men like David Rittenhouse, the astronomer and Benjamin 
Rushy professor of chemistry at newly created College of 
Philadelphia. Philadelphia, too, attracted men of the European 
Enlightenment, notably Joseph Priestly and Tom Paine. While 
the city could not rival London or Paris (or even Edinburgh) 
as a cultural centrep it did at least set the tone of the 
American Enlightenment*114 
The American obsession with science took to extremes 
the French preoccupation of acquiring "real and useful know- 
ledge". 
115 Certainly, the European Enlightenment perceived 
the endless possibilities of increasing the general happiness 
of mankind through scientific discovery, but essentially their 
enchantment lay with the application of scientific techniques 
to more ethereal branches of knowledge. American needs were, 
however, more basic; the realisation of the vastv unexploited 
natural resources she possessed prompted Americans to explore 
the possibilities of harnessing those resources for the benefit 
of all the people. American ideas of progressp especially in 
the nineteenth centuryv therefore acquired an unmistakably 
materialistic stampq which contrasted with European notions 
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of the eventual perfectability of man. Americans of the 
nineteenth centuryq including Calhoun, were fond of looking 
towards the moral improvement of mankind, but it was clear 
that they expected moral progress to be dependent, if it 
could be accomplished at all, on material progress. 
(d) Conclusion 
In this chapter I have attempted to outline the 
essential elements of the Enlightenment style which came to 
fruition in eighteenth century Europe and America. The descr- 
iption has necessarily been a composite one, for to have 
explored all the ramifications of the many complex strands 
which constituted the Enlightenment would have required the 
writing of several dissertations. What is essential to grasp 
is that the Enlightenment did not consist of a single unified 
and cohesive doctrinev but of a set of attitudes through which 
all forms of knowledge were perceived and understood. The key 
wast of courseq the attitude towards epistemology itself. Ernst 
Cassirer has rightly identified the universal enchantment with 
science as the distinctive feature of Enlightenment thinking 
which radiated outwards to the realm of politics, ethics and 
religion. Systematic observation of Nature and the promulgation 
of explanatory laws was considered the most certain form of 
knowledge which ought, as far as possible, to be imitated in 
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the sphere of moral philosophy. If moral conduct could be 
brought into alignment with the structure of Nature, there 
was to be found the true purpose of life. 
In religionp the Enlightenment style implied a shift 
away from the mystical and mysterious orthodoxy of the Middle 
Ages. The image of God as a personal Sovereign who ruled the 
universe was replaced by the image of an impersonal prime 
moverp whose primary manifestation was in the fixed laws of 
Nature. A cold, analytical deism took the place of a full- 
blooded and wrathful theism. In Europe, the spectrum of 
religious thinking was wider than in America, where, as de 
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Tocqueville noted, the Christian faith held a dominant sway; 
few American philosophes could ever go as far in their reject- 
ion of God as did La Mettrie or d'Holbach in France. In America, 
the demand for a more rational approach to religion took the 
f orm of Unitarianism, where the alleged incomprehensibility 
of the doctrine of the Trinity was more satisfactorily resolved. 
In politiesp the Enlightenment style implied liberalism, 
the freedom of man from the encumbrances of imperfect social 
institutions. Organisational structures which had developed 
incrementally over centuries, buttressed by superstition and 
authorityp were to be swept away to be replaced by more rational 
ones which supposedly conformed to Nature. 
117 But the political 
theory of the Enlightenment could not do without relying on 
moral postulates entirely: liberty was fundamental to their 
scheme of thingsp without which nothing valuable could be 
accomplished. Unless men were free to enjoy the benefits best- 
owed by Nature, those benefits would count for nought. Sot in 
its political thought the Enlightenment negotiated an uneasy 
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alliance between certain preconceived moral values and a 
supposedly value-free method of inquiry. The tensions 
inherent in such a position account for most of the incon- 
sistencies in Enlightenment thinking. 
These themes were held together by a feeling of 
optimism about the future, a feeling that man had reached 
a new stage in his development from which he could strike 
out towards perfectability. In America, the sense of progress 
was defined in the practical exploitation of the natural 
resources of the continentp while Europe continued to expect 
progress in the nature of man itself. 
These ideas percolated through to America throughout 
the course of the eighteenth century and served to shape the 
American mindt so much so that when the inconsistency between 
theory and practice exploded over the issue of slavery in the 
succeeding centuryv its defenders were unable to emancipate 
themselves from the thought patterns of the Enlightenment. In 
the following chapterst we shall be examining the Enlightenment 
content of Calhoun's Disquisition on Government: we shall look 
at his method of reasoning and his concept of Natural Law, his 
attitude towards progresst power and liberty and his devotion 
to a complex form of constitutionalism. In all these areas, 
Calhoun owes a debt to the Enlightenment, though on the funda- 
mental question of political values, he turns away from the 
philosophe and stands as a reactionary. 
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Chapter Pour: Philosophical Method in the Disquisition: 
The Reinterpretation of Natural Law 
At the beginning of the previous chapter, I outlined 
the central thesis of this dissertation, namely that for a 
proper understanding of Calhoun's political theory, as 
opposed to his constitutional theory, our attention ought to 
focus on his brief preliminary text, the Disquisition on 
Government. I have further argued that the ideas contained 
in the Disquisition are most fruitfully evaluated within the 
framework of the "Reactionary Enlightenment". an artificial 
and paradoxical category suggested by Louis Hartz, which is 
designed to emphasise and explain the apparent inconsistencies 
within Calhoun's theory of government. The essence of the 
paradox lies in the attempt to fashion a political theory 
which utilises the intellectual equipment most readily assoc- 
iated with the style of the Enlightenment, but which incorpor- 
atesl toog an implicit defence of slavery. For the Hartz thesis 
to remain a useful explanatory category of Calhoun's political 
thoughtv both elements must be shown to be present in the 
Disquisition. The main components of the Enlightenment style, 
both in its European and American manifestations, were ident- 
ified briefly in the previous chapter and were seen to consist 
in a devotion to the method of scientific empiricism in 
politicst religion and ethics, a belief in the capacity of 
the human mind to construct social institutions which were 
consonant with Nature, and a faith in the ultimate perfect- 
ability of man. Using these criteria, I want to examine in 
this, and in succeeding chapterst the validity of the "React- 
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ionary Enlightenment" as an explanatory concept and to analyse 
how applicable it is to Calhounts Disquisition. 
In this chapter and the next, the two specific areas 
which we shall be dealing with are Calhoun's philosophical 
method and his religious thought. The importance of philosoph- 
ical method was underlined in our discussion of the Enlighten- 
ment which was distinguished from earlier modes of thought 
chiefly by its eager acceptance of the epistemological assumpt- 
ions of seventeenth century science. The development of 
scientific empiricism offered a striking challenge to the 
accepted canons of a priori reasoning and resultedv in Bertrand 
Russell's words, in "One of the great historic controversies 
in philosophy". 
' Yet the empirical basis of the Enlightenment 
remains a complex and controversial issuep for, at least until 
1750, enlightened political values continued to be defined in 
terms of the ancient conception of Natural Law, a universal 
moral order which was knowable by reason and which could not, 
a fortioriv be demonstrated by empirical observation. 
2 It was 
not until the arrival on the scene of utilitarian concepts 
that the political theory of the Enlightenment could legitim- 
ately claim to be scientific. 
3 But if Natural Lawv based on 
self-evident (and therefore a priori) principles was one of 
the last intellectual conventions to be abandoned by the 
Enlightenment, it in no way inhibited the style of rigorous 
cross-examination which was so much a feature of the scientific 
method. Ultimately, it was only a question of time before the 
Ealightenment could bring its actual method into line with its 
self-professed ideal of "scientific" knowledgeof man and 
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society. Philosophical method is therefore a crucial 
distinguishing mark between those frames of thought which 
may properly be called "enlightened" and those which may 
not. Understanding Calhoun's method of reasoning in the 
Disquisition is an indispensable first step in determining 
the applicability of the "Reactionary Enlightenment" to his 
political thought. 
Although Calhoun's religious thought is a less 
obviously important area of study, it bears examination for 
two reasons. In the first place, where political obligation 
is conceived as moral obligation, as it was in all prescrip- 
tive political theories to a greater or lesser extent until 
the second half of the Enlightenmentv sanction for the moral 
order prescribed was thought to be ultimately derived from 
God. This is certainly true of all Natural Law theorists, 
including Locke, who held that the rights and duties of 
individuals rested on a law which was higher than human law, 
and which emanated from God. 
4 Even during the eighteenth 
century, when most avenues of thought became increasingly 
secularp writers were reluctant to deny absolutely God's role 
as the fountain of the moral law of the universe; but He was 
no longer thought of as being a personal God who intervened 
in the affairs of men to accomplish His divine purpose nor 
as a Divine Legislator who inscribed the moral law on blocks 
of stone. Rathert His will was consulted by recourse to 
Nature which was conceived of as the divine ordering of all 
created existence. Thus, it was possible for Thomas Jefferson 
to appeal to "Nature and Nature's God" as justification for 
the political separation of America from Britain in 1776. 
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Furthermore, he was able to argue that the rights to "Life, 
Liberty and the pursuit of happiness" were moral laws 
precisely because they had been endowed on men by their 
Creator. 5 
Enlightened religious thoughtp then, as it applied to 
politics and other branches of knowledge, tended to take the 
form of deism. God was retained in the scheme of things, but 
onlyv in Viscount Bolinbroke's phrase, as "the first efficient 
cause". 
6 All mystery was banished from the scene in an attempt 
to make religious faith conform to the precepts of reason, and, 
incidentallyp to remove it from the narrow confines of the 
various sects. Lockep it is true, along with other moderate 
British deistsp attempted to show in The Reasonableness-of 
Christianity (1695) that the Scriptures contained nothing 
which was incompatible with the dictates of human reasono but 
the prevailing tendency in Enlightened circles on both sides 
of the Atlantic was to regard the Bible as being of secondary 
importance to Nature as the true source of God's law. The 
eloquent American deist Ethan Allan summed up this position: 
"As far as we understand naturep we are become acquainted with 
the character of God; for the knowledge of nature is the 
revelation of God.. 
7 
Religious ideas, especially insofar as they touch upon 
politics in the form of Natural or Divine Law, are therefore 
a further mark of distinction between enlightened and other 
categories of thought. By comparing Calhoun's general religious 
attitude and his explicit statements on Natural Law in the Dis- 
quisition with the tenets of Enlightenment deism, we ought to 
be able to determine the extent to which his religious thought 
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conforms to the spirit of the Enlightenment. What makes this 
exercise a particularly fruitful one is the further compari- 
son of Calhoun's position with the attitudes of the Southern 
proslavery school. It will be argued that Calhoun's religious 
views stand in marked contrast to the views of those who 
undertook to defend slavery by insisting on a literal reading 
of Scripturet and that they give the appearance of being fully 
consonant with the Enlightenment attitude. Neverthelessp while 
the components of his religious thought might be significantly 
similar to the deism of the Enlightenment, the use to which he 
puts the fully-assembled ideas in the Disquisition is decidedly 
un-Enlightened. So far from erecting a set of moral laws, 
derived directly from God for the guidance of human actions, 
Calhoun postulates a form of Natural Law which gives divine 
sanction for the existing social order. There is an interesting 
irony involved here: Calhoun reaches a conclusion which the 
writers of the Enlightenment ought to have reached themselves 
had they been true to their ideal of investigating history 
and society scientifically. If they had conceived Natural Law 
(as their empirical temper should have told them to) not as a 
set of moral rules derived a. priori, but as a collection of 
inductively held hypotheses drawn from the experience of 
historyt scientifically-speaking, they ought to have concluded, 
along with Alexander Popet that "Whatever is, is right". 
8 
of 
courset to have done so would have robbed the Enlightenment 
of one of its most distinctive characteristics; but again, it 
is not the only movement in ideas which is known chiefly for 
its inconsistencies. In a curious way, then, Calhoun uses the 
Enlightenment against itself: he takes its method of scientific 
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investigation and inductively builds up a framework of 
Natural Law which contains its own moral imperative - that 
is, whatever isp is right. In this sense, Calhoun reminds 
us not so much of the classic Enlightenment of the eighteenth 
centuryp but more of the Social Darwinists of the late nine- 
teenth century. Calhounv like William Graham Sumnerv attempts 
to convert description of the status quo into prescription so 
that his interpretation of Natural Law is actually a sanction 
for existing social coercions. 
9 
There existsp therefore, an intimate and complex 
relation between Calhoun's philosophical method and his 
religious thought which we shall attempt to unravel in this 
chapter and the next. One caveat ought to be issued at the 
outsetp however. By using the formal terms "philosophical 
method" and "religious thought", there is the danger of 
investing themv as they apply to Calhoun, with a greater 
sense of systematisation than would seem to warrant from the 
text itself. There is little evidence, for example, that 
Calhoun ever considered the question of method in a philos- 
ophical sensev as did Hobbes, Locke and Hume. 
10 
Calhoun made 
no explicit attempt to evolve a prior theory of knowledge on 
which to build his political theory, and this as much as any- 
thing else distinguishes him as a political theorist rather 
than as a political philosopher. Neverthelessp this in no way 
implies that penetrating the Disquisition to find his method 
of reasoning is a futile or irrelevant exercise; simply 
because Calhoun felt no need to articulate his epistemological 
assumptions does not mean to say that he was devoid of them, 
butp on the contrary, that they were so well-established that 
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they needed no restatement. 
11 Moreover, it is often in these 
sub-conscious assumptions that we learn the extent to which 
thinkers are indebted to the intellectual traditions they 
operate within. 
The fundamental conception on which Americans based 
the theoretical justification of their separation from Great 
Britain in the 1770s was the idea of Natural Law, and no more 
eloquent statement of the American version of the doctrine 
can be found than in the Declaration of Independence: 
We hold these truths to be self-evidentt That 
all men are created equal, that they are endowed 
by their Creator with certain inalienable Rights, 
that among these are Life, Liberty and the 
pursuit of Happiness. That to secure these 
rights, Governments are instituted among Men, 
deriving their just powers from the consent of 
the governedv That whenever any Form of Govern- 
ment becomes destructive of these ends, it is 
the Right of the People to alter or to abolish 
it, and to institute new Government, laying its 
foundation on such principles and organizing its 
powers in such form, as to them shall seem most 
likely to effect their Safety and Happiness. 12 
The central elements of the American interpretation Of Natural 
Law theory are readily apparent in the above passage: the 
inviolability of certain individual human rightsp political 
obligation founded on consent, and an ultimate justification 
of resistance to tyrannical government. None of these state- 
ments of political principle were startlingly original, nor 
were they intended to be; Thomas Jeffersont author of the 
Declarationg maintained that the document was designed "to be 
an expression of the American mind". an exposition of "the 
harmonizing sentiments of the day". 
13 Yet what is peculiar 
about these "sentiments" is that they were erupting into the 
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forefront of American political theory in a more dramatic 
way than ever before at precisely the time they were passing 
out of fashion in Europe. 
The notion of Natural Law was an idea which the writers 
of the Enlightenment in Europe inherited from classical and 
medieval times. 
14 Throughout the course of its history subtle 
changes had occurred in its meaning which makes it one of the 
most difficult of political concepts to define. Nevertheless, 
certain constant features may be identified. In general, 
Natural Law was thought to be a transcendent, moral standard 
imposed on the universe by its Creator, to which all moral 
beings ought to conform. The Law of Nature, whether it derived 
from God or simply from the nature of things, was objective in 
the sense that it existed independently of human will and could 
therefore not be altered by human agency. Moreover, the law's 
application was universalt irrespective of time or place or 
the positivep man-made law which Obtained in different local- 
ities. It was this metaphysical principle which informed the 
political and ethical cosmology of writers from the time Of 
Cicero to the Enlightenment. But a crucial question remailled: 
if Natural Law didý in fact, exist, in what ways was it discOv- 
erable to man? In his discourse on the. Laws, Cicero had Inain- 
tained that man was equipped to perceive the Law of Nature by 
means of a special faculty - "right reason" - which enabled 
him to act in conformity with the universal principles of 
justice prescribed by Natural Law. On at least two occasiOrIOP 
Cicero held that this faculty applied to all men without regard 
to intellectual capacity or statusq therby implying that there 
existed a moral equality amongst men. 
15 This conclusion, V91"ch 
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contrasted sharply with Aristotle, was carried over into the 
later Middle Ages by Grotius and Pufendorf. Grotius's definit- 
ion of Natural Law, in De Jure Belli ac Pacis (1625), was a 
re-echo of Cicero: it was, he wrote, "the dictate of right 
reason, indicating that any act, from its agreement or dis- 
agreement with the rational nature, has in it a moral turpit- 
ude or a moral necessity.,, 
16 For Grotius, the principles of 
Natural Law were ultimately moral axioms, analagous to the 
propositions of mathematics, from which other principles could 
be derivedp but which themselves needed no proof simply because 
they were held a priori. This is clearly stated in the Proleg- 
omena: "In the first'place, it was my object to refer the 
truth of the things which belong to Natural Law to some notions, 
so certainp that no one can deny them, without doing violence 
to his own nature-" 
17 Grotius' appeal to Right Reason and self- 
evidence in the discovery of Natural Law is important because 
it formed the agenda of epistemological discussion to which 
Locke contributed so much, later in the century. 
The scientific advances of the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries drew attention to another sense in which Natural Law 
was usedv and in the process clarified the method employed for 
discovering it. In this second sense, Natural Law was again 
thought of as a universal standard, but one which goverened 
the movements of objects in the physicalp as opposed to the 
moralt world. (It would be misleading to imply that Natural 
Law, as a physical cosmologyv existed independently of the 
moralv for the essential fruitfulness of the concept derived 
from its fundamental assumption of the unity of the cosmos. 
is 
Thust the identification of regularities in the physical 
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world - the movement of planets, the succession of seasons - 
led thinkers to conclude that there existed an objective 
"law" governing the universe which applied to all spheres 
of existence, the moral as much as the physical. 
19 This 
assumption, present in early Greek thoughtp betokened (as 
George Sabine has put it) "the search for permanence amid 
change and for unity amid the manifold. 112-0 
)The 
scientific 
discoveries of Kepler, Galileo and Newton highlighted a 
cleavage between the two senses in which Natural Law was 
used, but a cleavage which was methodological rather than 
cosmological. Newton's great scientific synthesis, the 
Principia Mathematical continued to lend support to the 
notion of an all-embracing law of Nature, but as far as 
scientific inquiry was concerned the method used to discover 
it was observation and experimentp rather than pure reason. 
21 
Unlike moral precepts, which were prescriptive and self- 
evident, scientific hypotheses had to contend with the raw 
data of observed experience; instead of proceeding from 
certain logicalpa priori principles to deduce particular 
instances of fact, the scientific method inverted the proced- 
ure so that its hypotheses were induced by extracting the 
constant principle involved from all the observed instances 
of the behaviour of the object or objects under study. This 
method - scientific empiricism or induction -, by moving 
from the isolated "facts" of observed experience towards 
abstractiont provided a fundamental connection between 
reality and man's way of knowing it, which had been absent 
in the purely deductive systems of ancient and medieval 
philosophers. Of courset scientific "truth" arrived at by 
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induction could never claim the same status of certainty 
as logical proofs, for the possibility always exists that 
the future behaviour of an object might not conform to the 
hypothesis postulated to explain it, in which case the 
hypothesis itself is nullified, or at least subject to 
modification. 
22 
By the beginning of the eighteenth centuryv then, 
two senses in which Natural Law was conceived may be distin- 
guishedt each employing different methods of reasoning and 
directed towards different objects. Natural Law in the sense 
of being a moral standard to which human beings aspire, was 
knowable by the use of reason, and grasped intuitively. In 
its second sensev Natural Law was still considered to be a 
universal standard but one which regulated the physical 
behaviour of objects. The crucial difference between the two 
was method: "scientific" Natural Law, so to speakt proceeded 
along the lines of observation and experiment to frame 
inductive "laws" of behaviour which describedt rather than 
prescribedp events in the physical world. Moral theory could 
never be fully accommodated to this method precisely because 
it was not prescriptivev because it dealt with normative 
statements of value and not details of known fact. Nevertheless, 
the very freshness of the scientific approach, coming after 
centuries of arid scholasticism and closed deductive systems, 
breathed new life into all branches of philosophical inquiry. 
This was accomplished largely by the refinement of a new 
empirical epistemology and the man who accomplished it was 
john Locke. 
Locke's theory of knowledge was presented in his Essay 
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Concerning Human Understanding, published at the end of 1689, 
and became the source-book of the empirical method for most 
of the eighteenth centuryt or at least until David Hume 
published his, Treatise of Human Nature in 1739-40. Locke's 
purpose in writing the Essay was to analyse the implications 
of the scientific method and to clarify the psychological 
process involved in knowing anything from observation and 
experience. The fundamental premise of the Essay, and of all 
Locke's subsequent philosophical writings, stated at the 
opening of Book II, is that the human mind derives its ideas 
from sensation and reflection, that it is from experience 
"that all our knowledge is founded, and from that it ultimate- 
ly derives itself. " 
23 Locke was concerned with denying the 
existence of what were termed "innate principles, 19 that is 
ideas which are allegedly "stamped" on the human mind by God 
at birth; such a concept, though formulated by philosophyss 
great anti-authoritarian Descartesp implied that there 
existed a category of knowledge which could not be questioned. 24 
But at the same time, Locke was careful to distinguish between 
innate principles and self-evident ideas. His definition of 
self-evident principles was similar to Grotius's "fundamental 
conceptions which are beyond question so that no one can deny 
them without doing violence to himself"; they werep Locke 
maintainedp 
Such kinds of truth the mind perceives 
at the first sight of the ideas together 
by bare intuition, without the intervent- 
ion of any other idea; and this kind of 
knowledge is the clearest and most certain 
that human frailty is capable of. It is 
on this intuition that depends all the 
certainty and evidence of all our know- 
ledge; which certainty everyone finds to 
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be so great that he cannot imaginev 
and therefore not require, a 
greater. 25 
These are strange ideas indeed to be coming from a 
philosopher who is known primarily as an empiricistp for 
at this juncture Locke is arguing for the existence of a 
certain kind of knowledge which is a priori, not empirical. 
But the point must be made that Locke was not essentially 
opposed to the principle that certain kinds of knowledge 
could be intuitively or rationally perceived, only that the 
scope of such knowledge was severely limited. What disting- 
uishes Locke from his continental contemporaries Descartes, 
Spinoza and Leibnizt is essentially a shift of emphasis 
away from pure rationalism towards empiricism. Where Descartes 
could see the endless possibilities of achieving certain know- 
ledge through the exercise of unaided reason, Locke saw its 
limitations and sought to redress the balance in favour of a 
more commonsense empiricism. George Sabine's judgement of Locke, 
that he "was an empiricist but with a large residue of phil- 
osophic rationalism", 
26 
captures precisely the balance of 
Locke's thoughtp and restores to its proper status the ration- 
alistic content of his epistemology . 
27 
Traditional interpret- 
ations of Locke, which have tended to exaggerate his empiricism 
at the expense of his rationalism, have consequently been 
unable to find a connection between his theory of knowledge 
and his moral and political theory. 
28 Some have maintained 
that his use of Natural Law, as providing a moral standard 
and perceived through the exercise of reason, in his political 
theory is fundamentally irreconcilable with his epistemology, 
a criticism which would be true if Locke had denied the 
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possibility of a priori knowledge. 
29 But he does not; his 
denial of innate ideas does not amount to the same thing 
as a denial of self-evident propositions, which he explicitly 
accepts. 
30 Once this is grasped the irreconcilability of his 
epistemology with his political theory is removed. 
Locke's understanding of Natural Law is, however, 
sufficiently different from traditional interpretations of 
the doctrine that it bears closer examinationt particularly 
in the light of subsequent kmerican usage. In Locket Natural 
Law is conceived as the source of a corpus of rights which 
each individual born into the world holds by virtue of his 
humanity. The equality of these rights is derived directly 
from God's sovereignty over the world He created and the 
individuals He created to populate it; this is made clear 
at the beginning of the Second Treatise where Locke says 
that there is "nothing more evident, than that Creatures of 
the same species and rank promiscuously born to all the same 
advantages of Naturev and the use of the same faculties, 
should also be equal one amongst another without Subordinat- 
ion or Subjection.. ..,, 
31 Locke does not, of course, mean to 
imply that all individuals are equal in capacity or material 
statusp but that their moral standing before God makes them 
equal in rights, and no one but God can deprive an individual 
of his rights. But how does it come about that men recognise 
their own and others' moral equality? Locke answers that it 
is through the Law of Nature, which is the Law of Reason. 
32 
Reason is the peculiar gift of God to man which separates 
him from other animals; 
33 
moreover, in the state of nature, 
where individuals originally existed in the absence of civil 
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society, the Law of Reason was the only guide and the only 
limitation on human action. When a man offends against the 
Law of Nature by seeking to deprive another individual of 
his God-given rights, he is deemed to have "quitted Reason, 
which God hath given to be the Rule betwixt Man and Mant, 
34 
and "renders himself liable to be destroied by the injurld 
person and the rest of mankind, that will joyn with him in 
the execution of Justice...... 
35 
Amongst the rights which Locke regarded as Natural 
(that isq rights pertaining to individuals which existed 
independently of civil association and which were a direct 
consequence of God's endowment) were the rights to life, 
liberty and estatet which collectively he calls Property. 
36 
In the state of nature all men are in "a State of perfect 
Freedom to order their Actions, and dispose of their 
Possessionsq and Persons as they think fitl within the 
bounds of the Law of Naturep without asking leave, or depend- 
ing upon the Will of any other Man.,, 
37 The problem was that 
in the state of nature mens' rights were precarious indeed, 
for the absence of an enforcing agent afforded opportunities 
for the Law of Nature to be broken with virtual impunity. It 
is true that Locke regarded the "injurld person and the rest 
of mankind" as having a right to punish the offender "to 
that degree, and with so much Severity as will suffice to 
make it an ill bargain to the Offender, give him cause to 
repentg and terrifie others from doing the like"038 but he 
also recognised that the interests of justice might not be 
best served if the victimp through an excess of zeal or a 
desire for revengep were to exact a harsher penalty than the 
173 
original offence warranted. All in all, justice in the state 
of nature, whether for the victim or the offender, seemed 
hard to come by. 
It is for precisely these reasons that men find it 
convenient to organise themselves into civil communities, 
and the device by which they accomplish it is the social 
contract. Having shown that all men are "by Nature, all free, 
equal and independent'19 
39 Locke concludes that no individual 
can be forced into society without giving his freely-arrived 
at consent. "The only way whereby any one devests himself of 
his Natural Libertyp and puts on the, bonds of Civil Society 
is by agreeing with other Men to joyn and unite into a Comm- 
unityv for their comfortable, safe and peaceable living one 
amongst another. ...,. 
40 What is involved in this agreement is 
that each individual voluntarily consents to surrender a 
portion of the natural powers he held in the state of nature, 
to be placed at the collective disposal of the community at 
large. All this, of course, does not involve the renunciation 
of any Natural Rights because, in the first placep although 
they are inherent in each individual, properly speaking they 
belong not to the individual in whom they inhere, but to God 
whose original creation they were; and secondly, the whole 
purpose of instituting society is in order to protect the 
individual in the enjoyment of his Natural Rights - sog even 
if individual Natural Rights were alienable, which Locke 
denies, to surrender them on entering society would be 
contrary to the purpose Of its formation. It followed from 
this that the agent of the collective community - the govern- 
ment - was in no legitimate position to abrogate the rights 
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of any of the citizens, and should it attempt to do so, it 
was liable to be justly overthrown. 
These were the sentiments that Jefferson and his 
revolutionary contemporaries drew on in an effort to justify 
American actions to a candid world. The whole emphasis of the 
Declaration of Independence was clearly centred on the protect- 
ion of Natural Rights from capricious and arbitrary government, 
a charge which was levelled at George III in a litany of 
indictments. Yet if one surveys the scene of European enlight- 
ened political theory at this period, one finds this Lockean 
conception of Natural Law, based on self-evident propositions, 
coming under severe attack from Utilitarians and others 
precisely because of its non-empirical character. David Hume's 
Treatise of Human Naturep for example, sought to clarify the 
senses in which the concept of reason was used in Natural Law 
theory, and concluded that reason itself prescribed no princip- 
les of justice or right which were binding on men. In this 
sense, Reason had been confused with "propensity", a human 
inclination towards a particular course of action which was 
founded on the will and the passions. Reason was itself 
"perfectly inert" and could "never be the source of E30 active 
a principle as conscience or a sense of morals.,, 
41 Prom this 
Hume concluded in a famous phrase that "Reason is, and ought 
only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend 
to any other office than to serve and obey them.,. 
42 Hume's 
assault on reason as an active, controlling principle in 
human motivation struck systematically at the heart of trad- 
itional Natural Law philosophy in all its political manifest- 
ations and from which, in Europe at least, it never really 
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recovered. In France, although Hume's conclusions were not 
wholly acceptedp it gave added impetus to the nascent ideas 
of utilitarianism which continued into the nineteenth century. 
43 
Given this situation in European political theory, how 
are we to account for the American attachment to a theory of 
Natural Rights which was becoming obsolete elsewhere? One 
reason is suggested by purely physical factors: the sources 
which the French utilitarians were drawing ono particularly 
Hume's social philosophy,, were not generally available in 
America in the 1770s and 1780s. Hume's History of England and 
his Essayst it is true, were available, but not the important 
Treatise of Human Nature. It is notable that Jeffersonts main 
contact with Hume's work was through the Historýy of. EnRland, 
which he admired except for its Tory bias. 
44 This reason, 
howeverý cannot be pushed too far for even though the main 
statements of Hume's philosophy were not available in America, 
the writings of other sentimentalist philosophers were. 45 A 
secondp and more interesting reason for the cultural time lag 
has been suggested by Donald Meyer. Meyer has maintained that 
the attraction of Natural Rights for Americans lay in the 
realm of moral rhetoric, that is, its ideas served as 
"elaborate metaphors" to explain the moral relation between 
individuals and the state. 
46 For a people about to undertake 
the drastic step of rebellionp some form of psychological 
reassurance that their course was a right one was necessary; 
such reassurance could only succeed if the justification for 
revolt were grounded on firm, unassailablev self-evident 
principles. Empirical generalisation could never fully 
accomplish this kind of function simply because it could not 
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aspire to the same degree of certainty as moral axioms: its 
evidence, as Hume ironically pointed out, could always be 
countered by opposing evidence. 
47 Where the empirical method 
could come into its own was in the reconstruction of social 
institutions, drawing on history and experience, but as an 
instrument in a moral crusade it was weak and unappealing, 
almost insignificant alongside the cosmic certainty of moral 
dicta. 
Natural Rights, then, supplied the indispensable moral 
justification of the American Revolution, but in doing so it 
fixed the boundaries of American political theory for generat- 
ions. For by associating Natural Rights theory with so catacly- 
smic and meaningful an event as the Revolution, and by writing 
its fundamental propositions into their most revered political 
documentv Americans were recording in a moment of time the 
eternal principles they professed to live by. To a later 
generationt the Declaration of Independence stood both as a 
reminder of those original principles and as an indictment of 
the institution of slavery; the intellectual veneration of 
the Declaration may be accredited one of the reasons for the 
rise of the anti-slavery crusade which dominated politics in 
the early part of the nineteenth century. 
Against this conception of Natural Law - as a moral 
prescription entailing certain fundamental individual rights - 
Calhoun stands as a rigorous and systematic opponent. Few 
points emerge with greater clarity from the Disquisition on 
Government, than Calhoun's utter rejection of the theory of 
Natural Rights and the accompanying intellectual apparatus 
of social contract theory. The reason for this rejection, 
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namely the incompatibility of combining the concept of 
Natural Rights with the existence of slavery, will be 
discussed in greater detail in a later chapterp* but what 
is of particular interest here is the grounds on which Cal- 
houn bases his refutation and the implications it has for 
his philosophical method. For Calhoun's attack on Natural 
Rights is accomplished in the best empiricist style, in 
48 
much the same manner as Hume's critique of Locke was. 
In an admitted digression in the middle of the Disquis- 
ition, Calhoun considers the "prevalent opinion that all men 
are born free and equal" and concludes that "nothing can be 
more unfounded and false. 14 
9 The misconception, he maintains, 
is founded on an equally erroneous notion that there existed 
a state of naturev "a state of individuality supposed to have 
existed prior to the social and political state, and in which 
men lived apart and independent of each other. " "But ouch a 
state",, he continuesp "is purely hypothetical.... Instead of 
being the natural state of man, it is, of all conceivable 
states, the most opposed to his nature--most repugnant to his 
,, 50 feelings and most incompatible with his wants . Calhoun's 
grounds for rejecting the state of nature are important 
because they demonstrate the extent to which he utilises the 
empirical method of reasoning, for he bases his whole attack 
on a denial that the state of nature ever existed as a matter 
of fact. Indeed, more than this, he is prepared to accept the 
"natural" freedom and equality of men if it could be shown 
that such a presocial state of nature had existed as an 
historical reality: "If such a state ever did exist, all men 
would have been, indeedv free and equal in it; that is, free 
* See chapter six below 
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to do as they pleased and exempt from the authority and 
control of others .... ', 
51 But Calhoun is confident that 
"universal observation" would show no such state to have 
ever existed. 
52 
Calhoun's attack on the Lockean state of nature is 
along the same lines as Hume'st though Calhoun was more 
relentless in pushing his criticism to its logical conclusion. 
Hume had maintained that no empirical evidence could be found 
to support the contention that a state of nature had existed 
Philosophical 
and that consequently it was -to be regarded as a"mere fict- 
-IN 
ion.,, 53 But at the same timep Hume was prepared to tolerate 
the libertarian implications of the theories of the social 
contract writers, largely because their conclusions coincided 
with his own concept of political obligation and right. Hume, 
in factq deals remarkably gently with the social contract 
theoristst "Those political writers". as he calls them, who 
of ... intended to establish a principlep which is perfectly 
just and reasonable; thot the reasoningt upon which they 
endeavourld to establish itt was fallacious and sophistical.,, 
54 
What Hume was primarily concerned with was to show that the 
idea of rights and duties of individuals did not depend upon 
the actual existence of a presocial. state of nature or an 
original social contractp but that these elements served as 
a metaphor to describe the moral status of individuals in 
relation to the state and vice versa. Calhoun's purpose is, 
however, different; so far from accepting the conclusions of 
Lockeq he is concerned with eliminating entirely any notion 
of individual rights existing independently of society, for 
to have done so would have meant admitting that men held 
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rights within their own persons, by virtue of their status 
as the special creation of God, in which case he could not 
have escaped the conclusion that black slaves, being men 
(however inferior)v were entitled to such rights . 
55 In an 
effort to avoid this conclusion, Calhoun strikes at the most 
obviously weak element of social contract theory, the state 
of naturet attacking it on empirical grounds. Hume's mild 
rebuke of Locke for his non-empirical speculation in this 
regard, becomes in Calhoun a violent counter-assertion and 
the means of attacking the political value-system which the 
apparatus was designed to defend. 
What is entailed in Calhoun's denial of the existence 
of the state of nature does not involve an obscure philosoph- 
ical nicetyq but a point of fundamental importance in describ- 
ing the moral relation of individuals to each other and to the 
society of which they are a part. Whether Locke conceived the 
state of nature as a moral fiction or as an historical fact 
(and there are good grounds for believing the latter to be 
true56)q the effect was the same: it emphasised that individ- 
uals possessed rights prior to the formation of society, that 
they retained those rights once they had consented to join it, 
and that the purpose of society was to guarantee those rights. 
By attacking the state of nature, Calhoun was threatening the 
whole of this intellectual structure: if there were no state 
of naturep individual rights could not claim to derive from 
it; nor was consent necessary to become a part of society; 
but Most Of allp the community was under no obligation to 
protect the rights of individuals sincet properly speakingg 
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those rights did not exist apart from society. Whatever 
rights individuals did hold derived their force and legitimacy 
from society itselft and could therefore never be "natural" in 
the lockean sense. Even liberty, the most highly-prized of 
Southern rightsp was not an inviolable Natural Right: "It is 
a reward to be earned, not a blessing to be gratuitously 
lavished on all alike-a reward reserved for the intelligent, 
the patriotict the virtuous and the deserving-not a boon to 
be bestowed on a people too ignorant, degraded and vicious, 
to be capable of either appreciating or of enjoying it....,. 
57 
Through his attack on the state of nature Calhoun was 
therefore attacking the whole conception of Natural Rights 
and the traditional American interpretation of Natural Law. 
In June 1848# in a speech to the Senate on the Oregon Bill, 
he had subjected the natural law propositions of the Declarat- 
ion of Independence to severe, if pedantiop scrutiny. 
58 The 
idea that "all men are created equal'19 he maintainedt was 
wholly lacking in truthp for originally - and biblically 
only two persons were "created" and all the rest were born 
into the world. Moreoverv it was not men that were bornt but 
children and "While infants they are incapable of freedom, 
being destitute alike of the capacity of thinking and acting, 
without which there can be no freedom. Besides, they are 
necessarily born subject to the authority of their parents, 
and remain so among all people, savage and civilizedl until 
the development of their intellect and physical capacity 
enables them to take care of themselves.,. 
59 There is very 
little in this statement which would have caused Locke to 
quarrel with Calhoun, except that Calhoun goes on to say that 
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children, when they become men, acquire "the freedom of which 
the condition in which they were born permits.,, 
6 0 To Calhoun, 
liberty was relative to the individual's station in life, 
whereas in Locke the equality of the right to liberty was 
absolute; "Childrenllp maintained Locke, "are not born in this 
full state of, Equalityt though they are born to it. Their 
Parents have a sort of Rule and Jurisdiction over them when 
they come into the World, and for some time aftert but Itis 
a temporary one-" 
61 For Locke, the parental authority over 
offspring was a duty to be exercised only until they grew to 
adulthood when then they would claim the full rights of 
liberty held previously in trust for them. 
Calhoun's attack on Natural Rights both in the speech 
of June 1848 and in the Disquisition are examples of his 
appeal to observation and experience as opposed to a _priori 
speculation. If his objections appear trivial and superficial, 
this is an inescapable function of the method he chose to use, 
for against the grandiloquent statements of moral principle, 
criticisms based on empirical grounds, one might say on mere 
matters of fact* almost necessarily seem spurious. Yet it is 
difficult to see on what other grounds he could have accompl- 
ished the demolition of Natural Rights so completely. By 
denying the existence of the state of nature, both as an 
historical fact and as a philosophical device, the whole 
framework of natural rights theory crumbles in a heap. But, 
of courset this can only be the first step, a clearing away 
of the ground, prior to erecting a new philosophical structure 
to replace the old. If Natural Rights as a description of the 
moral status of the individual before the state is abolished 
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a whole series of important questions concerning the nature 
of political obligation is left unanswered and Calhoun must 
somehow account for these. The way in which he does this is 
to construct a completely new conception of Natural Law, 
drawn from a supposedly scientific analysis of human nature, 
which he then elevates into moral obligation by the intro- 
duction of a postulate of divine sanction. 
In the opening paragraphs of the Disquisitiont Cal- 
houn's reliance on a form of Natural Law which is quite 
different from the American notion of Natural Rightst is 
immediately apparent. "In order to have a clear and just 
conception"y he writes, "of the nature and object of govern- 
mentp it is indispensable to understand correctly what that 
constitution or law of our nature is in which government 
originates.... " 
62 The first major assumption of the work, 
thereforet is that there exists a fundamental law of human 
nature which governs the actions of all meng and which it is 
beyond the power of man to alter (for if it were alterable 
at willp it could not claim the status of a "law" in the 
scientific sense). To emphasise the constancy of this law of 
human naturep Calhoun employs a metaphor drawn from the 
realm of physical science: "Without this [law], it is as 
impossible to lay any solid foundation for the science of 
government as it would be to lay one for that of astronomy 
without a like understanding of that constitution or law of 
the material world according to which the several bodies 
composing the solar system mutually act on each other and by 
which they are kept in their respective spheres. " 
63 The use 
of this metaphor, to which Calhoun returned later in the 
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text,, is particularly suggestive because it implied that he 
intended to search for this law not so much in the realm of 
abstract speculation as in the sphere of observed and trust- 
ed experience. 
We have noted earlier in this chapter that the method 
of understanding the so-called "scientific" version of Natural 
Law proceeded along the lines of observing the behaviour of 
material phenomena with a view to extracting the constant 
principle involved and postulating it as a descriptive "law" 
or hypothesis. The adaptation of this method to political 
theory was the peculiar accomplishment of the latter phase 
of the Enlightenment. This is exactly the method that Calhoun 
professes to use in his reconstruction of Natural Law. Having 
assumed that the Law of Nature extends to the area of human 
motivationp Calhoun appeals to "universal experience'$ to 
discover what the constant principle involved in political 
life is. 
64 Two principles, history tells Calhoung are at 
work in human nature: man is both a social animal, and, at 
the same time, a self-interested one. He is not interested 
in knowing why this should be the case, only that it is so 
andq consequentlyt he presents these facets as "incontestable 
facts" and not as maxims of ethical right. Indeed# in order 
to avoid violating the scientific spirit of the theory, Cal- 
houn refrains from using the word "selfish" to describe mants 
self-centred feelings: "I intentionally avoid the expression 
'selfish feelings' ... because as commonly used, it implies an 
unusual excess of the individual over the social feelings in 
the person to whom it is applied and, consequently, something 
depraved and vicious. My object is to exclude such inference 
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and to restrict the inquiry exclusively to facts in their 
bearings on the subject under considerationg viewed as mere 
,, 65 phenomena appertaining to our nature... go 
From these two propositions of human natureq empiric- 
ally formulated, Calhoun derives almost the whole of his 
subsequent theory of government. Yet it is pertinent to 
inquire just how valid his empirical postulates are, for 
Calhoun does not bother to present the evidence he presumably 
must have in order to make them valid. By way of illustration, 
we may take his first proposition of human nature (namely,, 
that man is a social being) and subject his argument to 
closer scrutiny. Calhoun assumes "as an incontestable fact 
that man is so constituted as to be a social being. His 
inclinations and wantsy physical and moralp irresistibly 
impel him to associate with his kind; and he hasp accordingly, 
never been foundt in any age or country, in any state other 
than the social. In no otherp indeed, could he exiett and in 
no other - were it possible for him to exist - could he attain 
to a full development of his moral and intellectual facult- 
ies.... " 
66 Nowp in the first part of this quotationg Calhoun 
is making a strictly empirical claim - that man's needs force 
him to associate with his fellows; but having made that 
statementp we would expect Calhoun to offer evidence in 
support of it. Instead# howevery we get a second statementp 
not as evidence validating the firett but on the contrary, 
relying for its own validity on the truth of the original 
statement. The fact that man has never been foundq historically, 
in any state other than the socialp does not logically preclude 
the possibility that a prenocial state had, in fact, existed 
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for as Locke showed quite simply and reasonably, "Government 
is everywhere antecedent to Records. , 
67 On this point, then, 
Calhoun's argument is not sufficient to overthrow Locke's. 
though in fairnesep it is difficult to see what kind of 
argumentt other than an anthropological onet could settle 
the dispute. But what is interesting is that Calhoun moves 
from this empirical position to maintain that, in effect, 
the social condition is the one most suited to develop man's 
"moral and intellectual faculties". This claim has about it 
all the appearance of a value-judgementg though, of course, 
it is not expressed in those terms. Having denied that there 
has ever existed a state of naturep Calhoun is now saying 
that even if one had existed, it could not have fulfilled 
the function of encouraging the development of man's faculties, 
a claim which is entirely non-empiricalp though one with whicht 
I suspectv Locke would have agreed. 
What is at stake at this stage of the argument is not 
a scholastic dispute about whether or not an original state 
of nature ever existed - although Calhoun frames the argument 
in these terms - but an important point concerning Calhoun's 
style of discoursep and the values he is attempting to defend. 
Calhoun is displaying the same tendency which many of the 
writers of the Enlightenment displayedof allowing hie polit- 
ical values to merge with empirical factst and in some cases, 
to substitute for them. He is not simply saying, in this 
instance, that man is a social animal because he has never 
been found in any other conditionp but he is hinting that 
this is the "natural" condition of mang andq as such,, it is 
good and proper. Moreoverp by inference he is claiming, again 
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as the Enlightenment writers did, that the best possible way 
in which to frame social institutions is by making them 
conform as nearly as possible to the processes of Nature as 
observed through experience. Edmund Burke, a statesman and 
political writer whom Calhoun admired intensely, put it well 
when he wrote that "The science of constructing a commonwealth, 
or renovating it, or reforming it, is, like every other 
,, 68 experimental science not to be taught a priori . Although 
Burke, unlike Calhoung accepted the idea that society was an 
artificial contrivance and not a natural organism,, he believed 
that its institutions should be modelled to accommodate, and 
in some cases restrainp the "propensities" of human nature. 
Calhoun ist in some waysp more extreme than Burke; by making 
society the natural state of man and by maintaining that 
government is also a natural outgrowth of man's naturej he is 
shifting the emphasis away from the individual and his rights 
towards the community as a whole. Thus, as we shall see in a 
later chapter, * Calhoun not only falls outside the mainstream 
American interpretation of Natural Law theoryq but also out- 
side the individualist tradition which had dominated western 
political theory since the Reformation. 
Calhoun's commitment to an empirical political theory 
is not in doubt, even if at times he tends to commit the 
logical mistake of merging facts with values. He attempts to 
reinterpret Natural Law in such a way that it becomes knowable 
not through the exercise of pure reason, but by means of the 
"reasonable faculty used empirically. " 
69 
Reasonp in the 
Cartesian sensep has no place in Calhounts political philos- 
* See Chapter Seven below 
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ophy, just as it had little place in the philosophy of the 
Enlightenment. Indeedp there is evidence to suggest that 
Calhoun was nearer to the position of the sentimentalist 
school of the Scottish Enlightenment than he was to the 
Cartesians. "Interest"o he maintained in a speech to the 
House of Representatives as a young Congressman in 1812, 
"has wonderful control over sentiment. Even the more refined 
and elevated--the moral and religious sentiment--may be con- 
sidered as ultimately resting on it....,. 
70 Thus, it was the 
gratification of desirest a Hobbesian satisfaction of appet- 
ites, which motivated men primarily; reason merely enabled 
them to pursue this end more efficiently. 
Calhoun's version of Natural Law is not a "law, in 
the sense that it prescribes maxims of moral behaviour I but 
in the sense that it describes what actually existsv and 
seeks to portray its findings as reliable empirical general- 
isationse It is, one might say, an attempt to introduce a 
sense of philosophical realism to the study Of political 
behaviour. Calhoun's fundamental assumptions concerning human 
nature - and, of coursep the prior assumption that human 
motives can be reduced to a few unchanging principles - are 
evidence of his empiricist frame of mindp no less than his 
survey at the end of the Disquisition, of the variety of 
constitutions "hichp he maintainedp embodied his celebrated 
principle of the concurrent majority. 
71 
Calhoun's reinterpretation of Natural Law as it was 
expressed in the Declaration of Independence involved no 
appeal to self-evident truths which entailed certain impres- 
criptible individual rights; it did not proceed from the 
188 
highest plane of abstraction to work itself out in particular 
instances of fact. Ratherp the process was quite the reverse, 
borrowing for social and political theory, the method of the 
experimental sciences. For Calhoun, Natural Law was not a 
closed system in which conclusions were deduced from intuit- 
ively held "truths"t but a system which built-up its "truths" 
inductively from the hard facts of observed experience. In 
this, Calhoun was conforming to the methodological spirit of 
the Enlightenmentp though not, of course, to its political 
values. But how significant is this conformity? Within the 
context in which Calhoun was writing, that isq the ideological 
conflict over slaveryg there is evidence to suggest that he 
was not unusual in adopting an empirical approach. W. S. Jenkins 
has maintained that a prominent feature of proolavery political 
thought was its violent reaction against abstract reason as the 
decisive factor in determining-political norms and values. 
"Observation rather than speculation". he wrotev "became the 
technique of pro-slavery thinking* The slaveholder became a 
realist rather than an idealist in politico., History and 
experience were his guides in government....., 
72 Moreoverp as 
the conflict intensified in the 1850s# after Calhoun's death, 
the Southern revolt against abstraction became more virulent; 
it reached its zenith in the writings of George Fitzhugh: "The 
world", he maintained in the Sociology for the South (1854), 
"is beginning to be satisfied, that it is much safer and 
bettert to look to the past, to trust to experience, to follow 
nature, than to be guided by the ignis fatuun of a 
_priori 
speculations of closet philosophers.... "73 
One begins to see what Louis Hartz means by terming the 
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proslavery South the "Reactionary Enlightenment'le The denig- 
ration of abstract reason in favour of an appeal to tried 
and tested experience was a crucial hallmark of the Enlight- 
enment's style. By appropriating this method and tying it to 
a defence of slaveryp the South was detaching the liberal 
values of the Enlightenment and substituting its own react- 
ionary ones. Too much can be made of this tendencyt however, 
for the Southern attachment to the empirical method was never 
more than a superficial one and there is good reason for 
thinking that it was a position which was forced on them by 
the terms in which the agenda of debate was cloaked. Where 
the antislavery forces appealed to high-sounding maxims of 
universal moral rightt the proslavery South could only counter 
with appeals to historical realityt and it is difficult to see 
what else they could have done. They might, of coureep have 
attempted to manufacture an alternative system of morality to 
challenge the dominant liberal ideology9 and at times it seems 
as if they were doing exactly that; but if the thesis put 
forward by W. J. Cash and others is correct - that Southerners 
suffered agonising guilt over the existence of slavery - it 
would suggest that Southerners were too firmly gripped by the 
traditional liberal ethos to distance themselves from it# and 
that consequently they were unable to construct a meaningful 
and satisfying counter-cultureý 
4- 
In the event, a critique of 
the existing ideology couched in empirical terms was about as 
far as they could go. 
Calhoun's empiricism claimed to be more systematic, 
more "scientific"r than the bulk of proslavery writing, with 
possible exception of the fertile school of ethnologists. 
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Yet,, at the same time, it is a curious fact that Calhoun 
was unwilling to allow his political theory to rest on 
purely empirical grounds. Having formulated empirically 
his propositions of human nature, Calhoun then proceeds 
to attach to them a postulate of divine sanction which, as 
August Spain has quite rightly pointed outp adds nothing 
to the theory as a whole. 
75 Spain, howeverv omitted to 
inquire why Calhoun should have felt the need to include 
such a postulate when the theory could have stood on 
perfectly respectable empirical foundations. The inclusion 
of divine sanction in the Disquisition appears strangely 
out of placep almost an afterthought, though it does tell 
us at least two things about Calhoun's concept of Natural 
Law. In the first place, it demonstrates that Calhoun does 
possess a notion of Natural Lawt though one which is founded 
on description rather than prescription. Secondly, it tells 
us that however all-embracing Calhounts empiricism appears 
to be on the surfaceg in the end he is unwilling to allow 
his empirical postulates to stand on their own. In the next 
chaptert thereforet we shall examine the extent to which 
Calhoun uses divine sanction as a convenient buttresag to 
give an aura of moral legitimacy to his theoryp within the 
context of his overall religious attitudes. 
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Chapter Five: Calhoun's Religious Thought and the postulates 
of divine sanction in the Disquisition 
If Calhoun's empiricist pretensions did not differ 
markedly from the mainstream of Southern proslavery writing, 
the same cannot be said of his religious thinking. In the 
Disquisitiong Calhoun's sparse references to God as "the 
Infinite Beingg the Creator of all" and as "an all-wise 
Providence" suggest that he was speaking the language of 
Deismp a conception of the divine so out of place in the 
Evangelical South that it bears closer examination. Moreover, 
the role which Calhoun assigns to God in his Political theoryt 
as a passive# non-intervening Superintendant of the universe, 
whilst it bears a superficial similarity to the religious 
ideas of the Enlightenmentp is used to justify decidedly un- 
enlightened political values. How this comes about is best 
shown by contrasting Calhoun'B religious precepts - as they 
appear in his political theory - with those of John Locke. 
It has already been stated that Calhoun's introduction 
of a postulate of divine sanction to hie propositions of 
human nature was an inessential addition to the theory of 
government; inessentialp that is, in the sense that its 
absence would in no substantive way impair the validity of 
the empirical generalioations on which the propositions wore 
based. All that divine sanction adds to the Disquisition is 
a veneer of moral authority which in the end is unsuccessful 
simply because it is so easily detachable from the body of 
the theory. Such could never be the case with Locke's theory 
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of government; in Locke, God stands as the ultimate logical 
and moral justification of the existence of individual 
natural rights9 and without Him the whole of Locke's subsequent 
theory would crumble. That is, if God were removed from Locke's 
theory9 the rights to life, liberty and property would have no 
basis in logic, except as unsubstantiated assertionsp and hence 
they could not be properly considered as "rights'll but as 
maxims of prudence or preference. God's role in Locke is, 
therefore, of crucial importance because He stands as the 
first cause of political obligation and the arbiter of the 
rights and duties of individuals. 
1 
In Calhounp too, God is assigned the role of first 
cause of political obligation, but in a different sense to 
the one calculated for Him by Locke. Where Locke appeals to 
reasong the God-given faculty which distinguishea men from 
brute creationt in deriving his idea of the natural rights 
of individualsp Calhoun appeals to observation of the actual 
behaviour of men to ascertain why government is necessary, 
The origin of governmentp maintains Calhoun, is deeply rooted 
in the nature of mang which is ordained by God: he assumes 
"as an incontestable fact that man is so constituted as to 
be a social being-" 
2 There is nothing equivocal about this 
man cannot exist without the companionship of his fellows, At 
the most basic level, the mechanism whereby the species is 
perpetuated necessarily involves a degree of sociability 
between men and womeng and in this Calhoun finds God's 
purpose at work. The impulse towards association between 
individuals does not depend on rational choice 9 as it does 
3 in Locke , but on innate instinct which is stamped on the 
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nature of each individual by his creator. The social state 
is therefore not an artificial onev calculated by human 
reason to minimise the inconveniencies which would inevit- 
ably arise in its absence, nor is it formed by the volunteer- 
ing of consent; it is nothing less than the condition decreed 
by God for the benefit of mankind and for the development of 
their faculties. 
This single proposition does not, of courseg account 
for the necessity of government, and in order to establish 
the connection Calhoun interposes a second facet of human 
nature which he believes to be no less valid empirically than 
the first: "... while man is created for the social state 
and is accordingly formed as to feel what affects others as 
veil as what affects himselft he is, at the same timej so 
constituted as to feel more intensely what affects him 
directly than what affects him indirectly through otherst or, 
to express it differentlyt he is so constituted that his 
direct or individual feelings are stronger than his social 
or sympathetic feelings. .4 What Calhoun is saying is that 
man has a capacity for altruism where the affairs of others 
are concernedt but only to the extent that it does not 
conflict with his own self-interest. Such a conditiont how- 
ever, is bound to lead at some time or other to conflict: in 
the ordinary course of events, individuals pursuing their own 
interests would unavoidably come into conflict with other 
individuals doing likewise. In that eventualityv Calhoun 
recognisedl there would be a "tendency to a universal state 
of conflict between individual and individualt accompanied 
by the connected passions Of suspiciono jealousyp anger and 
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revenge - followed by insolencep fraud and cruelty.... "5 In 
order to avoid this state of discord, some controlling power 
was necessary to restrain the impulse towards conflict, and 
hence we find the origin of government. 
If this has seemed to be straying from the point - or 
anticipating the next chapter - it is not really because 
Calhoun, by derivation, finds divine sanction for government 
in the God-given nature of man. If God createB man in such a 
way as to make government necessary for his preservation and 
protectiong then that is the inescapable conclusion and Cal- 
houn admits it: "Both 
[society and government] arep however, 
necessary to the existence and well-being of our race and 
[are] equally of divine ordination.,, 
6 But is Calhoun here 
saying very much more than that man has a nature which is 
God-given? Again, to fully understand the import of his 
remarksp it is necessary to contrast him with Locke. Locke 
would not have dissented from the view that ultimately 
government was a divine institution in the sense that it 
was intended to make more secure those rights which God had 
endowed directly on manp and that its construction was accom- 
plished through the use of the God-given faculty of reason. 
I have underscored the word "ultimately" because I do not 
think that Locke would have regarded God as being the prox. 
imate cause of society and government, but rather that God 
had provided man with the means of constructing social and 
political mechanisms by which their rights might be safe- 
guarded# if they should choose to do so, This isq I think, 
the only possible sense in which Locke's society and govern- 
ment can be construed as being divinep for Locke explicitly 
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allows men the free choice of remaining in "the Liberty of 
the State of Nature... 
7 In section 13 of the Second Treatise, 
Locke maintains that "God hath certainly appointed Govern- 
ment to restrain the partiality and violence of men", but 
this statement in no way lessens the fact that men may, if 
they wish, choose not to constitute themselves into a civil 
commun ty. 
8 
The crucial difference between Locke and Calhoun on 
this point is that Calhoun does see God as being the prox- 
imate cause of society and government. The necessity for 
societyO according to Lockep becomes apparent to men through 
the use of their reason; that is, reason tells them the best 
way of protecting their God-given natural rights. 
9 But in 
Calhount reason is assigned a minimal role; Political society 
is not formed by a consciously rational process of deliberat- 
iont it is simply instinctive to man's nature. What Calhoun 
does is to short-circuit the rational faculty of mant and in 
so doing he dispenses with the voluntarism, which is so import- 
ant to Locke. The formation of society and the existence of 
govexmment pose no problems of consent for Calhoun because 
both are natural outgrowths of man's nature. "It is not even 
a matter of choice", he maintains, "whether there shall be 
one [a government] or not. Like breathingt it is not permitted 
to depend on our volition. " 
10 This is a significant analogy 
because it portrays exactly Calhoun's sceptical view of the 
capacity of h=an reasong and elevates the origin of govern- 
=ent to the status of a physical or sensory imperative. 
Both government and society, then, arise from an innate 
instinct planted in each individual by God. A number of 
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important consequences for Calhounts political theory flow 
from this proposal which tend to complicate itq the most 
important of which involves Calhoun's concept of resistance 
to tyrannical govexmment. 
Calhoun maintains that "although society and govern- 
ment are thus intimately connected with and dependent on 
each other--of the two society is the greater. It is first 
in the order of things and in the dignity of its object; that 
of society being primary--to preserve and perfect our race-- 
and that of government secondary and subordinate--to preserve 
and perfect society-" 
11 Now, on the surface this looks very 
different from Lockets idea of society and government, not 
least because he (Calhoun) assigns different purposes to each. 
In Locket there was no great division of purpose because the 
creation of govexmment was dependent on the terms of the social 
contract: the purpose of society was to make more secure the 
Natural Rights of its citizens, and governmentv which was the 
agent of the communityp was designed to accomplish that purpose 
more effectively. In other wordst Locke conceived government 
as the instrument through which the purpose of society might 
be more efficiently achieved. 
Calhoun's division of purpose between society and 
gover2=ent looks different from Locke's, but in fact it 
differs hardly at all. The great object of society, he main- 
tains, is to preserve and perfect our race, though what 
precisely he means by this is obscure for nowhere in the 
Disquisition does he elaborate on it. Gove=mentg on the 
other handp is designed to preserve and protect societyt and 
the concrete ways in which government can do this are left 
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significantly vague. But clearly what Calhoun is saying is 
that the purpose of government is to facilitatep with the 
minimum of inconvenience, the primary object of society 
itself, which is to preserve and perfect the race. Thus, in 
a senset Calhoun too sees government as being an instrument 
which enables society to accomplish its purpose. There is, 
therefore, little difference between Locke and Calhoun on 
this point; where they do differ - and massively so - is on 
the actual purpose itself. 
Locke's theory of government and society is a strictly 
teleological one; that is, the value of social institutions 
(including society itself) is dependent upon the consequences 
they producev and here Locke has an objective standard which 
is absent in Calhoun. The purpose of society and government 
is specifically limited to the protection of individual Nat- 
ural Rightsp which men bring with them into society from the 
original state of nature. The protection of these rights, 
which are God-given and calculated by reason, form the raison 
dletre of society and its agent the government. Uoreover, 
should either society or government seek to deprive any 
individual of his Natural Rights, it was liable to be dissol- 
ved or overthrown becausev in that event, it would not be 
performing the functions it was originally designed to achieve. 
Locke allows, as indeed logically he mustv an ultimate appeal 
to Heaven for protection against arbitrary invasion of Natural 
Rights, though he anticipates that such an appeal would only 
be made "if a long train of Abuses, Prevarications, and Art- 
ifices, all tending the same way, make the Design visible to 
the Peoplev and they cannot but feel, what they lie under, 
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and see whither they are going. , 
12 The logic of rebellion, 
then, lies in Locke's fundamental premise that the rights 
pertaining to individuals, which are endowed by God, cannot 
be legitimately abridged by any human power. 
Calhoun's theory is not teleological in the same 
sense that Locke's is, and this is a function of his imprecise 
and ill-defined statement as to what the purpose of society 
and government is. "To preserve and perfect" are generalised 
injunctionst but they offer little specific guide to the 
limits or sphere of governmental action. Lockets Natural 
Rights were objectively known through reason and existed 
independently of society. 
13 but in Calhoun there is no equiv- 
alent objectivity. Presumably the government in Calhounts 
scheme could justify any course of action by claiming that 
it was intended to "preserve and perfect society, 19 and this 
could includet of course, the most repressive of policies. 
What kind of protection could the citizens claim in that 
eventuality and from what source? Calhoung logicallyt cannot 
allow an ultimate appeal to Heaven because he has already 
maintained that government exists with divine sanction; to 
allow the citizens an appeal to God against an agency which 
He Himself had instituted would imply a contradiction in His 
plan. How could God ordain government and simultaneously 
ordain protection against government? 
Calhoun seems to have got himself - and God - caught in 
a tangle at this stagep for the whole premise on which his 
theory and his political career rested was that government 
in the United States had actually been abusing its power and 
tyrannising its citizens. Por twenty years Calhoun had consist- 
199 
ently maintained that the power of the federal government 
had been perverted in its imposition of an iniquitous tariff 
on the South and an attack on its peculiar institution. 
14 
This he saw as a systematic assault on the rights of the 
Southern States and as an infringement of the texms of the 
original contract by which the Union was created. But what 
kind of rights were being infringed? Under his own theory 
they could not have been Natural rights because he had 
effectively demonstrated that no such rights could exist. 
Furthermoreq could not the federal government claim that its 
policies were intended to "preserve and perfect" society, and 
thus refute Calhoun on his own ground? Calhoun thus appears 
to have been hoisted by his own petard, for by conferring 
divine sanction on the institution of governmentp he makes 
it more difficult for himself to argue that there is a 
legitimate mechanism whereby tyranny may be resisted. 
More difficultt certainlyv but not impossiblep and it 
is interesting to see how Calhoun extricates himself from 
this potential pitfall. The key lies in understanding the 
distinction between the institution of government and the 
government of men which actually exists at any given moment 
in time; this is a distinction which Calhoun impliest and 
one which is necessary to make the theory coherent, but one 
which he never fully spells out. It is the institution of 
govex=ent which Calhoun is anxious to confer divine sanction 
onp not one particular group of people who happen at any one 
time to occupy the office. Calhoun recognised that even 
though the institution of government may be divine, it was 
inoperable unless individuals were found to exercise its 
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functions and powers. By the same token, these men were 
subject to the same laws of human nature as all other men. 
Governmentq thenp "although intended to protect and preserve 
society, has itself a strong tendency to disorded and abuse 
of its powers, as all experience and almost every page of 
history testify. The cause is to be found in the same 
constitution of our nature which makes goverment indispen- 
sable. The powers which it is necessary for government to 
possess in order to repress violence and preserve order 
cannot execute themselves. They must be administered by men 
in whomp like others, the individual are stronger than the 
social feelings. And hence the powers vested in them to 
prevent injustice and oppression on the part of others, will, 
if left unguardedy be by them converted into instruments to 
oppress the rest of the community... 
15 This is how Calhoun 
manages to justify his concept of resistance to government: 
although the institution itself is of divine ordination, it 
can only be put into operation by the efforts of meny by the 
mingling of the flawed with the divine, which Calhoun confid- 
ently asserts will produce disorder and abuse. 
16 Before look- 
ing at his proposed remedyp it is first necessary to inquire 
further into the validity of this argument. 
Calhoun's distinction between the institution of 
government and the men who operate it seems entirely schol- 
astiep and has about it the appearance of a contrived device 
intended to rescue him from the blunder of having claimed 
divine sanction for government. The distinction actually 
amounts to very littlev since it is inconceivable that the 
institutionp divorced and abstracted from the men who operate 
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it, could have any practicable value in application. Govern- 
ment as an institution might, indeed, be divine, but it 
would be perfectly inert; it is only when it comes under the 
control of men who make laws and execute them that it becomes 
of paramount importance. By making the distinction, however, 
Calhoun manages to retain in his theory the sanction of God 
for government and allows him at the same time to propose a 
mechanism whereby government may be resisted. 
The means by which the abuse of governmental power was 
to be resisted was the framing of a constitution, an artific- 
ial framework by which goverment was held "strictly to the 
great ends for which it is ordained.,. 
17 Calhoun notes that 
there is a "striking difference" between the origin of govern- 
ment and the origin of the constitution, for the "Constitution 
is the contrivance of man, while government is of divine ord- 
ination. Man is left to perfect what the wisdom of the Infinite 
ordained as necessary to preserve the race. 1118 Leaving aside 
for the moment the theological imperfections of the latter 
sentencet we can see how Calhoun is attempting to maintain 
the semblance of consistency in asserting that the constitution 
is the work of human wisdom. Indeed, he cannot very well claim 
otherwisel for having said that goverment is divine, he can- 
not then say that the resisting mechanism is too. Technically, 
what he is saying is that the Constitution puts restraints on 
the men who, at any one timet assume the powers of goverment, 
and not on the institution itself, though in the light of 
what has been said aboveg the distinction seems spurious. 
The precise form of the constitution remains at the 
heart of Calhoun's theory of government. He rejected outright 
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and rightly so, the possibility that government could be 
restrained "by instituting a higher power" because "This 
would be but to change the seat of authority and to make 
this higher powerv in reality, the gover=ent, with the 
same tendency on the part of those who might control its 
powers to pervert them into instruments of aggrandizement. " 
19 
So. the idea of imposing an external framework of rules and 
limitations on the governmenty drawn up by an alternative 
agency, would not prevent the abuse of power for it would 
simply transfer the potentiality for abuse from the govern- 
ment to the other agency. What was really neededv according 
to Calhoun, was for the government to be organieed in such 
a way that it would, by its own "interior structurellp counter- 
act the tendency to abuse of power. 
20 To do this, the ruled 
had to possess an effective means of resisting their rulers 
by peaceable action, and in order that as large a proportion 
of the population as possible should have this meanst and 
not simply a majority of the wholev Calhoun proposed his 
elaborate mechanismy the concurrent majority. 
Leaving aside for a later chapter an examination of 
the theoretical and practical implications of the concurrent 
majorityv* what I want to stress here is that Calhoun places 
a high responsibility on the device as a means of nurturing 
political adjustment precisely because he refuses to allow 
an ultimate appeal to Heaven as liberal theorists had previous- 
ly done. Where Locke's liberal teleology had allowed him, 
indeed had demanded of him, an ultimate means of protection 
* See chapter nine below. 
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from the arbitrary usurpation of Natural Rights by a direct 
appeal to God, Calhoun has no equivalent authority to which 
to make an appealf for by establishing the naturalness and 
divinity of society and governmentq he cannot then claim 
God's protection against goverr=ent. Yet it was a major 
part of Calhoun's purpose to argue that tyrannical govern- 
ment, however it was defined, ought to be resisted. How 
could these two positions be coherently reconciled without 
doing damage to the theory as a whole? The answer is that 
Calhoun was forcedt for the sake of theoretical consistency, 
to formulate his concept of resistance in terms of an 
"internal organism" operating within the structure of govern- 
ment itself. Thisp I think, is a crucially important point 
because it goes a long way in explaining Calhoun's reliance 
on what has seemed to some commentators an over-elaborate 
and hence unworkable mechanistic device for regulating social 
conflict. 
21 In his zeal to destroy Natural Rights, Calhoun 
eliminates in the process the strongest theoretical justific- 
ation for resisting arbitrary power, and this seems unavoid- 
able given the strictly deductive character of Natural Rights 
theory; that ist the right of rebellion which Locke retained 
is abandoned by Calhoun and is replaced by a self-regulating 
mechanism which is built into the structure of government it- 
self. Calhoun thus appears to be unwilling to accept logical 
consequences of what he has done by making government a divine 
institution - he is not prepared to confer absolute moral 
legitimacy on all the actions of the government, but insists 
instead on introducing a device whereby they might be resisted. 
Two points concerning this are important to grasp. The 
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first is that in view of Calhounts initial statement that 
government is a divine institutiong there are few alternat- 
ives which could coherently enable him to subsequently claim 
that it is possible to resist it. If God ordains government, 
God cannot also ordain resistance to government on pain of 
self-contradiction. Calhoun recognises this and admits it: 
"Constitution is the contrivance of man, while government is 
of divine ordination.. oo" 
22 But, he continues, "Man is left 
to perfect what the wisdom of the Infinite ordained as necess- 
ary to preserve the race. " 
23 Now, it seems very much as if 
Calhoun has managed to save his logic, but at the expense of 
his theology. Not even the most daring of the Enlightenment 
philosophesp except perhaps those who dispensed with His 
existence altogethert had suggested that God's work could 
actually be improved by human wisdom. The essence of Ealight- 
enment deism was that God was the highest and most perfect 
being in the universe,, whose goodness and purpose was display- 
ed in the Book of Nature and in the actuality of events. To 
suggest as Calhoun does, that God's work may be perfected by 
man is to portray God either as a perverse Being or a fallible 
one; Calhoun seems therefore prepared to tolerate a loose 
theology in order to establish the coherence of his resisting 
mechanism. 
The second and more important point is that if Calhoun's 
reasoning appears tortured at this stage of the argument, it is 
so because he has caught himself in a dilemma: if the instit- 
ution of government is divineg why is it that it needs to be 
resisted at all? It has already been noted that Calhoun's 
distinction between the institution itself and the men who 
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operate it is of little practical merit, except as a philo- 
sophical device. The question remains: what logical basis 
does Calhoun have for maintaining that government ought to 
be resisted by means of the concurrent majority? In Natural 
Rights theoryt resistance was not merely permissiblet but 
actually a duty imposed on men when their individual Natural 
rights were threatenedt 
24 but Calhoun dispenses with this 
framework altogether* This suggests that Calhounts teleology 
was entirely different to that of the social contract writers 
and it is worthwhile examining this claim, again contrasting 
Calhoun with Locke. Locke's incorporation into his theory of 
a right of rebellion against the arbitrary invasion of Natural 
Rights indicates a keen attachment to a form of individualism 
which has always been important in American political culture. 
"Individualism" as a concept describes the moral relation 
between society and the state on the one hand and the individ- 
ual human beings it is designed to serve on the othert and it 
emphasises the primacy of the latter over the former. Thusp in 
Lockep it is the free and rational choice of individuals which 
brings the community and its governmental apparatus into being 
and imposes limits to its legitimate authority; governmentq in 
this scheme of thingsp has no rationale other than to serve 
the community of individuals which creates it, Even in Hobbes' 
absolutist theory there is an emphatic strain of individualism, 
for Hobbes' sovereign power is called into existence by the 
voluntary choice of men no less than Locke's society ist even 
though Hobbes is then prepared to sacrifice all individual 
rights, Hatural or otherwise, to the irresistable will of the 
sovereign. 
26 
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Calhoun's Disquisitiont however, departs sharply from 
the individualist ethos which in Americap more than anywhere 
else, it had gained so powerful a grip. Calhoun places a 
higher value on the harmony of society and-the absence of 
debilitating social conflict than he does on the protection 
of individual rights. His image of society is of an hierarch- 
ically structured organism into which individuals fit accord- 
ing to their God-given capacities. In a significant passage in 
the Disquisitiont Calhoun maintains: 
To the Infinite Being, the Creator 
of all, belongs exclusively the care 
and superintendence of the whole. He. 
in his infinite wisdom and goodness, 
has allotted to every class of animated 
beings its condition and appropriate 
functions and has endowed each with 
feelings, instincts, capacities, and 
faculties best adapted to its allotted 
condition. To manp he has assigned 
the social and political state as 
best adapted to develop the great 
capacities and facultiesp intellectual 
and moralp with which he has endowed 
him, and hact accordinglyp constituted 
him so as not only to impel him into 
the social state, but to make govern- 
ment necessary for his preservation 
and well-being. 27 
Although Calhoun is evidently speaking about the way in which 
God has organised the whole of created existence, it is not 
a bad description of his image of the social organism. Calhoun 
allows the possibility that through sheer industry and self- 
improvementp individuals may attain a higher status in the 
communityt and thus receive the most prized of rewards, lib- 
erty, but the process of mobility is necessarily slow; for 
to "elevate a people in the scale of liberty above the point 
to which they are-entitled to risep must ever prove abortive 
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and end in disappointment. " 
28 This conception of society as 
a natural, organic entity contrasts with the rationally 
artificial version as seen by the social contract writers. 
Where they viewed the social state as fulfilling the function 
of protecting Natural Rights, Calhoun saw it as an end in 
itself. The greatest of political evils for Calhoun was the 
unnatural disruption of society by anarchic elements because 
it hindered the orderly processes of lifeg andl therefore, 
unlike Lockep he could never sanction the right of revolution. 
29 
The concurrent majority which he proposed as a substitute for 
this right of rebellion seems overly-cumbersome precisely 
because he expects so much of it: political conflict had to 
be contained within manageable limits and could not be allowed 
to threaten the existence of society itself. The concurrent 
majority was therefore not a device which was intended to 
minimise political conflicty but to channel it into peaceful 
modes of resolution. In this respect, its attempt to collect 
the sense of the community (as opposed to a majority of the 
community) before allowing the government to implement a 
particular policyp was an effort to establish the limits of 
consensual politics andp as suchq Calhoun regarded it as the 
only viable alternative to revolution and the dissolution of 
society. 
So far in this chapter I have examined the theoretical 
implications of Calhoun's religious postulates contained in 
the Disquisition and I have attempted to show that certain 
consequences for his theory automatically flow from them; 
the most important of these consequencesp I have argued, is 
that Calhoun is compelled to formulate his mechanism of 
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of resistance to tyrannical government in terms of an internal 
device, which is built into the systemp because he has already 
precluded the possibility of allowing an ultimate appeal to 
Heaven by making the institution of government divine. However 
convincing or otherwise Calhoun's argument appears, it is 
sufficiently different from the mainstream of Southern relig- 
ious thought of the period to be of interest. In the second 
half of this chapter I shall be concerned with examining Cal- 
houn's general religious attitudes and how they contrast with 
the dominant views of his section, for on this important 
subject Calhoun seems to draw his inspiration from the views 
of those whose faith was in a rational religiong rather than 
the emotional Evangelicalism of the South. 
If one were describing the religious attitudes of the 
South at the end of the eighteenth-centuryg "evangelical" is 
hardly the adjective which springs most readily to mind. The 
last echoes of the Great Awakening of the 1730s and 1740a 
were, by the end of the centuryq smothered by successive waves 
of Enlightenment ideas which crossed the Atlantic from Europe. 
Scepticism in matters of religion -a French speciality - 
gained greater acceptance in the American South than in any 
other area of the colonies, though it resulted not in outright 
atheismp but in a complacent deism. 
30 Deism was, perhaps, the 
most fitting expression of religious sentiment for a nation 
which was about to enshrine Reason and the Rights of Man as 
the authoritative statement of its national creed, for it 
implied no great attachment to frames of thought which were 
not strictly rational. The Enlightenment spirit in America 
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demanded, then,, that religious attitudes conform as much as 
possible to the dictates of reason, and that whatever super- 
natural content remained was to be either ignored or somehow 
explained away. David Hume's Essay on Miraclesp available in 
America after 1758, though not apparently extensively read, 
was the authentic expression of this strain of seepticism. 
31 
The existence of miracles, according to Hume, could never 
attain a sufficient level of certainty to merit the status of 
a philosophical proof; miracle, in the sense of a designed 
violation of the physical laws of nature, could never be 
categorically asserted because of the inductive nature of 
"knowing" the laws of nature. Hume concluded that no amount 
of evidence could establish the existence of miracles and 
that therefore, they should be regarded essentially as 
religious (that is, non-rational) phenomena. 
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I have cited Hume's critique of the concept of miracle 
as an example of the more rational approach to religion which 
developed in the eighteenth century. The emphasis on the 
reasonableness of religious teaching, as opposed to the non- 
rational and supernaturalt was one which suited well the 
intellectual temperament of the age: where the Puritans, for 
all their freedom of inquiryl had stressed the Calvinistic 
version of Christianityq the American Enlightenment emphasised 
the overwhelming benevolence of God towards His creation. The 
elitist concept of predestination and election which Calvin 
had preached no longer seemed to accord with the new found 
dignity of man as a free, thinking individual in which role 
the American Revolution had seemed to cast him. 
33 The sinful- 
ness of man, a biblical truism, was retained by the American 
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Enlightenment but with a difference: mants depravity was no 
longer remediable solely through salvation by faith through 
grace, but through the active self-improvement of his natural 
faculties. 
34 Man could by his own effort pull himself out of 
the pit of sin and improve his own condition on earth, with- 
out necessarily accepting the substitutionary atonement of 
Jesus Christ. Irving Bartlettv in discussing the background 
of the nineteenth century American mind, has accurately written 
that "The quest for salvation was replaced by the quest for 
morality and worldly successv and the sense of sin gave way 
to the knowledge that man by the use of reason could live 
blamelessly without God*s intervention... 
35 The depersonalisat- 
ion of the Gospel and its central protagonist was one consequ- 
ence of the intellectual climate of rationalism: interest in 
the figure of Jesus as a persong human and divinev was over- 
shadowed by an interest in the abstract principles of his 
teaching. It did not much matter, deists maintainedv whether 
Jesus of Nazareth was God Incarnate or not; what did matter 
was that he taught principles which were benevolent and which 
were perceivable as such by all reasonable men. Indeedv Jesus 
played an insignificant part in deistic theology and, if he 
was noticed at ally it was as a great teacher, 
36 But it was 
God Himself who was ultimately the most important Beingv for 
He was the one who held the fabric of the Universe together at 
any one moment in time. Yet the God of the deiets was as myster- 
ious a being as the Jehovah of the Old Testamentt for little 
could be known about him for certain except that he surveyed 
the course of human events from on high. In some casesp he was 
even reduced to the status of an abstraction, a regulatory 
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principle which dictated the flow of eventst and in this 
impersonal capacity he was usually referred to as "Divine 
Providence". 
At the height of the Revolutionary era in America, 
deism became the dominant expression of religious sentiment 
and nowhere more so than in the South. 
37 The interaction 
between political enlightenment, which came to a head in 
38 the literature of the Revolution, and religious enlighten- 
ment produced in the South a strain of religious liberalism 
which was more pronounced than in other parts of the colonies. 
The declining membership of the evangelical churches (mainly 
the Baptists and the Methodists) was evidence of a general 
southern revulsion against the excessive "enthusiasm" and 
emotionalism of orthodox evangelical Christianity. Amongst 
the Southern intellectual classt deism was especially apparent 
for it became a badge of enlightened refinement which the less 
articulate and literate portions of southern society lacked. 
More than anything elsep deism betokened an increasing indiff- 
erence to the cosmological preoccupations which had absorbed 
the interest of earlier generations of Americans; questions 
concerning eternal salvationt which their forefathers had 
taken seriously, became increasingly less important than the 
pressing issues of the present. 
39 
Deism wasp howeverp a passing phase in the religious 
and intellectual development of the South. By the beginning 
of the nineteenth centuryp religious radicalism was becoming 
as unfashionable as its political counterpart and by the 18308 
Southern deism was on the way to extinction. The North Carol- 
ina Constitution of 1832 expressly declared that "No person 
212 
who shall deny the being of God, or the truth of the Christ- 
ian religiont or the divine authority of the Old or New 
Testament ... shall be capable of holding any office or 
place of trust or profit in the civil department within 
this state.,, 
40 The resurgence of orthodox Christianity in 
the South after a period of scepticism and deism seems a 
startling development and one which historians have accounted 
for by associating it with the need to defend the institution 
of slavery. Increased attacks on the institution led Southern- 
ers to close ranks on intellectual speculation and to develop 
a dogmatic orthodoxy with which to refute such attacks. The 
Evangelical mentalityp especially in its deference to the 
authority of the biblev provided a suitable rallying point 
from which the defence of slavery could be conducted. one 
ought, perhapsp to distinguish between the brands of evang- 
elicalism which characterised the sections in the decades 
prior to the Civil War for in their consequences they led to 
radically differing conceptions of political action. Northern 
evangelicalst like Arthur and Lewis Tappant were inspired by 
the biblical account of God's justice and love to oppose 
slavery wherever it existed by supplying the national abolit- 
ionist societies with material aid. 
41 This form of evangelical 
Christianity was outward looking in the sense that it had 
shifted the emphasis away from personal salvation towards a 
reform of earthly things. The southern verniont howeverp became 
increasingly introverted by insisting on a fundamentalist 
interpretation of the Scripturest for even the most amateur 
exegete could find there support for the institution. 
42 Hist- 
orians have tendedt therefore, to view the Southern return to 
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fundamentalist-evangelical, orthodoxy as an unnatural by- 
product of the search for a defence of slavery. Henry F. May 
has suggestedv howeverv that the relation is more complex 
in that the rise of fundamentalist-evangelicalism was as 
much a consequence of the emotionally unsatisfying facets 
of deism as it was of the need to defend slavery; moreover, 
as fundamentalist-evangelicals gained converts in the South, 
the churches were led to modify their anti-slavery stance 
which had been a feature of their early history. The primacy 
of the search for salvation could not allow secular affairs 
to alienate potential convertsl and thus whatever anti-slavery 
sentiments southern evangelicalism had once given rise to was 
quickly sublimated. "The collapse of evangelical anti-slavery", 
writes Henry Mayp "is the most melancholy fact in American 
religious history. , 
43 By the 1830s, the South was firmly with- 
in the fundamentalist-evangelical campt and continued to be so 
until after the Civil War. Between 1820 and 1850, membership 
of the evangelical churches in the South increased dramatically: 
in Virginiag the Carolinas and Georgiat the Baptist membership 
in 1820 had collectively been just 99,000, but by 1850 this 
number had increased to 246vOOO. Similar proportional increases 
were evident in the Methodist Church in those same states. 
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Furthermore, the doctrinal positions of these churches were 
becoming more conservative in a return to traditional Calvinist 
theology coupled with a strong reaction against religious 
rationalism* Charles Sydnor has characterised the trend as 
being "not so much from liberalism to conservatism as it was 
from intellectualism to emotionalismIlp but this is only partly 
true because the essence of conservative theology is its 
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mphasis on the life of faith rather than intellect . 
45 
A 
etter characterisation would be to say that southern 
, eligion became both conservative and anti-intellectual, 
hat is more Calvinistic and non-rational, and its symbol 
iecame the literal interpretation of Scripture. 
The resurgence of southern evangelicalism in the first 
alf of the nineteenth centuryt with its distinctively fund- 
nentalist complexiong marked a complete turnabout from the 
Leyday of the American Enlightenment in which the South had 
)layed so prominent a role at the end of the previous century. 
'The Southo whose deistic liberalism had shocked conservative 
few Englanders at the time of the Revolutionp was becoming 
; he citadel of conservative theology. Ito religious leaders, 
.n turn, were shocked at 
the unorthodoxy of New England. ll46 
)ut this judgement of Sydnor's is not without its difficulties 
. ither, for although 
the South became more rigid in religious 
; ermst there existed at the same time a small but vocal intel- 
Lectual minority which dissented strenuously from the imposit- 
Lon of orthodox Christian values on the life of the southern 
cLind. The school of proslavery ethnologiots, led by Josiah 
lott, George Gliddon and others, were at least as interested 
Ln undermining the rising wave of evangelical biblicism with 
uhich the majority of the South sought to defend slaveryt as 
they were in defending slavery themselves on purely scientific 
3rounds. Indeed, William Stanton has gone so far as to claim 
that "The conscious extrascientific bond which linked many of 
these men together was not sympathy for Southern institutions 
but an anticlericalism and antibiblicism.,, 47 The publication 
Df Josiah Nottle Two Lectures on the Natural History of the 
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Caucasian and Negro Races in 1844 was the opening shot in 
an extended campaign between the ethnologists and biblicists, 
when Nott denied the scientific validity of the Mosaic account 
of creation contained in the Book of Genesis. The essence of 
his attack was that differences in physiology could only be 
accounted for by maintaining that there had been several sep- 
arate creations of the races instead of one. The theory of 
diverse originsv as it was calledp scientifically plausible in 
the days before Darwinp wasp however, pregnant with implicat- 
ion for social and political thought. The North could not 
accept it, not because it was scientifically untenable, but 
because it implied that there was a qualitative difference in 
the degrees of humanity between the racesp which in turn gave 
a scientific basis for, and a justification of, the origin of 
slavery. The Southp on the other hand, which might have been 
expected to embrace such findings with relish, was extremely 
reluctant to accept any theory which conflicted so starkly 
with biblical accounts of creation. The curious Position 
developed, thereforep where the ethnologists and the bibliciste 
were agreed on the legitimacy of slavery, but were in conflict 
with each other. 
48 
The deliberately provocative stance of the ethnologists 
towards the biblical fundamentalism of other proalavery writers 
served to reaffirm the South's commitment to evangelical Christ- 
ianity. 49 Gliddon's Types of Mankind, the second part of which 
was devoted to biblical criticism, drew the fire of the review- 
er of the Richmond Enquirer of July 6,1854; the bible was, 
maintained the reviewer, "the grand object of attack from 
Abolitionists, because they know it is the bulwark of Southern 
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principles.... Destroy the Bible, and you lay bare the very 
citadel of our strength to our foes .... Let us not then allow 
this shield of strength to be torn from us until we have some- 
thing to put in its place.,, 
50 Clearly, this reviewer saw the 
Bible as a means of defending slavery and not as the reposit- 
ory of divine truth, and therefore as an end in itself. But 
the same could not be said of the general position of the 
South, for the rejection of ethnology in favour of the Bible 
betokened a commitment to religion which was far deeper than 
regarding it simply as a convenient pretext with which to 
defend slavery. After all, scientific evidence did lend consid- 
erable support to slavery, at least as much as the Bible did; 
but the decision to back the Bible, as it weret underlined the 
deep-rootedness of the South's religious convictions. 
I have spoken at some length about the fundamentalist- 
evangelicalism of the South and its relation to the defence of 
slavery because it marks a point of contrast with Calhoun's 
religious attitudes. So far from being a frevent evangelical, 
Calhoun tended towards the cold, analytical and philosophical 
precepts of Unitarianismp 
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which is more reminiscent of the 
intellectual religious style of the North than it wan of the 
emotional South. Although Calhoun spent his formative years 
in a strictly Calvinistic environment, he displayed no great 
preoccupation with religion in his later years, except insofar 
as it touched political life. At the same time, many of Cal- 
hounts fundamental assumptions seem to have been shaped by the 
harsh dogma of Calvinism, with its emphasis on the inherent 
depravity of man. In the Disquisitiong Calhoun's propositions 
of human nature, and especially the primacy of self-interest, 
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although they are supposedly empirically drawn, seem at times 
to have an a priori squint derived from Calvinist doctrine. 
But then there is nothing remarkable about this, for exactly 
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the same thing may be said of the Founding Fathers. 
What is remarkable about Calhoun's religious views is 
that they seem to be at odds with the ferventp emotional 
biblical faith which most of the proslavery school shared, 
and this once more begs the question as to what Calhoun's 
intention in writing the Disquisition was. If it was nothing 
more than a proslavery polemict why did he bother to evolve 
an elaborate political theory when there was a ready-made 
biblical defence of the institution at hand? Part of the 
answer, which has already been touched on, is that he was 
attempting to transcend the immediate debate over slavery and 
to expound the underlying principles of political behaviour 
which could be applied to all kinds of situations. Another 
part of the answer is that he was dissatisfied with the literal 
appeal to Scripture because it did not accord with his own 
enlightened religious beliefs. There is considerable evidence 
that Calhoun's religious attitudes were more consonant with 
those of the Enlightenment than with the proslavery fundament- 
alists. Mary Boykin Chesnut reported in her Diary from, Dixie 
that "Mr. Calhoun's piety was of the most philosophical type,, 
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and Margaret Coit is emphatic that he refused to become a 
professing Christian because he was searching for a faith 
which accordedg or at least did not conflict with, his reason, 
54 
Calhoung moreover, retained an aloofness to the appeals of his 
friends that he accept the salvation offered through Jesus 
Christ the Saviour; in December 1843p R. B. Rhett wrote Calhoun: 
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Let me implore you, my aged friend 
and political Father, seek God in 
Christ. I have found him, and you 
will find him also if you will 
seek him. Excuse me, if it is 
presumptiong in thus speaking to 
you, and attribute it, to a 
sincere and affectionate interest 
in your temporal and spiritual 
welfare. That God will bless and 
visit you and yours with his 
salvation is the prayer of 
Your Friend 
R. B. Rhett 55 
Calhoun's reply to Rhett is not recorded, but Coit maintains 
that even on his deathbed he refused to accept Christian 
succour, and this suggests that Calhoun was not susceptible 
to persuasion on this point. 
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By far the most visible sign of Calhoun*s religious 
convictions is apparent in his attitude to the mutual inter- 
action between politics and religion. He seems to have regard- 
ed religion as being important only insofar as it offered a 
standard of morality to which political values should be gear- 
ed, though it must be admitted that his standard is not always 
clearly defined. In February 1833, in a speech on the Force 
Billq he referred to the increase in Bibles as leading to a 
more favourable regard for religion and morality; 
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what is 
notable is that he did not say that such an increase would 
lead to personal salvation, which is the significance an 
evangelical would have perceived in such a fact. Religion for 
Calhoun, as for Edmund Burke and Benjamin Franklin, was import- 
ant in that it diffused a sense of stability and order into 
social relationships. 58 Charles Cotesworth Pinckney recounted 
in the 1890s a conversation with Calhoun concerning a sermon 
both had heard on the benefits of the Christian Sabbath, After 
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Calhoun had recapitulated the main points of the sermon, he 
added an extra benefit vhicht he thought, the clergy did not 
appreciate - its social influence: 
... The very fact of meeting 
to- 
; 
ether once a weekq with a common 
object in view, uniting in the 
same acts of worship, shaking hands 
with your neighbour at the church 
door, asking after his family, even 
remarking that it is a pleasant day, 
- all these things have a wonderful 
power in binding men together and 
diffusing harmony in the community. 
If any difficulty should occur this 
week between us, if my servants or 
my cattle should trespass upon you# 
depend upon it, we would be more 
ready to settle it peaceably from 
having met and exchanged courtesies 
at the church door. The social 
influence of this observance is most 
salutary. 59 
Calhoun seems? therefore, to have been more interested in the 
social effects of religion than in the possibility of eternal 
salvation. To himp God was an impersonal Providencet "the 
Great Disposer of Events", "He who governs all things". 
6 0 He 
seems not to have considered deeply the figure of Jesus Christ 
as SaviOurt for his concept of God was too abstract, too imper- 
sonal. God manifested Himself through the regularities of 
physical and moral lawst and this was all that was needed to 
tell Calhoun that He existed. 
It is clear that Calhoun's religious views were closer 
to the spirit of the Enlightenment than they were to the fund- 
amentalist-evangelicalism. of the proslavery South* In the Dis- 
quisition, his concept of a divine Providence superintending 
the whole of creation lacked entirely the emotional fervency 
of a full-blooded evangelical faith. Yetq by the same tokeng 
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Calhoun, unencumbered by the intricacies of Christian theol- 
ogy, was able to find in his concept of God a sanction for 
the status quo. Since God was the Author of all beingt what- 
ever was, was necessarily right. Moreover, in his scheme of 
things, Calhoun assigned to God the role of overseer of the 
whole; the harsh realities of life made it almost inevitable 
that some individuals would suffer injustices and unfairness, 
but these could be tolerated in the sure knowledge that ult- 
imately society as a whole would benefit. Calhoun therefore 
falls outside the individualist tradition in emphasising the 
importance of the community over and above the individual. In 
the process, he remoulds the role assigned to God by Locke by 
making Him the guardian not of individual rights, but of the 
rights of communities. Communities therefore are left to decide 
the rights which its individual citizens may enjoy9 and these 
have the vicarious sanction of God. It is crucially important 
that in making its decision the community consults all the 
interests involvedp for once the decision is made there can 
be no further court of appeal. Calhoun allows no right of rev- 
olution by an appeal to Heaven as Locke does because that 
would be logically improper given the premises he works from; 
if he wants to retain a protective device, it must take a form 
other than an appeal to the right of rebellion. This is 
precisely what Calhoun's concurrent majority is intended to 
accomplish. It aims at eliminating the possibility of social 
rupture by ascertaining the lowest co=on denominator of policy 
which is acceptable to all interests involved; only then can 
that policy be put into effect* The concurrent majority is 
also more ambitious as a protective device in that it aims 
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to prevent social disintegration by collecting the sense of 
the community before putting policy into actionp rather than 
reacting to illegitimate abuse of power. The problem that he 
never actually comes to grips with, though it is implicit in 
everything he writes in the Disquisition, is how the various 
interests of the community are identified. Calhoun himself 
talks about geographical and economic interests, but once one 
begins to talk in this vein the problem arises as to where to 
draw the line. Logically, if all the interests of the community 
are to be consulted, this would necessarily involve taking 
account of the interests of each individual, a situation which, 
as Louis Hartz has maintainedp "unravels itself out into Locke's 
1,61 state of nature . What Calhoun has to say about this in the 
Disquisition is explored more fully in Chapter Nine. 
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